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Institutional investors have been evolving significantly in China since 1997 when 
they were formally introduced to China’s market. The influence of institutional 
investors on firm policies has been studied extensively (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Koh, 
2007; Yuan et al., 2008; Crane et al., 2016; Firth et al., 2016; Dyck et al., 2019). These 
studies mainly focus on the level of ownership by institutional investors, however they 
do not consider the influence of the controlling shareholders. In China’s firms, 
ownership is highly concentrated, and the controlling shareholders usually dominate the 
decision-making in firm policies. Therefore, the behaviours of institutional investors 
could be influenced by the controlling shareholders and could be related to their ability 
to compete with the controlling shareholders. This thesis examines the influence of 
large controlling shareholders on institutional investor behaviour and addresses the 
question: In China, what is the effect that institutional investors have on firm policies in 
the presence of the large controlling shareholders? 
Firstly, this thesis investigates the effects of institutional investors on firm overall 
corporate governance measured by CEO pay-performance relationship. Secondly, this 
thesis examines the influence of institutional investors on firm investment activities, 
specifically, the innovation performance. Finally, this thesis provides insights into their 
demand for accounting conservatism. Due to the different investment incentives of 
domestic institutional investors and foreign institutional investors, their impacts may be 
heterogeneous. Therefore, this thesis examines the effects of domestic mutual funds and 
qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) separately and more importantly, 
compares their effects.   
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With respect to the effects of institutional investors on firm overall corporate 
governance as measured by CEO pay-performance relationship, this thesis finds that the 
presence of domestic mutual funds can strengthen the positive pay-performance 
relationship, while QFIIs have no significant effects. These results indicate that 
domestic mutual funds could efficiently discipline managers’ behaviours and thereby 
improve overall corporate governance, while QFIIs could not exert significant influence 
on corporate governance. Moreover, the effects of domestic mutual funds are stronger 
when they ownership level is closer to that of the controlling shareholders, and are also 
stronger in non-state-owned enterprises (Non-SOEs), firms with a weaker industry 
tournament, and firms located in more developed regions.  
For firm innovation performance, both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs have 
positive effects. Their effects are not only determined by their ownership level, but also 
by their ability to contest with the controlling shareholders. It is found that when the 
ownership of domestic mutual funds is closer to that of the controlling shareholders, the 
contestability of the controlling shareholders is strengthened and this can enhance firm 
innovation. However, QFIIs do not have as significant contestability effects on firm 
innovation. Furthermore, the effects of contestability by domestic mutual funds are 
stronger in non-SOEs, firms without politically connected CEOs, firms facing more 
competitive markets and firms with less analyst coverage.  
It has been documented that accounting conservatism could mitigate agency 
problems between managers and shareholders, so equity investors usually demand 
conservative accounting, treating it as a governance device. However, as evidenced, 
domestic mutual funds could efficiently monitor managers’ behaviours in direct ways, 
therefore they may be less dependent on financial numbers to discipline managers. 
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Moreover, in China the large controlling shareholders usually adopt a lower level of 
accounting conservatism. In this context the requirement of institutional investors for 
conservative accounting would be weaker. The results show that domestic mutual funds 
have negative effects on accounting conservatism, whereas QFIIs have positive effects. 
Their effects are also subject to their relative ownership level to the controlling 
shareholders. The negative effects of domestic mutual funds and positive effects of 
QFIIs on accounting conservatism are stronger when their ownership level is closer to 
that of the controlling shareholders. Also, their influence on accounting conservatism is 
more significant in non-SOEs, firms with a higher ownership concentration and a lower 
level of information asymmetry. 
Overall, the monitoring role of domestic mutual funds is more efficient than that of 
QFIIs in China. Their effects are not only relevant to their ownership level, but more 
importantly are related to their ownership difference to the controlling shareholders. 
These results imply that the behaviour of institutional investors is subject to their 
identities, the controlling ownership, and the institutional environment.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and research questions 
During the past two decades, institutional investors have evolved substantially in 
the capital market and are playing an increasingly important role in affecting firm 
policies. Academics have paid considerable attention to the role that institutional 
investors play in the investee firms and have provided comprehensive empirical 
evidence. Compared with individual investors, institutional investors are more 
professional and sophisticated in collecting and processing information (Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; Jiang and Yuan, 2018). In addition, institutional investors are holding a 
relatively large percentage of shares and their investment portfolios are more diverse. 
With these advantages, institutional investors have incentives and capacity to influence 
a firm’s policies, such as dividend policy, earnings management, firm valuation, 
corporate social responsibility and firm performance (Short et al., 2002; Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003; Koh, 2007; Yuan et al., 2008; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012; Aghion et 
al., 2013; Crane et al., 2016; Firth et al., 2016; De-la-Hoz and Pombo, 2016; Dyck et al., 
2019).  
However, these studies mainly focus on the level of institutional ownership without 
considering the presence of the large controlling shareholders. It should be noted that 
unlike developed markets, ownership is highly concentrated in emerging markets and 
the large controlling shareholders usually play a dominant role in deciding firm policies 
for their own benefits. The behaviours of institutional investors, usually the non-
controlling shareholders, may be affected by the large controlling shareholders. Little 
attention has been given to the influence of the large controlling shareholders in 
emerging markets. The motivation for this thesis is to fill this void by examining 
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whether institutional investors could play an effective monitoring role and make some 
difference in emerging markets, and whether and how their effects are influenced by the 
controlling shareholders. 
This thesis focuses on the Chinese market, which is motivated by its unique 
emerging market institutional characteristics including a highly concentrated ownership 
structure, fast development, various types of institutional investors, and the large 
variation in institutional ownership. First, China has become the second largest 
economy in the world after the US, but it is still a representative emerging market. 
China has the unique institutional characteristics of emerging markets including the 
underdeveloped financial market, highly concentrated ownership structure, weak 
investor protection, and low level of law enforcement, which together may shape the 
incentives and behaviours of institutional investors. The findings drawn from China’s 
market could provide some implications for other emerging markets. More importantly, 
there exist large controlling shareholders in China’s listed firms including the 
government and families. This is the setting for the investigation of whether the effects 
of institutional investors in the investee firms are subject to the ownership level of the 
large controlling shareholders. Second, during the last two decades, institutional 
investors have been growing quickly in China’s capital market. There are various types 
of institutional investors with various owner identities such as mutual funds owned by 
local private entities, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) owned by 
foreigners, and other institutional investors that are usually owned by the government 
including banks, brokers, social securities and pension funds. These owners each have 
different investment incentives. The differences are particularly important for domestic 
and foreign institutional investors. Domestic institutional investors, such as mutual 
funds, are sophisticated and informed about the local firms, so they are able to have an 
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impact on firm performance or firm dividend policies (Yuan et al., 2008; Firth et al., 
2016). However, foreign institutional investors are faced with language and cultural 
barriers, which yield more severe information asymmetry (Kang and Kim 2010; 
Chakravarty et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2014; Luong et al., 2017). Thus, it is this variety in 
institutional investors in China that enables the different types of institutional investor 
to be examined. Third, the large variation of institutional ownership facilitates the 
investigation of the influence of their ownership relative to the largest controlling 
shareholders. 
Chapter 2 is the first study of this thesis, which is about the effects of institutional 
investors on CEO pay-performance relationship. Recent studies about the effects of 
institutional investors are mainly focused on firm policies that benefit institutional 
investors directly, such as earnings management (Sakaki et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2016) 
and dividend policy (Firth et al., 2016), and it is reported that institutional investors 
could have some influence on these policies. However, it is unknown whether 
institutional investors could improve overall corporate governance to benefit all the 
minority shareholders, particularly in the emerging market of China where investor 
protection is weak and the financial market is underdeveloped. In addition, to obtain 
private benefits through expropriation, controlling shareholders are less likely to align 
the interests of top executives and minority shareholders. With the presence of large 
controlling shareholders, institutional investors’ effects on corporate governance may 
not be straightforward. Therefore, by employing an important corporate governance 
indicator, CEO pay-performance relationship, this thesis first provides insights into the 
effects of institutional investors on overall corporate governance particularly in the 
presence of large controlling shareholders.   
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Chapter 3 is the second study of this thesis. It investigates the effects of control 
contestability by institutional investors on firm innovation performance. This 
investigation aims to detect the role that institutional investors play in disciplining 
managers’ investment behaviours and promoting economic development. In the last 
decade, China’s economy has been growing faster and it has aimed to be an innovative 
country. Institutional investors are professional in processing information and hold 
diverse portfolios; this makes them more likely to evaluate a firm’s performance from a 
long-term perspective and be less afraid of risk from firm investment failure. Hence, 
institutional investors intend to have some influence on firm innovation. However, in 
China, the effects of institutional investors on firm innovation may not be as 
straightforward as in developed markets: The underdeveloped financial market hampers 
firms’ ability to access external funds (Fan et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2017); and because 
of the lack of diversification, the large controlling shareholders are reluctant to invest in 
innovative projects bearing any risk (Minetti et al., 2015). Studies on multiple large 
shareholders (MLS) have shown that institutional investors may form control 
contestability of the controlling shareholders and thereby improve firm innovation. Thus, 
the effect of institutional investors on firm innovation may be subject to their ability to 
contest with the controlling shareholders. Furthermore, based on the controlling 
shareholders’ identity, China’s firms can be divided into two types: state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). The result of severe 
government intervention is that the investment activities are highly subject to 
government policies, and this is more severe in SOEs. Against this background, this 
thesis uses firm patent numbers as a measure of firm innovative performance, and then 
examines the influence of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation.  
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Chapter 4 is the third study of this thesis, which examines the effects of institutional 
investors on firm accounting conservatism. Firm accounting conservatism could benefit 
shareholders by mitigating agency problems (Ahmed and Deullman, 2007; Lara et al., 
2016) and reducing managers’ ability to overstate financial performance (Watts 2003a). 
These benefits motivate institutional investors to demand high accounting conservatism 
as a corporate governance device. However, institutional investors are able to discipline 
managers’ behaviour by taking advantage of their professional knowledge in processing 
information. Therefore, whether institutional investors still rely on conservative 
accounting to conduct their monitoring on managers is worth investigating. In addition, 
the high concentration of ownership makes the interest conflict between the controlling 
shareholders and other investors dominate in China’s firms. The controlling 
shareholders are usually dominant in firm policy making. Since controlling shareholders 
have incentives to lower accounting conservatism for their private benefits, accounting 
conservatism could be more beneficial to other investors such as creditors. Therefore, 
the demand of institutional investors for accounting conservatism could be influenced 
by the large controlling shareholders. This thesis thus is motivated to further look into 
the influence of institutional investors on accounting conservatism in the presence of 
large controlling shareholders in China.  
Based on the statement above, it is essential to investigate the role that institutional 
investors play in the large emerging market of China where there exists a high level of 
ownership concentration, different types of controlling shareholder, a large variation in 
institutional ownership, an underdeveloped financial market, and weak investor 
protection. The following section summarises the institutional characteristics in China 
and how they could shape the behaviours of institutional investors.   
24 
 
1.2 Institutional background  
1.2.1 Development of institutional investors 
Since the establishment of two stock exchanges, Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the early 1990s, the Chinese government has been trying 
hard to stabilise the stock market and promote its development. These two stock 
exchanges have developed into comprehensive exchanges with trading of A-shares, B-
shares, indices, funds, fixed income products and diversified derivative financial 
products. It is only about two decades since institutional investors emerged in China and 
they have now become important market participants. In 1997, the government issued 
the ‘Interim measures for the administration of securities investment funds’, which 
aimed to protect the rights of fund stakeholders and formally allowed institutional 
investors to trade common shares on the two stock exchanges. This document was 
replaced with ‘The measures for the administration of securities investment funds’ 
(amended 2012) by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
1
. Since then, 
domestic mutual funds have grown quickly in terms of number of fund management 
companies and total capitalization. Specifically, there were only 10 fund management 
companies managing 23 mutual funds at the end of 1999, while by the end of 2018, the 
number of fund management companies had increased to 120 managing 5,626 mutual 
funds
2
. Domestic mutual funds are now playing a “pillar role” of institutional investors 
in China. The average mutual fund ownership for China’s listed firms is around 4.2%. 
In Figure 1.1, it is shown that there is a notable increase in the number of firms which 
have domestic mutual funds as shareholders. 
                                                 
1
 Please see the link:  
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz/jjl/201402/t20140226_244348.html.  
2
 The mutual funds statistic data are announced by the Asset Management Association of China. Please 
see the link: http://www.amac.org.cn/tjsj/xysj/jjgssj/index.shtml. 
25 
 
Mutual funds are generally sophisticated with professional knowledge and are able 
to collect and process firm information (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Boone and White, 
2015; Doidge et al., 2015; Ferreira et al., 2017). Many studies have extensively 
examined shareholder activism by institutional investors in both developed markets and 
emerging markets (Gillan and Starks, 2000; David et al., 2001; Hartzell and Starks, 
2003; Yuan et al., 2008; Helwege et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2014; Firth et al., 2016; 
Cvijanović et al., 2016; Moreno et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019). These studies evidenced 
that domestic mutual funds have strong activism in improving corporate governance and 
influencing firm policies, such as reducing the incidence of modified audit opinions 
(Chan et al., 2014), enhancing managerial efficiency and the quality of corporate 
decision-making (Yuan et al., 2009), increasing forced CEO turnover (Helwege et al., 
2012) and improving corporate social responsibility (Li et al., 2019). 
Figure 1.1 Number of firms with mutual funds and QFIIs as shareholders  





To further promote the development of the stock market, improve the corporate 
governance of listed firms, and regulate investment activities, in 2002 the People’s 























Commission (CSRC) jointly issued the ‘Measures for the administration of domestic 
securities investment of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs)’ (amended in 
2006)
3
. In 2003, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) were formally 
introduced to the Chinese stock exchanges and since then they have increased 
substantially. There were only 49 QFIIs at the end of 2007, while by May 2012 this 
number had increased to 138, and further increased to 312 by August 2019
4
. The growth 
of QFIIs in China has experienced several stages with strict regulations from the 
Chinese government in terms of ownership held in listed firms and their overall 
investment quota. In principal, the ownership held by a single QFII in a listed firm is 
not allowed to exceed 10%, and the total ownership of all the QFIIs in a listed firm is 
not allowed to exceed 30%
5
. By the end of 2018, the total investment quota was 
restricted to 150 billion USD, and this had doubled to 300 billion USD in January 2019
6
. 
However, this strict regulation was released in September 2019 when the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) announced the scrapping of the QFIIs 
investment quota, indicating the free flow of QFII investment
7
. The average QFII 
ownership for China’s listed firms is around 1.3%. Meanwhile, as indicated in Figure 
1.1 above, the number of investee firms of QFIIs has been increasing since they were 
introduced. Existing literature shows that the foreign institutional investors also have 
the strong incentives to exert monitoring due to their independence from local 
                                                 
3
 Please see the link: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz/jjl/201012/t20101231_189872.html.  
4
 The QFIIs statistic data are available on web page of China Securities Regulatory Commission and State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange. Please refer to the following links: 
http://www.safe.gov.cn/safe/2007/1209/4380.html, http://www.safe.gov.cn/safe/2012/0520/4771.html and 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306205/201511/t20151106_286098.htm. 
5
 Please see details in Measures for the Administration of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (2012) 
at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/jj/hgjw/201310/t20131021_236658.html. 
6
 Please see: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-02/01/c_137790411.htm. 
7
 Please see: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/16/c_138396063.htm. 
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management and expertise in monitoring firms (Aghion et al., 2013; Luong et al., 2017; 
Rong et al., 2017; Bena et al., 2017). 
In addition to domestic mutual funds and QFIIs, there are other types of 
institutional investors simultaneously and actively investing in the Chinese stock market 
including banks, insurance companies, social security funds, brokers, entrust companies, 
and financial companies. These institutional investors mainly emerged in the early 
2000s. For example, the insurance companies’ investment funds were allowed to enter 
the market after the issue of ‘Interim measures for the administration of insurance 
companies’ security funds investment’ in 1999 by the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission
8
. In November 2000, the National Council for Social Security Fund 
(NACSSEF) was established to manage the social security fund. In 2001, the Ministry 
of Finance of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security
9
 jointly issued the ‘Interim measures for the administration of national social 
security fund investment’
 10
, which formally allowed the social security fund to enter the 
market. The investment of the social security fund is strictly constrained that for one 
particular fund manager, it is not allowed to invest more than 10% of the managed 
assets in one company
11
. The average aggregated ownership by these institutional 
investors is 2.8%. Since these institutional investors are usually controlled by the 
government, they are therefore mostly passive investors that hold their ownership due to 
business connections with firms. In line with the Commercial Bank law
12
, since 2003, 
                                                 
8
 In 2018, China Insurance Regulatory Commission was merged with China Banking Regulatory 
Commission to become China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission. 
9
 In 2008, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security was merged with the Ministry of Human Resources 
to become the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China. 
10
 Please see the link: http://www.ssf.gov.cn/cwsj/ndbg/201204/t20120425_3978.html . 
11
Please see the regulation in ‘Interim measures for the administration of national social security fund 
investment’ from the following link:  
http://www.scio.gov.cn/32344/32345/33969/34130/xgzc34136/Document/1466812/1466812.htm. 
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banks are not allowed to hold the common shares of listed firms in China, so banks can 
only hold shares that are pledged by firms as collateral for bank loans, and these shares 
are forced to be disposed in two years.  
In summary, there are three main types of institutional investors based on the 
identities of owners. The first type is domestic mutual funds that are owned by domestic 
non-government institutions, the second type is QFIIs that are owned by foreign 
investors, and the third type includes all the other domestic institutional investors such 
as brokers, banks, insurance companies, social security funds, entrust and financial 
companies. Since these institutional investors have different characteristics including 
investment objectives and owner identities, and are faced with different regulations, it is 
expected that their influence in the investee firms will differ.  
This thesis aims to compare the effects of domestic institutional investors and 
foreign institutional investors in China where there exists high ownership concentration. 
Domestic mutual funds have incentives and are able to influence firm policies, because 
they are familiar with the investee firms, and are also sophisticated investors who have 
professional knowledge in collecting and processing information. Compared with 
domestic mutual funds, QFIIs are faced with more information asymmetry because they 
have different culture and language with that in China (Liu et al., 2014; Luong et al., 
2017). QFIIs thus may not be able to influence firm policies efficiently as domestic 
mutual funds. Other institutional investors (such as banks and insurance companies etc.) 
have very weak incentives to monitor managers or influence firm policies, given that 
they are dependent institutional investors with business ties with the investee firms. For 
example, banks are only allowed to hold shares that are pledged by firms as collateral 
for bank loans in case of default, and these shares are forced to be disposed within two 
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years (Commercial Bank law). Therefore, this thesis will compare the different effects 
of domestic mutual funds and QFIIs on corporate activities, and will incorporate the 
effects of other institutional investors in a later section in empirical analysis. 
1.2.2 Ownership structure in China 
In 1978, an economic reform commenced in an attempt to introduce a market-
oriented economy to replace the centrally planned economy. As the main part of the 
reformation, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were transformed from traditional SOEs 
into profitable and modernized enterprises. Before this period, all of China’s firms were 
controlled by the central government. Since the reformation commenced, state 
ownership has been gradually released and SOEs are becoming joint-stock companies 
with private entities and foreign investors holding some ownership. To improve 
investment efficiency, in early 1980, the government adopted the “loan for (fiscal) grant” 
(bo gai dai) scheme, the process in which the government reduces free funding but 
makes loans to enterprises. This scheme hardens the budget constraints faced by SOEs 
and further makes SOEs be market-profit oriented. 
In the early 1990s, the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange 
were established. Since then, SOEs have been further privatised by issuing shares to the 
public and being listed on the stock exchanges. According to the regulations of the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the listed firms on these two stock 
exchanges are allowed to issue three types of shares: state shares, legal person shares, 
and public common shares. The state shares are converted from state-owned assets, 
which are under the control of the State Asset Management Bureau (SAMB). Legal 
person shares are held by institutions which were owners of the listed firms before they 
are listed on the stock exchange. Both state shares and legal person shares were non-
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tradable, except in some special situations until 2005, when split share structure reform 
was launched. This reform aimed to transform non-tradable shares into tradable shares, 
and most of the firms had finished this reform before 2007. Public common shares 
traded on China’s two stock exchanges include A-shares and B-shares, which are 
initially issued to Chinese residents and foreign investors, respectively. Another type of 
common shares is H-share, which are issued by domestic Chinese companies on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Chinese people on the mainland were not allowed to trade 
H-shares before 2014 when the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect was introduced. 
Since then, institutional investors on mainland China have been allowed to trade H-
shares.  
Ownership in China’s firms is highly concentrated and there exist largest 
shareholders and controlling shareholders. In most cases, the controlling shareholder 
controls the firm directly, so the controlling shareholder is just the largest shareholder. 
In some other cases, the controlling shareholders control the firm indirectly through a 
pyramid structure. For example, company A holds 60% of the ownership of company B 
and company B holds 50% of company C. In this situation, company A is the 
controlling shareholder of company C. Company A owns 50% of the control rights of 
company C, and 30% of cash flow rights of company C.  
In China, as many listed firms are reformed SOEs, but the state is still the ultimate 
controlling shareholder. Among the three types of shares introduced above, the state and 
legal persons own about one‐third each of capitalization in the domestic market, and the 
remaining capitalization is owned by a large number of individuals and institutions. 
Although legal persons own a similar proportion of the market capitalization with the 
state, it does not mean they are controlling shareholders because the ownership of legal 
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persons is an aggregated value. Thus, the most important type of controlling 
shareholders in China’s listed firms is the state. The proportion of firms under the 
control of the state is around 50%. The other types of controlling shareholders include 
families (25%), individuals (13%), co-founders (7%), collectives (3%) and private 
institutions (1%). The remaining 1% are widely held firms. The average ownership held 
by the controlling shareholders in the sample is 36%, with the maximum value of 89%. 
Therefore, controlling shareholders usually have incentives to monitor CEOs and 
dominate decision-makings in firm policies (Firth et al., 2006; Cao et al., 2011). 
Moreover, they have the incentives to pursue private benefits and expropriate from 
other shareholders to enjoy private benefits of control (Faccio and Lang, 2002; 
Claessens et al., 2002; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Faccio et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2018).  
In addition, the controlling shareholders are concentrated on industries. State-
controlled firms are primarily concentrated on the electronic power and coal, aerospace 
and military, and machinery industries, which are all considered to have political and 
strategic importance for the central Chinese government. Other industries such as high-
tech and catering industries are mainly privately controlled by families, co-founders, 
and collectives etc. Foreign institutional investors have a preference for state-controlled 
sectors due to the lower requirement for local knowledge, while the portfolios of 
domestic mutual funds are distributed more evenly (Liu et al., 2014). 
In China, institutional investors are not controlling shareholders given the lower 
level of their ownership. Both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs are controlled by non-
government entities, and other types of the institutional investors are controlled by the 
government related entities. 
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1.3 Methodology and key findings 
The main methodology used in this thesis is empirical analysis. The sample consists 
of all the listed firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE). All the required data are obtained from the Chinese Stock Market 
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which is a frequently used data source 
for studies on corporate governance in the Chinese market (Fan et al., 2007; Firth et al., 
2016; Zhang et al., 2016). Specifically, institutional ownership data are derived from the 
“Institutional Investor” section, firm innovation data are from the “Listed Firm’s Patents” 
section and all the required data for calculating firm accounting conservatism are 
collected from the “China Listed Firms Research Series” section. 
1.3.1 Institutional investors, CEO pay-performance relationship 
Chapter 2 tests the effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance 
relationship by firstly constructing a linear regression model. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of CEO’s total cash compensation including salary, bonus and 
other cash compensation. The key independent variables include the ownership of 
domestic mutual funds and the ownership of QFIIs. To examine the effects of the 
controlling shareholders on institutional investors’ behaviour, two continuous variables 
are constructed: one is the ratio of domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling 
shareholders’ ownership; the other is the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling 
shareholders’ ownership. To illustrate the effects of institutional investors on the CEO 
pay-performance relationship, the interactive term between mutual funds’ ownership 
and firm performance measured by return on assets ratio (ROA) as well as the 
interactive term between QFIIs’ ownership and ROA are included in the model. The 
coefficients of these two interactive variables indicate the impact of domestic mutual 
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funds and QFIIs respectively on the CEO pay-performance relationship. The estimation 
method of the main regression is a firm fixed-effects model to address the concern that 
there may be some unobservable firm-level characteristics. Secondly, to test the effects 
of state ownership on institutional investors’ monitoring on managers, the main 
regression model is re-estimated using subsamples of SOEs and non-SOEs. To test the 
potential channels through which institutional investors influence CEO pay-
performance relationship, the main regression model is further re-estimated in firms 
with good or poor corporate governance by employing industry tournament as a proxy 
for corporate governance. To test whether the influence of institutional investors is 
dependent on the development of the legal system and investor protection, the prime 
question is examined in both more developed and less developed regions. Thirdly, a 
change regression model, Heckman two-stage method and propensity score matching 
(PSM) method are employed to address endogenous issues. 
Chapter 2 finds that domestic mutual funds’ ownership has positive effects on CEO 
pay-performance relationship and the positive effects are stronger when their ownership 
is closer to the controlling shareholders’ ownership. However, QFIIs have no significant 
effects on CEO pay-performance relationship. It is also evidenced that the improvement 
of corporate governance is an important channel through which domestic mutual funds 
positively affect CEO pay-performance relationship. 
1.3.2 Institutional investors and firm innovation 
Chapter 3 examines the effects of institutional investors’ contestability of the 
controlling shareholders on firm innovation performance by employing firm patent data 
as the measure of firm innovation. In the empirical regression model, the dependent 
variable is firm innovation, represented by the natural logarithm of the number of firm 
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patent applications. The key independent variables are contestability by mutual funds 
and QFIIs. To measure contestability, this thesis firstly uses the ratio of institutional 
investors’ ownership level to that of the controlling shareholders. Secondly, this thesis 
uses ownership dispersion as a proxy for contestability by institutional investors. The 
ownership dispersion is defined as the difference in ownership level between controlling 
shareholders and mutual funds (or QFIIs) divided by the sum of their ownerships. For 
the main regression model, the ordinary least square (OLS) method is initially employed 
as the estimation method. The coefficients of these contestability measures reflect the 
influence of institutional investors on firm innovation performance. To test the 
robustness of the main results, this chapter further re-estimated the main regression 
model using alternative firm innovation measurements: the Heckman two-stage method, 
the propensity score matching (PSM) method, and change regressions are applied to 
mitigate endogenous concerns. 
Chapter 3 finds that the effects of institutional investors on firm innovation are not 
only determined by their ownership level but also subject to their ability to contest with 
the controlling shareholders, i.e. contestability of the controlling shareholders. Domestic 
mutual funds’ contestability has positive effects on firm innovation, while QFIIs have 
no such contestability effects. 
1.3.3 Institutional investors and firm accounting conservatism 
Chapter 4 examines the effects of institutional investors on firm accounting 
conservatism. Following previous studies (Chen et al., 2013; Cullinan et al., 2012), the 
method developed by Khan and Watts (2009) is applied to calculate accounting 
conservatism, namely C_Score. After the accounting conservatism (C_Score) data are 
obtained, a regression model with C_Score as the dependent variable, institutional 
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ownership as the independent variable and other control variables is constructed. The 
method to measure the influence of the controlling shareholders is the same as that in 
Chapter 3. To mitigate the concern that there may be some unobservable firm-level 
characteristics, a firm fixed-effects model is applied as the estimation method. 
Furthermore, to mitigate endogenous concerns, the PSM method and 2SLS model are 
employed. 
The study finds a significant negative relationship between domestic mutual funds’ 
ownership and accounting conservatism, while the QFIIs’ ownership is positively 
related to accounting conservatism. The negative effects of domestic mutual funds and 
the positive effects of QFIIs are both stronger when their ownership level is closer to 
that of the controlling shareholders. Additional evidences suggest that the negative 
effects of domestic mutual funds and positive effects of QFIIs are stronger in non-state-
owned firms, firms with higher level of ownership concentration and lower level of 
information asymmetry. 
1.4 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to existing literature in several ways. Firstly, it adds to the 
extant literature by examining the effects of institutional investors on firm policies in 
emerging markets. Previous studies on the effects of institutional investors are mainly 
focused on developed countries (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Aghion et al., 2013; 
Ramalingegowda and Yu 2012); this thesis provides insights into China, the largest 
emerging market. It provides evidence on whether institutional investors can exert 
influence on investee firms against the background of high ownership concentration, 
weak investor protection and in an emerging market. 
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Secondly, this thesis advances the understanding of the effects of institutional 
investors in China. The results indicate that in China, the influence of institutional 
investors is not only determined by their ownership level, but also is subject to the 
difference of their ownership to that of the controlling shareholders. Specifically, this 
thesis find that when the ownership level of domestic mutual funds is closer to that of 
the controlling shareholders, domestic mutual funds have incentives to contend with the 
controlling shareholder in monitoring managers through strengthening the CEO pay-
performance relationship, and in improving firm innovation performance. At the same 
time, their incentives to lower firm accounting conservatism become stronger.  
Thirdly, this thesis adds to the corpus of studies investigating the behaviours of 
institutional investors by discussing the heterogeneity of domestic institutional investors 
and foreign institutional investors. The empirical evidence shows that domestic mutual 
funds are professional in processing information and have information advantages. This 
enables them to have an effective monitoring role on managerial behaviours by 
strengthening the CEO pay-performance relationship and improving firm innovation 
investment. Furthermore, due to their ability to monitor managers directly, they are less 
dependent on financial numbers and high accounting conservatism. In contrast, due to 
cultural and language barriers, foreign institutional investors are faced with more server 
information asymmetry, so their direct monitoring role is less effective and thus they 
tend to require high accounting conservatism. 
Finally, this thesis gives a practical understanding of the role of institutional 
investors in investee firms in the context of China. 
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1.5 Structure of this thesis  
This thesis consists of five chapters: Chapter 1 is introduction, which describes the 
motivation for this research, research questions, related institutional background, 
methodology, key findings and contributions. Chapters 2 to 4 present the three main 
studies. Specifically, chapter 2 examines whether and how institutional investors could 
improve corporate governance by using CEO pay-performance relationship as an 
indicator. The findings from this chapter answer the question: whether institutional 
investors could play an effective monitoring role in improving corporate governance 
and strengthening CEO pay-performance. Chapter 3 examines the effects of institutional 
investors’ contestability of the controlling shareholders on firm innovation. Aghion et al. 
(2013) documented that in the US, institutional investors could improve firm innovation. 
This chapter aims to answer this question for the Chinese market that has large 
controlling shareholders who are reluctant to invest in innovative projects (Minetti et al., 
2015). Chapter 4 examines the demand of institutional investors for accounting 
conservatism.  
Chapters 2 to 4 commence with an introduction of the research question, followed 
by a background summary and the proposed hypotheses before the empirical analysis is 
presented. Following hypotheses, some basic statistics are presented for the key 
variables used in the empirical analysis. The hypotheses are examined by employing 
regression analyses. Some robustness tests are carried out and endogenous issues are 
addressed following the main regression results. Chapter 5 provides some conclusions 





Chapter 2 Institutional investors, controlling shareholders and 
CEO pay-performance relationship  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the effects of institutional investors on CEO pay-performance 
relationship in the emerging market of China. Over the past few decades, the growth of 
institutional investors has become a global phenomenon and they play an important role 
in mitigating information asymmetry and monitoring managers
13
. This role became 
even more prominent after the 2008 global financial crisis when institutional investors 
were required to exert their influence on management proposals including those related 
to CEO compensation (OECD, 2009).  
Since then, a number of studies have revealed explicit evidence on the roles played 
by institutional investors in developed markets. They show that institutional investors 
are effective monitors and can mitigate information asymmetry
14
. Meanwhile, other 
studies have examined the roles of institutional investors in emerging markets and 
document that institutional investors can affect firm performance/valuation (Yuan et al., 
2008; Lin and Fu, 2017), the quality of financial reporting (Chan et al., 2014), firm 
innovation (Rong et al., 2017) and dividend policy (Firth et al., 2016; Cao et al., 2017). 
However, to the best of my knowledge, it is still unclear whether institutional investors 
could discipline managers’ behaviors and influence the overall corporate governance in 
the interests of all the other minority shareholders. It is expected that this issue might be 
more prominent and relevant in emerging markets. On the one hand, the institutional 
                                                 
13
 See, for example, Hartzell and Starks (2003), Aggarwal et al. (2005), Shin and Seo (2011), Helwege et 
al. (2012), Boone and White (2015), Bena et al. (2017) and Chen and Keung (2018). 
14
 See, for example, Koh (2007), Ferreira and Matos (2008), Boehmer and Kelley (2009), Fich et al. 
(2015), Cornett et al. (2007) and Borochin and Yang (2017). 
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environment is still underdeveloped and investor protection legislation is weaker in 
emerging markets. Thus, whether the expected functions of institutional investors can be 
ensured is unclear, as these concerns directly shape the incentives and behaviors of 
institutional investors. On the other hand, ownership concentration is usually a prevalent 
aspect in emerging markets, and controlling shareholders usually make the final 
decisions regarding firm policies. Institutional investors may have been captured by 
controlling shareholders and thus their independence is compromised, so their 
monitoring role is no longer as straightforward. 
This chapter empirically investigates whether and how institutional investors 
monitor CEO compensation in China, the largest emerging market. This investigation is 
motivated by several strands of literature. First, a series of studies suggest that 
institutional investors can potentially affect corporate compensation schemes (Hartzell 
and Starks, 2003; Croci et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2015; Golebiowska and Urbanek, 
2016), and these impacts are different due to differing investment horizons, the cost of 
monitoring, and the business relationships with their portfolio firms (Chowdhury and 
Wang, 2009; Shin and Seo, 2011; Zhu et al., 2017). Since these studies mainly focus on 
developed markets, it is really unknown whether it is the case in China with poor 
investor protection and prevailing ownership concentration.  
Second, it has been argued that the role of shareholders is mainly attributed to their 
identities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2008; Lin et al., 
2011), so a more rigorous investigation of institutional investor heterogeneity is 
required. In China’s stock markets, there are various kinds of institutional investors with 
different ownership identities, such as private institutions, governments, and foreign 
institutions. This setting can thus provide a sufficient tension where the different 
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monitoring roles exerted by various types of institutional investors can be investigated.   
Third, existing studies document that if firms have several shareholders with 
substantial ownership, they have the incentive to monitor the controlling shareholders to 
reduce the associated expropriation and moral hazard activities (Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon, 2000; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Jiang et al., 2018). However, it is unclear 
whether the effectiveness of monitoring by other large shareholders can be attributed to 
the identities of controlling shareholders. Chinese listed firms can be divided into state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs, and these controlling shareholders have 
different incentives for monitoring CEO compensation (Kato and Long, 2006; Cao et 
al., 2011). In the spirit of these studies, this chapter further investigates how institutional 
investors respond to controlling shareholder’s ownership.  
It has been argued that CEO compensation incentives are not only determined by 
observed CEO characteristics, but also determined by unobserved characteristics such 
as CEO psychological traits and personality. Coles and Li (2016, 2018) further 
document that these unobserved CEO characteristics can better explain the variations of 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Therefore, to address this concern, a firm-fixed 
effects model is employed as estimation method in the empirical analysis. Using a 
sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2015, the following findings are obtained. 
First, the presence of domestic mutual funds can strengthen the relationship between 
CEO pay and firm accounting performance (measured by ROA), and such positive 
effects are stronger when their ownership becomes closer to that of the controlling 
shareholders. However, Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) wield no 
significant effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship. Second, empirical results 
show that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds are more pronounced in non-
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SOEs than in SOEs, particularly the central government controlled SOEs. Third, 
additional analysis reveals that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds are 
stronger in firms located in more developed regions or in firms with weaker industry 
tournament, which supports the assertion that mutual funds strengthen the CEO pay-
performance relationship by improving corporate governance. The overall results are 
robust when taking the potential endogeneity into consideration and using alternative 
measures of executive compensation.  
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature on this topic. First, over 
the last decade many studies have examined shareholder activism by institutional 
investors in developed markets (Smith 1996; Cvijanović et al., 2016; Gillan and Starks, 
2000). There are also a large number of studies investigating the influence of 
institutional investors in emerging markets (e.g., Yuan et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2016; 
Lin and Fu, 2017; Rong et al., 2017). However, these studies on emerging markets only 
examine the effects of institutional investors’ activism on firm performance or firm 
policies (e.g., dividend policy) that could benefit institutional investors directly (Firth et 
al., 2016). As a complement to their studies, this chapter examines how institutional 
investors affect corporate governance, in particular the CEO pay-performance 
relationship in China. Moreover, studies from developed countries or international 
markets document that foreign institutional investors have a positive effect on 
enhancing corporate governance (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Luong et al., 2017), 
whereas this chapter finds some contrasting evidence that QFIIs exert no significant 
effect on corporate governance in China due to its different and unique culture (a 
relationship-based economy), different dialects and government intervention in the 
economy. This study therefore advances the understanding of the real effects that 
domestic and foreign institutional investors have on corporate governance.  
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Second, this work builds on literature that examines shareholders’ influence on 
corporate governance (Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009). By focusing on the 
institutional investors who are usually non-controlling shareholders, this chapter 
provides direct evidence that their influence on the CEO pay-performance relationship 
depends largely on their relative ownership to controlling shareholders, which is 
consistent with arguments made by Firth et al. (2010) and Huang and Zhu (2015). This 
chapter finds that the monitoring effects of institutional investors depend on their 
ownership, as well as the difference in ownership compared to controlling shareholders.   
Third, this study also adds to literature that examines the effect of identity of 
shareholders on the CEO pay-performance relationship (Kato and Long, 2006; Conyon 
and He, 2011). From the perspective of ownership types, this chapter examines the 
effects of institutional investors by distinguishing different types of owners because this 
is relevant to their behaviours and provides evidence of how comprehensive 
institutional investors work in emerging markets.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops 
hypotheses. Section 2.3 introduces the data and method of analysis. Section 2.4 presents 
the main empirical results. Section 2.5 reports the results after addressing endogeneity 
issues and other robustness tests and finally, section 2.6 draws some conclusions.  
2.2 Hypotheses development 
2.2.1 Institutional investors and CEO pay-performance in China 
In the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the incentives and behaviours of 
institutional investors depend largely on their identities. It is thus of great significance 
to distinguish the types of institutional investors for investigating their effects in the 
43 
 
investee firms (Borochin and Yang, 2017). According to the descriptions in the section 
1.2.1, this chapter mainly identifies both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs.  
It has been well documented that institutional investors serve the monitoring role in 
mitigating the agency problem between managers and shareholders, thus improving the 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Almazan et al., 2003). 
Domestic mutual funds in China are controlled by domestic private institutions whose 
main objective is to maximize portfolio returns. Moreover, domestic mutual funds are 
becoming large, better-informed and more active shareholders. Therefore, domestic 
mutual funds are similar to their counterparts in developed markets and are able to exert 
influence on firms’ decisions. It is expected that domestic mutual funds have positive 
effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship for the following several reasons.  
First, domestic mutual funds do not have business connections with their portfolio 
firms, so their monitoring activities are less sensitive to pressure and face less conflict 
of interest with their portfolio firms (Yuan et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2014). Thus, domestic 
mutual funds have strong incentives to restrain managerial opportunistic behaviours and 
impose a strong dependence of CEO pay on firm performance (Cornett et al., 2007). 
Moreover, since domestic mutual funds hold a relatively large percentage of shares, 
they can also place more exit threat on investee firms by voting with their feet. For this 
reason, the board prefers to make decisions that favour mutual funds.  
Second, the compensation of mutual funds’ managers is not only related to their 
funds’ size but also linked to the incremental value of their funds’ assets (shares), which 
directly reflect the performance of the investee firms. So mutual funds’ managers are 
concerned about the performance of their investee firms and are likely to impose 
disciplinary activities over CEOs.  
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Third, professional skills in analyzing information enable investors to influence 
firms (Borochin and Yang, 2017; Jiang and Yuan, 2018). Domestic mutual funds are 
considered to have expertise and are professional in gathering and processing 
information. Their professional information processing helps mitigate information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders, which makes it easier for shareholders 
to monitor managers’ behavior (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). There is a suspicion that 
transient investors have short investment horizons and consequently are unlikely to 
collect and analyze firm information. However, this chapter argues that transient 
investors could benefit from private information, as collecting/analyzing private 
information enables them to trade ahead of firm-specific news and gain from short-term 
price movements or avoid sudden loss (Boone and White, 2015).  
Fourth, domestic mutual funds have reputational concerns because they are usually 
expected to be monitors in firms. It is generally agreed that a weaker association 
between CEO pay and firm performance signals a weak corporate governance and poor 
monitoring system towards the stock markets. Therefore, a weaker relationship between 
CEO pay and firm performance may lead to the reputational detriment of domestic 
mutual funds. To protect their reputation, domestic mutual funds tend to strengthen the 
CEO pay and performance relationship, so the following hypothesis is formed:  
H1a: Domestic mutual funds have positive effects on the CEO pay-performance 
relationship. 
With respect to QFIIs which are owned by foreigners, it has been extensively 
documented that they are also effective monitors of firm management by providing 
more sophisticated knowledge and advanced management skills (Ferreira and Matos, 
2008; Huang and Zhu, 2015; Firth et al., 2016; Bena et al., 2017). However, because 
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QFIIs are less familiar with the unique institutional environment of China, such as 
relationship-based economy, many regional dialects spoken and different accounting 
standards (Liu et al., 2014; Zou et al., 2016; Luong et al., 2017), they do not have the 
ability to handle issues with their invested firms in comparison with their domestic 
counterparty – domestic mutual funds. It is proposed that the expected significant and 
beneficial effects of QFIIs on enhancing the positive relationship between CEO pay and 
firm performance could be seriously compromised for the reasons set out below.  
First, unlike developed countries, information asymmetry is severe in China’s 
market due to both insider control and weak requirement for disclosure (Yuan et al., 
2009). In the spirit of Bae et al. (2008) and Ferreira et al. (2017), foreign investors may 
be less informed about China’s firms than domestic investors. Coupled with the fact that 
the Chinese language is not spoken worldwide (Liu et al., 2014), QFIIs are less efficient 
at processing and comprehending information and thus face more severe information 
asymmetry when investing in China.  
Second, the Chinese economy is highly controlled by the central and local 
governments and imbedded within a culture traditionally based on relationships, which 
means that the key element to success in business is to build and maintain a relationship 
with government (Shen et al., 2019; Li et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014). 
Unlike domestic investors, it is harder for foreign investors to cooperate with China’s 
regulators or establish valid connections with government representatives, and this may 
undermine their expected efficient monitoring. If these two reasons are combined, QFIIs 
may have a weaker effect on enhancing the CEO pay-performance relationship. This 
chapter has the following hypothesis: 
H1b: QFIIs may have weaker effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship.  
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Moreover, an evolving literature on multiple large shareholders (MLS) asserts that 
other large shareholders can serve efficient monitoring in curbing the expropriation by 
controlling shareholders, achieved through forming coalitions with other large 
stakeholders or competing for control by attracting minority shareholders. This becomes 
stronger when the ownership held by these large shareholders is closer to the ownership 
held by the controlling shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2008, 2009; Mishra, 2011; Ben-
Nasr et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2018). In China, ownership of a business is usually 
concentrated in the hands of controlling shareholders, and domestic mutual funds are 
usually other large shareholders. Thus, the monitoring influence of domestic mutual 
funds is also subject to the balance of power between their ownership and that of 
controlling shareholders. Following the MLS literature, this chapter conjectures that 
when domestic mutual funds present as one of the large shareholders and hold closer 
ownership to that of the controlling shareholders, they are more likely to monitor the 
CEO pay-performance relationship better. Therefore, this chapter puts forward the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: The positive effect of domestic mutual funds on the CEO pay-performance 
relationship is stronger when the difference in ownership between domestic mutual 
funds and the controlling shareholders decreases. 
2.2.2 The effect of institutional investors in SOEs and non-SOEs 
According to the above discussion, the effect of institutional investors is more 
likely to be captured by controlling shareholders, so this chapter also conjectures that 
the effects that institutional investors have on the CEO pay-performance relationship are 
subject to the types of controlling shareholders. Chinese listed firms can be divided into 
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs (Peng et al., 2017). SOEs are controlled 
by different levels of government (Kong et al., 2019). Multi-task theory contends that 
SOEs function more like the institutions of governments and seek to achieve multiple 
objectives such as improving production, maintaining social stability and keeping 
employment (Chang and Wong, 2009; Fan et al., 2013). Therefore, CEO pay in SOEs 
does not dependent solely on firm performance, which weakens the relationship 
between CEO pay and firm performance. Moreover, CEOs in Chinese SOEs have other 
incentives to consider such as political promotion which also weakens the relationship 
between CEO pay and firm performance. However, non-SOEs are controlled by private 
sector entities who strive to maximize firm value and face less government intervention 
when making decisions (Chen et al., 2011). This requires a stronger relationship 
between CEO pay and firm performance in non-SOEs, which provides sufficient 
incentive for CEOs to perform well.  
In addition, since 1978, Chinese SOEs have experienced a series of privatization 
and corporatization reforms when the government awarded sufficient autonomy to 
enterprises and relinquished its control over some SOEs to a large extent. Consequently, 
SOEs are becoming market-oriented and aim to maximize profitability, and 
compensation of executives in SOEs is becoming more aligned to profits and sales. 
However, this is more likely to be the case in those SOEs controlled by the local 
governments (Chen et al., 2009; Cao et al., 2011), rather than in those SOEs controlled 
by the central government. In particular, central SOEs are still under the absolute 
control of the government which has certain political and strategic objectives, such as 
maintaining its monopoly over some sensitive industries. So their CEO compensation 
incentives are determined by the government, and less likely to be influenced by the 
institutional investors. In this sense, it is expected that institutional investors can affect 
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the CEO pay-performance relationship in local SOEs, but have no effect on the CEO 
pay-performance relationship in central SOEs. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
formed: 
H3: The influence of domestic mutual funds on the CEO pay-performance 
relationship is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs, particularly than in central 
government controlled SOEs. 
2.3 Data and methodology 
2.3.1 Data and sample selection 
The sample of empirical analysis includes firms listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2005 to 2015. The 
sample year starts from 2005 when individual executive compensation began to be 
disclosed in annual reports, but only the total compensation received by the top three 
executives was reported before 2005. From the total population of firms, this chapter 
excludes those flagged with ST and *ST (Special Treatment), firms from the finance 
industry and firms with missing information. The final sample consists of 1,960 firms 
and 15,613 firm-year observations. All the data are collected from the Chinese Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.  
2.3.2 Institutional investors and ownership measurements 
Empirically, three dimensions are applied to measure institutional investors’ 
ownership. First, to denote whether a firm has institutional investors as common 
shareholders, two dummy variables are created, Mutuald and QFIId, which are equal to 
1 if a firm has domestic mutual funds and QFIIs as the common shareholders, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise. Second, to denote the level of ownership held by 
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institutional investors, two continuous variables are created, Mutual and QFII, which 
are defined as the percentage of ownership held by domestic mutual funds and QFIIs, 
respectively. Third, to denote the difference in ownership between institutional 
investors and controlling shareholders, two continuous variables are created, 
Mutualratio and QFIIratio, which are defined as the ratio of ownership held by 
domestic mutual funds and QFIIs to the ownership held by the controlling shareholders, 
respectively. The higher these two ratios are, the smaller the difference in ownership 
between institutional investors and controlling shareholders is.  
2.3.3 Model 
In the empirical analysis, the following regression equation is used to examine the 
effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay and firm performance relationship, 
which is reflected by the coefficients of interactive terms: 
CEOpayi,t=β0+ β1Mutuali,t+ β2QFIIi,t+ β3ROAi,t-1+ β4Mutuali,t*ROAi,t-1 
                +β5QFIIi,t*ROAi,t-1+ β6Otherinsi,t+ β7Asseti,t+ β8Leveragei,t+ β9Boardi,t 
                       + β10Indepi,t + β11Controllingi,t+ β12CEOagei,t 
                      +Dummy(year)+εi,t                                                                                  (2.1)                                                                             
where CEOpay represents the compensation of CEOs as measured by the natural 
logarithm of CEO’s total cash compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonus and 
other cash compensation. Mutual and QFII represent domestic and foreign institutional 
ownerships, respectively, which are discussed in section 2.3.2. ROA is return on assets 
calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets, which serves to measure firm 
performance. To reflect the logical influence of performance on CEO pay, this chapter 
uses one-year lagged performance as an independent variable in the regression analysis 
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so that the sample size for the regression analysis should be reduced. β4 and β5 are used 
to test the main hypotheses. According to the previous discussions, β4 is expected to be 
significantly positive and β5 is expected to be insignificant.  
To consider the effects of other variables on CEO pay, a set of control variables is 
also included, namely firm total asset level, leverage ratio and board characteristics. 
Table 2.1 lists the definitions of all the variables in this model. Otherin is the sum of 
ownership of all the other types of institutional investors. Asset is the natural logarithm 
of the total assets. Leverage is leverage ratio, defined as total debts over total assets. 
Board is the natural logarithm of the number of board directors. Indep is the proportion 
of independent directors on the board. Controlling is the number of shares owned by the 
controlling shareholder. CEOage is the age of the CEO. Year dummies are also 
included to control for time-series effects. According to the studies by Coles and Li 
(2016, 2018), unobserved CEO characteristics also have significant effect on CEO pay-
performance relationship. Thus, the equations are estimated with firm fixed effects to 
address this issue.  
It is acknowledged that the current literature also uses delta to measure the CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity (Coles et al., 2006; Babenko, 2009; Dang et al., 2018). 
However, in the sample of Chinese firms, there are only 127 firms granting stock 
options to CEOs. Due to the small sample disproportionate the investigated population, 
the results using delta to measure the CEO pay-performance sensitivity could not be 
meaningful. Moreover, the data obtained from the CSMAR database is limited, so for 
this reason, it is unlikely to calculate the value of stock options using the Black-Scholes 
model indicated by the delta definition. In addition, it has been argued that Chinese 
stock market is influenced by various factors including government manipulation, 
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which makes stock price too noisy to measure firm performance (Pan and Mishra, 2018). 
Therefore, the delta is not used in this chapter to measure the CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity.   
Table 2.1 Variable Definition 
Variables Definition 
Panel A: Executive compensation and age 
CEO pay  The natural logarithm of CEO compensation 
CEO age The age of CEO 
Panel B: Institutional ownership  
Mutual The ownership percentage of domestic mutual funds in a firm.  
QFII The ownership percentage of QFIIs in a firm 
Otherins The sum of ownership of other types of institutional investors 
(including banks, insurance companies, social security funds, 
brokers, trust companies, and financial companies) in a firm. 
Mutuald A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has domestic 
mutual funds as shareholders and 0 otherwise   
QFIId A dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has QFII as 
shareholders and 0 otherwise 
Mutualratio Ratio of domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the largest 
shareholder’s ownership 
QFIIratio Ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the largest shareholder’s 
ownership 
Panel C: Firm characteristics and corporate governance 
Board size (Board) The natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board 
Independent directors (Independent) Proportion of independent directors on the board 
Leverage Total debts/total assets in book value 
Asset The natural logarithm of total assets 
Controlling Percentage of shares owned by the controlling shareholders 
Tobin’s Q Market value/replacement value 
Panel D: Firm performance 
Return on assets (ROA) Net income/total assets 
Stock Return (RET) Firm annual stock return 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of the sample. The statistics are reported in 
separate panels. Specifically, Panel A reports summary statistics for executive 
characteristics. Panel B reports summary statistics of firm institutional ownership. Panel 
C reports summary statistics for firm characteristics and corporate governance. Panel D 
reports summary statistics for firm performance. Panel E reports firm distribution.  
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Median Min 25% 75% Max 
Panel A: Executive characteristics   
CEO pay  15,613 480,899 299,482 403,000 120,000 233,454 680,000 1,056,000 
CEO age 15,613 47.825 5.205 48 40 43 52 56 
Panel B: Institutional ownership    
Mutual
*
 (%) 9,501 4.189 4.468 2.52 0.02 0.88 6.06 33.416 
QFII
*
 (%) 1,548 1.254 1.263 0.88 0.01 0.44 1.63 12.468 
Otherins
*





9,501 14.389 20.028 7.183 0.035 2.443 18.187 330.198 
QFIIratio
*
 (%) 1,548 4.101 5.598 2.394 0.012 1.068 4.968 68.430 
Mutuald 15,613 0.627 0.484 1 0 0 1 1 
QFIId 15,613 0.099 0.299 0 0 0 0 1 
Panel C: Firm characteristics and corporate governance   
Board Size 15,613 9.057 1.828 9 3 8 9 19 
Independent 15,613 3.274 0.664 3 1 3 4 8 








15,613 36.602 15.503 34.655 2.197 24.210 47.890 89.990 
Q 15,613 1.750 0.834 1.454 0.893 1.060 2.251 3.393 
Panel D: Firm performance   
ROA (%) 15,613 3.626 5.681 3.300 -27.920 1.220 6.190 20.460 
RET (%) 15,613 41.591 92.095 15.03 -86.930 -11.49 70.59 142.87 
Panel E: Firm type distributions   




Panel A reports summary statistics for executive characteristics. CEO pay is the cash compensation of 
CEO, which has been available since 2005. Panel B reports summary statistics of firm institutional 







 represent firms which have mutual funds, QFIIs and other institutional 
investors as shareholders. Panel C reports summary statistics for firm characteristics and corporate 
governance. Panel D reports summary statistics for firm performance. Panel E reports firm distribution. 
All the definitions of the variables are listed in Table 1.1 and the values of variables are in terms of 
China’s currency, the RMB. 
 
It is shown that the average CEO pay is 480,899 RMB, which is almost six times 
more than that from 1998 to 2000 (Firth et al., 2007). The average ownership of 
domestic mutual funds and QFIIs are 4.189% and 1.254%, respectively. These statistic 
results for institutional ownership are in line with Firth et al. (2016). The summary of 
Mutuald and QFIId shows that in the sample, 62.7% of firms have domestic mutual 
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funds as shareholders and 9.9% of firms have QFIIs as shareholders. This indicates that 
institutional ownership is quite common in the Chinese equity market. Based on average 
board size (9.057) and the number of independent directors (3.274), the percentage of 
independent directors can be obtained, which is 36.15%. The average percentage of 
shares held by the controlling shareholders is 36.602%, which reflects a high level of 
ownership concentration in Chinese firms. Moreover, the percentage of observations for 
non-state-owned firms is 42.855%. 
2.4.2 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship 
Table 2.3 presents the results of testing the main hypotheses. Specifically, column 
(1) shows the results of focusing on whether there are institutional investors as 
shareholders. Column (2) shows the results of focusing on institutional investors’ 
ownership, while column (3) shows the results of focusing on the difference between 
institutional investors’ ownership and controlling shareholder’s ownership. In this 
chapter, the interactive terms are concerned because they reflect the effects that 
institutional investors have on the CEO pay-performance relationship. As shown in 
columns (1) and (2), the coefficients of Mutuald*ROA (0.686) and Mutual*ROA (8.454) 
are both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the 
presence of domestic mutual funds helps to link CEO pay to firm performance, and this 
effect becomes stronger when domestic mutual funds hold a larger percentage of shares. 
This result is consistent with hypothesis H1a. It is also found that the coefficients of 
QFIId*ROA and QFII*ROA are positive but insignificant, which implies that QFIIs do 
not have significant effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship. This is  




Table 2.3 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship 
This table reports the effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship using the 
firm fixed-effect model. Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO compensation. Mutuald (QFIId) is 
the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there are mutual funds (QFIIs) as shareholders in a firm and 0 
otherwise. Mutual and QFII denote ownership level of mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. Mutualratio 
and QFIIratio are the ratios of mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership, respectively. Definitions of all the other variables are listed in Table 2.1. Year 
dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Mutuald 0.012   
 (1.06)   
QFIId -0.007   
 (-0.36)   
Mutuald*ROA 0.686***   
 (3.87)   
QFIId*ROA 0.025   
 (0.10)   
Mutual  0.310  
  (1.63)  
QFII  -0.303  
  (-0.24)  
Mutual*ROA  8.454***  
  (3.75)  
QFII*ROA  7.777  
  (0.42)  
Mutualratio   0.061 
   (1.37) 
QFIIratio   -0.012 
   (-0.05) 
Mutualratio*ROA   1.556*** 
   (3.38) 
QFIIratio*ROA   0.024 
   (0.01) 
ROA 0.857*** 0.970*** 1.047*** 
 (6.10) (7.83) (8.63) 
Others 0.110 0.149 0.139 
 (0.69) (0.92) (0.86) 
Asset 0.177*** 0.186*** 0.184*** 
 (9.60) (10.17) (10.08) 
Leverage -0.139** -0.149*** -0.148*** 
 (-2.57) (-2.78) (-2.75) 
Board 0.139** 0.141** 0.137** 
 (2.48) (2.52) (2.45) 
Independent 0.074 0.080 0.074 
 (0.52) (0.57) (0.52) 
Controlling -0.069 -0.062 -0.037 
 (-0.71) (-0.64) (-0.38) 
CEOage 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (4.16) (4.21) (4.19) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,028 13,028 13,028 
R-squared 0.344 0.346 0.345 
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Mutualratio*ROA is 1.556 and significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.38), while the 
coefficient of QFIIratio*ROA is insignificant. This suggests that the previously  
documented strengthening effects of domestic mutual funds become even stronger when 
their ownership is closer to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis H2. The results concerning the relationship between control 
variables and CEO pay are consistent with previous studies (Firth et al., 2007). 
 
Overall, the existence of domestic mutual funds can improve corporate governance 
by strengthening the CEO pay-performance relationship. When the ownership of 
domestic mutual funds is closer to the controlling shareholders and they are presenting 
as large shareholders, their influence becomes stronger as a result of the strong incentive 
to contend with controlling shareholders. However, due to the challenges/obstacles that 
are unique to China’s culture (such as relationship-based economy and various 
languages spoken within the country), QFIIs cannot improve corporate governance due 
to an inability to improve their monitoring performance. 
 
2.4.3 Effects of institutional ownership between SOEs and non-SOEs  
This section tests hypothesis H3 by dividing the sample firms into SOEs and non-
SOEs. A firm is identified as an SOE if the ultimate controlling shareholder is the 
government. Empirically, equation (2.1) is re-estimated using separate subsamples of 
SOEs and non-SOEs, and Table 2.4 reports the results. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) 
are the results of using a subsample of SOEs, and columns (4) to (6) are the results of 
using a subsample of non-SOEs. Again, the interactive terms are the main concerns in 




Table 2.4 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship in SOEs and 
non-SOEs 
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay 
                     SOE subsample                   Non-SOE subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutuald 0.032**   -0.021   
 (2.24)   (-1.13)   
QFIId 0.003   -0.030   
 (0.12)   (-0.76)   
Mutuald*ROA 0.533**   0.944***   
 (2.17)   (3.60)   
QFIId*ROA 0.028   0.053   
 (0.08)   (0.11)   
Mutual  0.641***   -0.350  
  (2.69)   (-1.21)  
QFII  0.301   -1.558  
  (0.22)   (-0.62)  
Mutual*ROA  7.481**   11.926***  
  (2.40)   (3.92)  
QFII*ROA  4.434   17.361  
  (0.20)   (0.56)  
Mutualratio   0.139**   -0.067 
   (2.08)   (-1.15) 
QFIIratio   -0.027   -0.044 
   (-0.09)   (-0.09) 
Mutualratio*ROA   1.405*   2.292*** 
   (1.81)   (4.32) 
QFIIratio*ROA   1.656   0.107 
   (0.30)   (0.02) 
ROA 1.194*** 1.257*** 1.335*** 0.320 0.463** 0.545*** 
 (6.61) (7.93) (8.52) (1.46) (2.38) (2.85) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,588 7,588 7,588 5,440 5,440 5,440 
R-squared 0.356 0.359 0.357 0.332 0.333 0.333 
 (1) vs (4) (2) vs (5) (3) vs (6)    
Chow test 5.205*** 5.327*** 5.293***    
This table shows different effects of institutional investors in SOEs and non-SOEs using the firm fixed-
effect model. Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO compensation. Columns (1) to (3) are results 
of using SOEs as the sample and columns (4) to (6) are results of using non-SOEs as the sample. Mutuald 
(QFIId) is the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if there are mutual funds (QFIIs) as shareholders in a 
firm and 0 otherwise. Mutual and QFII denotes ownership level of mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. 
Mutualratio and QFIIratio are the ratios of mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership to the 
controlling shareholder’s ownership, respectively. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each 
regression. Definitions of all the variables are the same as those in Table 1.1. Year dummies are included. 
The Chow tests’ F statistics reveal the significance of the difference in the coefficients on Mutuald*ROA, 
Mutual*ROA and Mutualratio*ROA for SOEs and non-SOEs. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 




 which is significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.17), and 0.944 for non-SOEs, which is 
 significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.60). The coefficient of Mutual*ROA is 7.481 for 
SOEs, which is significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.40), and 11.926 for non-SOEs, 
which is significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.92). These results suggest that domestic 
mutual funds can strengthen the CEO pay-performance relationship, and this is more 
significant in non-SOEs as reflected by the larger magnitude of coefficients for non-
SOEs.  
The different effects that domestic mutual funds have in SOEs and non-SOEs are 
more obvious when the difference in ownership between them and controlling 
shareholders is considered. In particular, column (3) shows that the coefficient of 
Mutualratio*ROA is 1.405 in SOEs, which is significant at only the 10% level (t-value 
is 1.81); while it is 2.292 for non-SOEs in column (6), which is significant at the 1% 
level (t-value is 4.32). This suggests that when the ownership of domestic mutual funds 
is closer to that of controlling shareholders, the incentives of domestic mutual funds to 
contend with controlling shareholders are stronger in non-SOEs. This is reflected by the 
more significant and larger coefficient of Mutualratio*ROA for non-SOEs. The Chow 
tests (F=5.205, p-value<0.01; F=5.327, p-value<0.01; F=5.293, p-value<0.01) reveal 
that the effects of domestic mutual funds on the CEO pay-performance relationship are 
stronger in non-SOEs than SOEs.  
To further test H3, equation (2.1) is re-estimated separately using subsamples of 
central government controlled SOEs and local government controlled SOEs. The results 
are reported in Table 2.5. It is observed that in columns (1) to (3), the coefficients of all 
the interactive terms between mutual funds’ ownership measure and ROA are 
insignificant. This means that mutual funds have no significant effects on the CEO pay- 
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Table 2.5 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship in central 
government controlled SOEs and local government controlled SOEs 
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay 
 Central government controlled 
SOEs subsample 
Local government controlled SOEs 
subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutuald 0.056**   0.022   
 (2.03)   (1.34)   
QFIId -0.038   0.024   
 (-0.80)   (0.87)   
Mutuald*ROA -0.123   0.785***   
 (-0.29)   (2.69)   
QFIId*ROA 0.233   -0.112   
 (0.39)   (-0.27)   
Mutual  0.577   0.679**  
  (1.33)   (2.37)  
QFII  -3.107   1.590  
  (-1.07)   (1.04)  
Mutual*ROA  4.944   8.396**  
  (0.78)   (2.30)  
QFII*ROA  38.960   -7.371  
  (0.85)   (-0.29)  
Mutualratio   0.200*   0.125 
   (1.80)   (1.60) 
QFIIratio   -1.077*   0.351 
   (-1.73)   (1.08) 
Mutualratio*ROA   0.078   1.821** 
   (0.05)   (2.07) 
QFIIratio*ROA   12.025   -1.923 
   (0.86)   (-0.31) 
ROA 1.406*** 1.198*** 1.316*** 1.130*** 1.250*** 1.323*** 
 (3.93) (3.68) (4.13) (5.53) (6.89) (7.35) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,122 2,122 2,122 5,466 5,466 5,466 
R-squared 0.303 0.308 0.306 0.327 0.330 0.329 
This table shows different effects of institutional investors in central government controlled SOEs and 
local government controlled SOEs using the firm fixed-effect model. Dependent variable is the natural 
log of CEO compensation. Columns (1) to (3) are results of using central government controlled SOEs as 
the sample and columns (4) to (6) are results of using local government controlled SOEs as the sample. 
Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all the variables are the 
same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed 
using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
performance relationship in central government controlled SOEs. However, the results 
in columns (4) to (6) reveal that the coefficients of interactive terms between mutual 
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funds’ ownership measure and ROA are significantly positive. This suggests that 
mutual funds have significant effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship in local 
government controlled SOEs. These results validate hypothesis H3. These results are 
also consistent with Firth et al. (2010) who argue that domestic mutual funds face 
pressure and regulation from local governments, so the effect of domestic mutual funds 
is mitigated and they are less likely to contend with governments in SOEs. 
2.5 Endogeneity issues and robustness tests 
2.5.1 Endogeneity issues 
Although a firm fixed effects model has been applied to address the potential 
endogeneity issue, it could also be argued that institutional investors prefer investing in 
firms with a strong CEO pay-performance relationship, which results in reverse 
causality. To address this issue, this section examines changes in the CEO pay-
performance relationship when institutional investors sell their holding firms ownership. 
This selling event is not directly related to a specific firm’s pay-performance 
relationship. Empirically, two dummy variables are constructed, Mutualdec and 
QFIIdec, which are equal to 1 if the ownership of mutual funds and QFIIs decrease, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise. Then, equation (2.1) is re-estimated by replacing Mutual 
and QFII with Mutualdec and QFIIdec, respectively. Moreover, this section tests the 
changes occurring in pay-performance when there is a change of institutional ownership. 
To do so, Mutual and QFII in equation (2.1) are replaced with two new continuous 
variables, ΔMutual and ΔQFII, denoting the ownership change of mutual funds and 
QFIIs, respectively. The results are reported in Table 2.6. It is observed that the 
coefficient of Mutualdec*ROA is significantly negative, indicating that the decline in 
mutual funds’ ownership can weaken the pay-performance relationship. In addition, the 
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significant positive coefficient of ΔMutual*ROA indicates that the increase (decrease) of 
mutual funds’ ownership strengthens (weakens) the pay-performance relationship.  
 
Table 2.6 Effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship addressing 
reverse causality 
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay 
 (1) (2) 
Mutualdec 0.015  
 (1.56)  
QFIIdec 0.023  
 (1.16)  
Mutualdec*ROA -0.292**  
 (-1.98)  
QFIIdec *ROA  -0.212  
 (-0.94)  
ΔMutual  -0.300* 
  (-1.94) 
ΔQFII  -0.364 
  (-0.40) 
ΔMutual *ROA   7.921*** 
  (3.69) 
ΔQFII*ROA   4.691 
  (0.34) 
ROA 1.309*** 1.201*** 
 (9.86) (10.16) 
Control Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 13,028 13,028 
R-squared  0.293 0.292 
This table shows the effects of institutional investors on pay-performance relationship after addressing the 
endogenous issue of reverse causality. Column (1) shows results of examining the changes of pay-
performance relationship when institutional investors sell their holding firms. Column (2) shows the 
results of examining the changes of pay-performance when there is a change of institutional ownership. 
Mutualdec and QFIIdec are dummy variables which are equal to 1 if mutual funds and QFIIs sell their 
holding firms, respectively, and 0 otherwise. ΔMutual and ΔQFII represent the ownership change of 
mutual funds and QFIIs, respectively. Definitions of all the other variables are the same as those in Table 
2.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 





Table 2.7 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance (Heckman and PSM) 
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay     
 Heckman two-stage (second stage) PSM method 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutuald -0.023   0.010   
 (-1.18)   (0.78)   
QFIId 0.010   -0.006   
 (0.40)   (-0.28)   
Mutuald*ROA 0.705***   0.548***   
 (3.96)   (2.72)   
QFIId*ROA 0.043   -0.038   
 (0.16)   (-0.14)   
Mutual  0.168   0.354*  
  (0.82)   (1.77)  
QFII  1.245   -0.161  
  (0.81)   (-0.13)  
Mutual*ROA  8.918***   7.400***  
  (3.96)   (3.18)  
QFII*ROA  7.352   4.463  
  (0.40)   (0.24)  
Mutualratio   0.021   0.067 
   (0.45)   (1.42) 
QFIIratio   0.171   0.027 
   (0.58)   (0.10) 
Mutualratio*ROA   1.686***   1.333*** 
   (3.72)   (2.84) 
QFIIratio*ROA   0.270   -1.048 
   (0.06)   (-0.25) 
ROA 0.839*** 0.954*** 1.024*** 1.125*** 1.215*** 1.312*** 
 (5.97) (7.67) (8.42) (6.14) (8.12) (9.08) 
LambdaMutual -1.818** -0.900* -1.242**    
 (-2.04) (-1.78) (-2.54)    
LambdaQFII 2.625 3.958* 2.411    
 (1.12) (1.76) (1.15)    
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,028 13,028 13,028 11,206 11,206 11,206 
R-squared 0.298 0.302 0.301 0.331 0.334 0.332 
This table shows the effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship using the 
Heckman two-stage method and PSM. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) are results of using the Heckman 
two-stage method (second stage), and columns (4) to (6) are results of using PSM. Control variables in 
equation (2.1) are included in each regression. LambdaMutual and LambdaQFII are inverse Mills ratios 
obtained from the first stage of the Heckman two-stage model. Definitions of all the variables are the 
same as those in Table 2.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Second, there is a potential issue of sample selection bias as institutional investors 
may prefer particular firms or industries. To address this issue, the Heckman two-stage 
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method is employed. The first stage involves an OLS analysis where institutional 
ownership is regressed against the same control variables from the main equation. To 
meet the exclusion restrictions, the first stage regression also includes three variables 
that are not included in the second-stage regression. The first two variables are the 
industry median level of mutual funds and QFIIs. The third variable is a dummy 
variable which captures the index inclusion of a firm, following Firth et al. (2016) and 
Rong et al. (2017). In particular, this variable is Indexdom which is equal to 1 if a firm 
is included in either the Shanghai 180 index or the Shenzhen Component index in a year 
and 0 otherwise. Then the inverse Mills ratios (Lambda) are obtained from the first 
stage and are included as independent variables in the second stage. The results are 
reported in columns (1) to (3) in Table 2.7, which shows a broadly consistent results 
with those in Table 2.3. 
Third, the PSM method is used to construct a sample in which the treatment sample 
and control sample are similar in terms of some observed characteristics. In this 
matching process, for each firm-year observation in the treatment sample (i.e., 
observations with either domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders), an 
observation in the control sample is identified (i.e., observations without either domestic 
mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders) which has the same/nearest propensity score of 
firm characteristics including firm asset level, leverage ratio, board size, board 
independence, the largest shareholder’s ownership, and CEO age in the same year from 
the same industry. The results of using PSM are reported in columns (4) to (6) of Table 
2.7, which are quite similar to those reported in Table 2.3, indicating that the main 
results are robust after considering the potential endogeneity issues using alternative 
estimation methods.  
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2.5.2 Corporate governance channel 
It has been previously argued in this chapter that mutual funds strengthen CEO pay-
performance by monitoring CEOs’ behaviours and improving corporate governance. 
This section provides empirical evidence to validate that corporate governance is the 
 
Table 2.8 Effects of institutional investors in firms with larger and smaller industry tournament   
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay 
 Firms with larger industry tournament Firms with smaller industry tournament 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutuald 0.001   0.010   
 (0.07)   (1.05)   
QFIId -0.016   0.007   
 (-0.73)   (0.48)   
Mutuald*ROA 0.343   0.410**   
 (1.80)   (2.59)   
QFIId*ROA -0.087   0.064   
 (-0.34)   (0.31)   
Mutual  0.025   0.345**  
  (0.12)   (2.03)  
QFII  -0.278   0.484  
  (-0.15)   (0.57)  
Mutual*ROA  3.292   4.486**  
  (1.34)   (2.16)  
QFII*ROA  2.488   1.026  
  (0.08)   (0.08)  
Mutualratio   -0.001   0.063 
   (-0.01)   (1.48) 
QFIIratio   -0.381   0.054 
   (-0.82)   (0.29) 
Mutualratio*ROA   0.782   0.771* 
   (1.37)   (1.86) 
QFIIratio*ROA   1.488   -0.108 
   (0.23)   (-0.03) 
ROA 0.026 0.082 0.088 0.813*** 0.912*** 0.970*** 
 (0.23) (0.80) (0.87) (5.73) (7.70) (8.46) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,543 3,543 3,543 9,485 9,485 9,485 
R-squared 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.204 0.209 0.207 
This table shows the effects of institutional investors on the pay-performance relationship in firms with 
larger or smaller industry tournament using the firm fixed-effect model. Columns (1) to (3) are results of 
testing firms with larger industry tournament. Columns (4) to (6) are results of testing firms with smaller 
industry tournament. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all 
the variables are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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channel through which mutual funds can affect CEO pay-performance.
 
To measure the 
level of corporate governance, the industry tournament incentives are employed, 
since it is argued that strong industry tournament provides effective incentives for CEOs 
(Coles et al., 2018). In particular, this section uses the compensation gap between CEO 
in a firm and the highest paid CEO among firms operating in the same industry to 
measure industry tournament. The sample firms are then divided into two groups based 
on the median value of industry tournament, and equation (2.1) is re-estimated using 
these two subsamples and Table 2.8 reports the results. As can be seen from the results, 
the coefficients of interaction terms of mutual funds’ ownership and firm performance 
are more significant in firms with less intensive product market competition and in 
firms with weaker industry tournament. These results support the argument that mutual 
funds affect CEO pay-performance via improving corporate governance.  
Moreover, there may be some other potential channels through which mutual funds 
have influence on CEO compensation. For instance, Li et al. (2019) document that 
mutual funds are likely to require a stronger relationship between CEO pay and firm 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) outcomes, and firm CSR outcomes are determined 
by mutual fund’s CSR score. Their study indicates that mutual funds’ self-attributes 
affect their incentives for monitoring and improving corporate governance, which is a 
key channel for mutual funds to affect CEO pay-performance relationship. However, 
due to the data unavailability, this potential channel is not able to be tested empirically 
at the moment, but this chapter calls for future studies on this important issue. 
2.5.3 Effects of regional development 
Whether or not the function of institutional investors can be guaranteed depends 
mainly on the development of a legal system and investor protection. The laws and 
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regulations in more developed regions could be better enforced which would protect 
investors’ interests. Moreover, information asymmetry is believed to be more severe in 
firms from less developed regions, which makes it difficult for institutional investors to 
know what is happening through investee firms and to monitor effectively. Thus, it is 
proposed that institutional investors have a greater effect in firms located in more 
developed regions. In this section, this conjecture is tested by taking advantage of the 
regional variations in China’s economic development. The full sample is divided into 
firms located in more and less developed regions based on the Chinese marketization 
index (Fan et al., 2011) which measures the marketization levels of 31 provinces. 
Provinces ranking in the top 15 are defined as more developed regions and all the others 
as less developed.   
Empirically, equation (2.1) is estimated using subsamples of firms located in more 
and less developed regions separately. The results are reported in Table 2.9. Consistent 
with the structure in Table 2.8, columns (1) to (3) are the results of using a subsample of 
firms located in more developed regions, and columns (4) to (6) are the results of using 
a subsample of firms located in less developed regions. Again, the interactive terms are 
the main concerns. Note that the coefficients of Mutuald*ROA, Mutual*ROA and 
Mutualratio*ROA are positive and statistically significant for firms from more 
developed regions, while they are insignificant for firms from less developed regions. 
These findings suggest that the effects of domestic mutual funds on strengthening the 
CEO pay-performance relationship are stronger in firms from more developed regions. 
It is also noted that all the coefficients of interactive terms related to QFIIs are not 
significant in firms from either more or less developed regions, which confirms 
previous findings that QFIIs have no significant effect. These results support the 
argument that the function of institutional investors can only be ensured when their 
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interests/rights are well protected, when the legal system is developed, and when 
regulations are properly enforced. 
 
Table 2.9  Effects of institutional investors on the CEO pay-performance relationship across 
regions 
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay 
 Firms from more developed regions Firms from less developed regions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutuald 0.013   0.021   
 (0.93)   (0.98)   
QFIId 0.001   -0.002   
 (0.05)   (-0.04)   
Mutuald*ROA 0.725***   0.626   
 (3.50)   (1.59)   
QFIId*ROA -0.088   0.235   
 (-0.27)   (0.42)   
Mutual  0.329   0.165  
  (1.37)   (0.46)  
QFII  0.011   -0.951  
  (0.01)   (-0.46)  
Mutual*ROA  9.314***   5.033  
  (3.46)   (1.08)  
QFII*ROA  2.594   23.197  
  (0.11)   (0.61)  
Mutualratio   0.068   0.032 
   (1.17)   (0.40) 
QFIIratio   0.141   -0.717 
   (0.48)   (-1.13) 
Mutualratio*ROA   1.701***   0.588 
   (2.99)   (0.60) 
QFIIratio*ROA   -0.951   -1.920 
   (-0.19)   (-0.20) 
ROA 0.782*** 0.907*** 0.987*** 1.000*** 1.161*** 1.267*** 
 (4.61) (5.90) (6.57) (3.73) (4.87) (5.37) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,062 9,062 9,062 2,697 2,697 2,697 
R-squared 0.327 0.329 0.328 0.397 0.396 0.395 
This table shows the effects of institutional investors across regions using the firm fixed-effect model. 
Columns (1) to (3) are results using firms from more developed regions as the sample and columns (4) to 
(6) are results using firms from less developed regions as the sample. The slightly lower number of 
observations is due to missing information about some firms’ locations. Dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of CEO compensation. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression. 
Definitions of all the variable are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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2.5.4 Robustness tests  
In this section, a further analysis is conducted to check the robustness of the main 
results. First, two alternative measures of CEO compensation are considered: the first 
measure is CEO compensation including CEO ownership values; and the second 
 
Table 2.10 Effects of institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship using 
alternative definition of CEO pay 
Dependent 
variable 
The natural log of (CEO pay + value 
of CEO’s shareholding) 
The natural log of average compensation of 
the top three executives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutuald 0.004   0.028**   
 (0.16)   (2.34)   
QFIId 0.013   0.003   
 (0.41)   (0.14)   
Mutuald*ROA 1.129***   0.398**   
 (3.52)   (2.10)   
QFIId*ROA -0.648   -0.099   
 (-1.40)   (-0.37)   
Mutual  0.789**   0.478**  
  (2.16)   (2.18)  
QFII  -0.163   0.849  
  (-0.07)   (0.72)  
Mutual*ROA  8.978**   5.813**  
  (2.05)   (2.06)  
QFII*ROA  -36.944   4.896  
  (-1.11)   (0.29)  
Mutualratio   0.175**   0.068 
   (2.09)   (1.26) 
QFIIratio   -0.007   0.130 
   (-0.01)   (0.48) 
Mutualratio*ROA   1.635*   1.206** 
   (1.66)   (2.10) 
QFIIratio*ROA   -10.319   1.814 
   (-1.35)   (0.40) 
ROA 1.035*** 1.306*** 1.379*** 1.038*** 1.064*** 1.114*** 
 (4.82) (6.58) (7.12) (6.93) (8.18) (8.73) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 
R-squared 0.174 0.176 0.175 0.508 0.510 0.509 
This table shows the results using different measurement of CEO pay. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) use 
the natural logarithm of (CEO pay + value of CEO’s shareholding) to measure CEO compensation. 
Columns (4) to (6) use the natural log of average compensation of the top three executives to measure 
CEO pay. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression. Definitions of all the 
variables are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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measure is the average compensation of the top three executives. It has been shown in 
previous literature that managerial ownership can be used to incentivize managers to 
deliver good performance (Harford and Li, 2007), and thus its relationship with firm 
performance should also be positive due to the monitoring by institutional investors. In 
this section, to test this conjecture, it is examined whether CEO pay, including the value 
of their shareholding, is positively related to firm performance with the presence of 
institutional investors. Following the method used by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), 
the value of shares held by the CEO is calculated as the total number of common 
shares held by CEOs at the end of the fiscal year, multiplying the closing prices of the 
common shares at the end of the fiscal year. The results are reported in Table 2.10. The 
results of the key variables are quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.3 
which confirm the robustness of the main results.  
Second, this section considers an alternative measure of firm performance which is 
market-based. This is mainly because institutional investors are expected to maximize 
the return of their investment portfolios via appreciations in stock price so they might 
have incentives to link CEO pay to market-based performance. To provide empirical 
evidence for this conjecture, two proxies for firm market performance are employed: 
annual stock returns (RET) and Tobin’s Q, and then equation (2.1) is re-estimated. 
Table 2.11 reports the results. It is observed in Table 2.11 that both domestic mutual 
funds and QFIIs have no significant effects on linking CEO pay to firm market 
performance. This suggests that in China, institutional investors are more concerned 
about the accounting performance of investee firms than market performance. One 
possible explanation could be that since the Chinese stock market is influenced by many 




Table 2.11 Effects of the institutional ownership on the CEO pay-performance relationship using 
stock return and Tobin’s Q as the proxy for firm performance 
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay 
 RET Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutuald 0.038***   0.007   
 (3.88)   (0.35)   
QFIId -0.006   -0.013   
 (-0.42)   (-0.37)   
Mutuald*Perfmarket 0.010   0.021*   
 (0.88)   (1.89)   
QFIId* Perfmarket 0.012   0.006   
 (0.61)   (0.35)   
Mutual  0.841***   0.808***  
  (5.77)   (2.95)  
QFII  0.226   1.355  
  (0.28)   (0.80)  
Mutual* Perfmarket  0.063   0.047  
  (0.53)   (0.36)  
QFII* Perfmarket  0.337   -0.634  
  (0.28)   (-0.65)  
Mutualratio   0.162***   0.167** 
   (4.50)   (2.46) 
QFIIratio   0.035   0.515 
   (0.21)   (1.30) 
Mutualratio* Perfmarket   0.008   0.002 
   (0.30)   (0.08) 
QFIIratio* Perfmarket    -0.020   -0.314 
   (-0.05)   (-1.26) 
Perfmarket 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.013 0.021* 0.025** 
 (3.94) (4.14) (4.66) (1.05) (1.90) (2.42) 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 
R-squared 0.332 0.334 0.333 0.331 0.333 0.332 
 This table shows the results of testing the effects of institutional investors using firm fixed-effect model. 
Dependent variable is the natural log of CEO compensation. Perfmarket is firm market performance, 
which is proxied with RET (annual stock return) and Tobin’s Q. Columns (1) to (3) are results of using 
RET as a proxy for firm market performance. Columns (4) to (6) are results of using Tobin’s Q as a proxy 
for firm market performance. Control variables in equation (2.1) are included in each regression. 
Definitions of all the variable are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 performance accurately. For example, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
 $1,211 billion in 2000 and $12,237 billion in 2017, which means that it increased by 
14.57% each year. Meanwhile, the Shanghai Stock Exchange index was 1408 in 2000 
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and 3196 in 2017, representing an increase of 4.9% per year. Obviously, market 
performance cannot reflect accounting performance. Therefore, the accounting 
measures are most likely to reflect firm performance and applied by investors to assess 
firm value. 
 
Table 2.12 Regression results with one-year lagged institutional investors’ ownership   
Dependent variable: the natural log of CEO pay 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Mutualdt-1 0.029**   
 (2.55)   
QFIId t-1 0.024   
 (1.14)   
Mutualdt-1*ROA t-1 0.456**   
 (2.44)   
QFIId t-1*ROA t-1 -0.104   
 (-0.43)   
Mutual t-1  0.756***  
  (4.85)  
QFII t-1  0.901  
  (0.81)  
Mutual t-1*ROA t-1  2.988*  
  (1.68)  
QFII t-1*ROA t-1  0.901  
  (0.81)  
Mutualratio t-1   0.227*** 
   (5.21) 
QFIIratio t-1   0.702* 
   (1.70) 
Mutualratio t-1*ROA t-1   1.136** 
   (2.40) 
QFIIratio t-1*ROA t-1   -0.308 
   (-0.05) 
ROA t-1 1.065*** 1.427*** 2.599*** 
 (7.06) (16.75) (25.53) 
Control Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,028 13,028 13,028 
R-squared 0.285 0.293 0.304 
This table shows the results of testing one-year lagged institutional ownership. Definitions of all the 
variables are the same as those in Table 2.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are computed using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance 




Moreover, to further test the robustness between institutional ownership and CEO 
pay-performance relationship, re-estimates equation (2.1) is re-estimated by using one-
year lagged institutional ownership and control variables. Table 2.12 presents the results. 
It is shown that all the coefficients of one-year lagged mutual funds’ ownership 
measurements and firm performance are positive and significant, while all the 
coefficients of QFIIs’ ownership measurements and firm performance are insignificant. 
These results indicate that mutual funds’ ownership in the last year can yield to a 
stronger positive relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in the current 
year, while the ownership of QFIIs have no such effects. The results further validate the 
causality issue between mutual funds’ ownership and CEO pay-performance 
relationship.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 2005 to 2015, this chapter examines 
the effects of institutional investors on the relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance. The empirical results indicate that domestic mutual funds play an 
important monitoring role in linking CEO pay to firm performance. Moreover, this 
monitoring effect is stronger when mutual fund ownership is larger and closer to 
controlling shareholder’s ownership. However, QFIIs do not have such an effect on the 
CEO pay-performance relationship. These results are robust to alternative estimation 
methods in addressing endogeneity issues and using alternative measures for the key 
variables. 
Moreover, the effects of domestic mutual funds are more pronounced in non-SOEs 
and local government controlled SOEs than in central government controlled SOEs. 
This chapter also provides strong evidence that mutual funds affect CEO pay-
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performance by improving corporate governance. In particular, the positive effect of 
mutual funds is more significant in those firms with weaker industry tournament. 
Meanwhile, the monitoring role of domestic mutual funds is stronger in firms from 
more developed regions due to better investor protection and less information 
asymmetry.  
Overall, institutional investors reveal heterogeneous influences on monitoring firm 
management in China, which advances the understanding of the importance to identify 
the types of institutional investors when investigating their influence. The results show 
that in China with many dialects and a relationship-based economy, foreign investors 
face severe information asymmetry problems and are less efficient in monitoring, 
suggesting that further regulatory efforts are required to protect foreign investors’ rights 
and reinforce their function in improving corporate governance in China. As a more 
important implication, this chapter suggests that considering the influence of controlling 
shareholders can shed more light on understanding the effect of involving institutional 
investors in corporate governance practices in China.   
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Chapter 3 Institutional investors, contestability and firm 
innovation 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides insights into the effects of institutional investors on firm 
innovation performance. Firm innovation is crucial for firm development and 
contribution to economic growth. However, innovation involves a long-term investment 
with a high probability of failure, hence it is important to understand the determinants of 
firm innovation. Since institutional investors continue to evolve and play an 
increasingly important role in corporate governance, a number of studies have 
investigated the effect that institutional investors have on firm innovation activity, 
whilst presenting different views. Some studies contend that institutional investors 
increase short-termism because they are mainly concerned with short-term performance 
and thus undermine innovative effort. Whereas other studies argue that institutional 
investors tend to encourage/force managers to innovate by reducing their myopic 
behaviour or protecting them from the reputational consequences of innovation failure. 
As a result, institutional investors have positive effects on firm innovation (Kochhar and 
David, 1996; Aghion et al., 2013; Bena et al., 2017; Luong et al., 2017; Rong et al., 
2017). 
However, these studies on the impact of institutional investors on firm innovation 
are mainly focused on the level of institutional ownership (Aghion et al., 2013; Rong et 
al., 2017), while ignoring the influence of the controlling shareholders on institutional 
investors’ monitoring behaviours which is of greater significance especially in emerging 
markets. On the one hand, in emerging markets, the concentration of ownership is a 
common phenomenon and the controlling shareholders usually make the ultimate 
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decisions on firm policies (La Porta et al., 1998; Jiang and Kim, 2015). It is therefore 
possible that institutional investors are captured by the controlling shareholders, which 
compromises their independence and leads to their monitoring role less straightforward. 
On the other hand, the institutional environment is underdeveloped and investor 
protection is weaker in emerging markets, so it is difficult for non-controlling 
shareholders to have a voice in investee firms (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Thus, whether 
the expected functions of institutional investors can be ensured or whether the interest 
of institutional investors can be effectively preserved is unclear, because these concerns 
directly shape the incentives and behaviours of institutional investors. Moreover, it is 
important for firms to access funds when there is a need to invest in new technology. 
However, financial markets are underdeveloped in emerging economies, and this 
hampers a firm’s ability to access external finance for innovation investment (Fan et al., 
2011; Jiang et al., 2017). Thus, it is meaningful to investigate the effects of institutional 
ownership on firm innovation in emerging markets by considering the influence of the 
controlling shareholders. 
This chapter provides insights into these issues and answers the question: What is 
the effect of institutional investors on firm innovation, particularly with the presence of 
controlling shareholders in the emerging market of China? This investigation is 
motivated by recent studies that attempted to examine the effects of institutional 
investors on firm innovation (Aghion et al., 2013; Bena et al., 2017; Luong et al., 2017). 
By using US listed firms as a sample, Aghion et al. (2013) document that domestic 
institutional investors in the US can enhance firm innovation. As a complement to this 
study, Bena et al. (2017) and Luong et al. (2017) provide further evidence that foreign 
institutional investors, especially those from developed countries, have a positive effect 
on innovations of non-US firms. By putting them together, it is clear that institutional 
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investors from developed countries can effectively boost firm innovation. The study in 
this chapter complements theirs by considering the controlling shareholders’ influence 
and showing the different roles that domestic and foreign institutional investors play in 
affecting firm innovation in China.   
This investigation is also motivated by existing studies on the influence of multiple 
large shareholders. Some studies argue that when there are multiple large shareholders 
in a firm, they have incentives to compete for the controlling position by uniting other 
minority shareholders and serve a monitoring role (Pagano and Röell, 1998; Bennedsen 
and Wolfenzon, 2000; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Attig et al., 2008; Laeven and Levine, 
2008). Other studies show that large shareholders, other than the controlling 
shareholders, may find it valuable to collude with the controlling shareholders to extract 
benefits by trading on private information rather than exercising effective monitoring 
(Kahn and Winton, 1998). In the spirit of these studies, institutional investors’ effects 
are relevant to whether they are one of the large shareholders in a firm. With the 
presence of controlling shareholders, the effects of institutional investors may be subject 
to their ability to challenge the controlling shareholders, i.e., their contestability of the 
controlling shareholders. However, any examination in this regard is rarely to be found 
in the literature. Thus, this chapter will fill the void to provide insights into the effects 
of institutional investors on firm innovation in terms of their contestability that is 
represented by their ownership difference with that of controlling shareholders.  
It is important to obtain a much deeper understanding about the effects of 
institutional investors on firm innovation in the Chinese context. First, China’s economy 
is growing faster and has become the second largest economy in the world after the US, 
which plays a crucial role in the world economy. One important engine driving this 
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sustainable growth is the improvement in innovation capacity. China has aimed to 
become an innovative country since 2006, which was emphasized at the 18
th
 National 
Congress meeting in 2012. Innovation has therefore become the theme of economic 
development and is the driving force behind China’s transformation, which has 
contributed to the recovery and growth of the world economy, especially after the global 
financial crisis.  
Second, China is still an emerging market with an institutional environment that 
differs from developed markets, such as underdeveloped financial market, government 
intervention, concentrated ownership, and weaker investor protection. The theory 
established based on developed markets may not be able to directly explain the 
behaviours of institutional investors in China. Therefore, it is essential to understand the 
roles that institutional investors play in promoting firm innovation, particularly facing 
with the presence of the controlling shareholders. The findings drawn from this research 
will help to provide some implications for other emerging markets. 
Third, over recent decades, various types of institutional investors have emerged 
and are growing rapidly, such as domestic mutual funds, Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (QFIIs), brokers, banks, social security funds and others. They are expected to 
have different effects on corporate policies and governance (Liu et al., 2014), and 
thereby firm innovation. The investment incentives of various types of institutional 
investors provide sufficient tension to examine/compare their influences on firm 
innovation. Moreover, ownership concentration is a prevalent feature in Chinese listed 
firms, and governments and families are usually the controlling shareholders. This 
existence of ownership concentration also enables this chapter to investigate whether 
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the influence of institutional investors is subject to the incentive that controlling 
shareholders have for innovation. 
Furthermore, China’s unique culture (such as a relationship-based economy, 
different accounting standards and uncommon languages) aggravates the information 
asymmetry faced by foreign institutional investors (Chakravarty et al., 1998). In this 
situation, whether or not foreign institutional investors can have the same influence as 
domestic institutional investors becomes unclear, so whether or not foreign institutional 
investors can still enhance firm innovation effectively, as expected, is still worth 
investigating.  
This chapter draws several notable findings. First, domestic mutual funds’ 
contestability can significantly enhance firm innovation, while QFIIs do not have such 
an effect, after controlling for the ownership level of institutional investors. These 
results are robust after correction for endogeneity issues using the Heckman two-stage 
model, propensity score matching (PSM) method and the change regressions. These 
results are also robust when using several different proxies for firm innovation. Second, 
the positive effects of contestability by domestic mutual funds on firm innovation 
becomes stronger in firms where the controlling shareholder is a non-government entity, 
facing more competitive market, with non-politically connected CEOs, and with less 
analyst coverage. These results show strong support that the effects of institutional 
ownership on firm innovation become stronger when they are able to compete with the 
controlling shareholders and monitor CEOs, which are consistent with the career 
concern view.  
This chapter contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, it enriches the 
research on the effects that institutional investors have on firm innovation. Existing 
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studies either focus on domestic institutional investors in the developed market (Aghion 
et al., 2013) or foreign institutional investors in an international context (Bena et al., 
2017; Luong et al., 2017), whereas this chapter focuses on domestic and foreign 
institutional investors in the largest emerging market of China and directly compares 
their influence on firm innovation by considering some unique institutional factors in 
emerging markets. 
Second, this chapter also relates to Rong et al. (2017). Although they examined a 
similar issue in China, they mainly focused on the level of ownership held by these 
institutional investors, whereas this chapter carries out further analysis by differentiating 
between domestic and foreign institutional investors, and more importantly looking at 
their contestability of the controlling shareholders by examining the difference between 
the ownership of institutional investors and the controlling shareholders. In this way, 
this chapter provides new insights into the relationship between institutional investors 
and firm innovation by considering the influence of the controlling shareholders in 
China where ownership is usually concentrated. 
Third, this chapter adds to the literature about the effect that foreign institutional 
investors have on firm innovation in emerging markets. Previous studies find that 
foreign institutional investors can stimulate firm innovation by providing new 
knowledge/technology and reducing managerial career risk (Bena et al., 2017; Luong et 
al., 2017). However, this chapter provides empirical evidence from a new perspective 
by considering the Chinese institutional context. This chapter finds that in the presence 
of the controlling shareholders, QFIIs are more likely to be captured by the controlling 
shareholders so that their influence on firm innovation does not increase significantly 
when their ownership is close to the controlling shareholders, which is probably due to 
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that foreign institutional investors are less informed about the culture of investee 
countries so it would be difficult for them to compete with the controlling shareholders.   
Fourth, Bena et al. (2017) and Luong et al. (2017) use a cross-country analysis to 
examine the effect that foreign institutional investors have on firm innovation. A cross-
country analysis intends to generate rules that are able to apply in a number of countries. 
However, it could also raise some concerns due to the large variation of institutional 
environments across countries such as the legal systems, taxation regimes, political 
economies, and security laws. The observed variations of institutional ownership and 
firm innovation relationship could be the result of these institutional factors at the 
country level. For example, foreign institutional investors who invest in different 
countries are subject to different accounting standards and regulations. Thus, the rules 
generated from a cross-country analysis may be short of applicability in a single 
emerging market. With this in mind, this chapter applies a single country analysis by 
focusing on the Chinese economy, which can overcome some of the criticisms of cross-
country studies, while holding constant the institutional factors that may be correlated 
with institutional ownership and firm innovation. 
Finally, this chapter contributes to existing literature with regards to the effects of 
multiple large shareholders (MLS). Previous studies note that the presence of MLS 
indicates an efficient monitoring effects in curbing the expropriation achieved by 
forming a coalition with other large stakes or competing for control by attracting 
minority shareholders (Attig et al., 2009; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Lehmann 
and Weigand, 2000; Mishra, 2011). However, this chapter finds some useful evidence 
to show that the monitoring function of MLS depends on the identity of the large 
shareholders and the controlling shareholders, because domestic and foreign 
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institutional investors have different effects on firm innovation when they face pressure 
from the controlling shareholders.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 introduces background 
information and develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the sample and variables 
used in the empirical model. Section 3.4 presents the empirical results and addresses 
endogeneity issues. Section 3.5 makes some additional analysis and reports results of 
testing potential channel and section 3.6 draws some conclusions. 
3.2 Background and hypotheses  
3.2.1 Firm innovation in China 
Firm innovation is of great importance for long-term economic growth in a country. 
The Chinese economy has developed rapidly since the economic reform in the late 
1970s and is now the second largest economy in the world. Firm innovation contributes 
a lot to China’s rapid economic development. The Chinese government has enacted a 
series of laws and regulations to stimulate firm innovation activities. In October 2007, 
China’s Property Law was inaugurated to protect the rights of property owners. In 
China, there are three types of patents including invention patents, utility patents, and 
design patents. Invention patents are to protect the new technical solution for a product, 
a process or an improvement. Utility patents are granted to protect the new and practical 
solutions related to a product’s shape or structure. Design patents are granted to protect 
the shape patterns, or the combinations of colour and shape, or patterns that are 
aesthetically pleasing and industrially applicable. The statistics of firm patents shows 
that the capacity of Chinese firm innovation has improved significantly over the past 
decades. For instance, from 1985 to 2011, the accumulative number of patent 
applications from China and foreign countries was 8,665,828, of which 2,849,906 
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(32.89%) were invention patents, whereas the annual patent applications in 2015 were 
2,798,500, of which 1,101,864 (39.37%) were invention patents. The number of annual 





Figure 3.1 Firm innovation among sample firms 
This figure illustrates the trend of firm innovation among sample firms. Panel A shows the average 
number of patent applications, patents granted and patents in force in each year. Panel B shows the 
number of firms which have non-zero patent applications each year.  
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Figure 3.1 shows the innovation output by the sample firms in each year between 
2003 and 2017. Panel A shows the average number of patent applications, patents 
granted and patents in force across the sample period. Panel B shows the number of 
firms which have non-zero patent applications across the sample period. In Panel A, it 
shows that the total number of patent applications, patents granted and patents in force 
by all sample firms have been increasing steadily since 2003, especially after 2015, the 
increase trend became more significant. This indicates a significant increase of input 
and output of innovation activities in China. In Panel B, it is also found that the number 
of firms that have patent applications increases during the sample period, indicating that 
more and more firms in China have put efforts and emphasis on innovation.  
3.2.2 Institutional investors and firm innovation  
It has been documented that institutional investors have a positive influence on firm 
innovation (Aghion et al., 2013; Bena et al., 2017; Luong et al., 2017; Rong et al., 2017). 
On the one hand, innovation is long-term investment with complicated procedure and 
requires a high level of professional knowledge and management skills. Thus, CEOs 
may avoid updating knowledge and hardworking (quiet life view, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003), and hence they are reluctant to take action in firm innovation. On 
the other hand, innovation is risky investment that has high possibility of failure. CEOs’ 
career concerns may also reduce their incentives to innovate, as they are afraid of being 
sacked due to the early-stage failure of innovation (career concern view, Manso, 2011; 
Ederer and Manso, 2013). The existence of institutional investors could resolve these 
issues. It is acknowledged that institutional investors are sophisticated with professional 
knowledge and are able to collect and process firm information, which can effectively 
reduce the information asymmetry, improve corporate governance and exert efficient 
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monitoring over managers’ behaviours (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Hartzell and Starks, 
2003; Khan et al., 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Boone and White, 2015; Doidge et 
al., 2015). By gathering more proprietary firm information, institutional investors are 
also likely to identify the stochastic reasons of innovation failure, thus are able to 
insulate CEOs from punishment due to innovation failure and motivate them to innovate 
(Aghion et al., 2013; Luong et al., 2017). Additionally, compared with individual 
investors, institutional investors usually hold diversified portfolios, so they are more 
tolerant of innovation failure and tend to encourage investment in innovative projects.  
However, these existing studies almost exclusively focus on the level of 
institutional ownership and ignore the influence from other shareholders, such as the 
controlling shareholders when ownership is concentrated. It has been well documented 
that ownership concentration is a common feature of Chinese listed firms, and a large 
proportion of shares are held by the controlling shareholders who usually dominate firm 
policies (Jiang and Kim, 2015). Institutional investors in China are usually non-
controlling shareholders, thus their positive effects on firm innovation might be 
determined by their contestability of the controlling shareholders.   
The contestability of the controlling shareholders by non-controlling shareholders 
and their influence on firm value and policy have been examined by an established 
literature of multiple large shareholders (MLS). This literature contends that non-
controlling shareholders are still powerful and influential in firm policy making via 
competing for control by forming coalitions with other large shareholders. Thus, the 
existence of MLS indicates control contestability and plays a governance/monitoring 
role in a firm (Pagano and Röell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Attig et al., 
2008; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009; Mishra, 2011; Jiang et al., 2018).   
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According to this strand of literature, it is proposed that institutional investors, who 
usually hold a relatively large ownership compared with other individual investors in 
China, have powerful contestability and are likely to compete with the controlling 
shareholders, which facilitate their influence on firm innovation policy more effectively. 
However, this contestability effect is heterogeneous across institutional investor types.  
It is proposed that domestic mutual funds are able to exert strong contestability to 
enhance firm innovation. This conjecture is mainly motivated by existing findings that 
domestic mutual funds are active monitors and have significant influence on firm 
policies (Chen et al., 2007; Yuan et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2016). In the spirit of Dvořák 
(2005) and Bae et al. (2008), it could be argued that in China, domestic mutual funds 
are better informed about investee firms and have the information advantage, because 
they are familiar with the Chinese accounting standards, local language/dialects, and 
local regulations (Chakravarty et al., 1998). Moreover, domestic mutual funds are 
independent from the local governments and have no conflicts of interest with the 
investee firms. Therefore, domestic mutual funds are more likely to exert their influence 
on promoting firm innovation via competing with the controlling shareholders.  
However, QFIIs face more challenges and disadvantages when making investments 
in listed firms in China which may constrain their abilities and incentives in exerting 
their influence on firm innovation policy. First, as described in Section 1.2.1, foreign 
institutional investors face strict regulations and restrictions on their investment in listed 
firms due to the institutional setting. Therefore, QFII ownership in listed firms is lower 
and QFIIs are less likely to compete for control as they can obtain very little benefits 
from the high cost monitoring (Jiang and Kim, 2015). Second, QFIIs are owned by 
foreigners, who may have a different culture, language and the legal system of their own 
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countries from those in China (Liu et al., 2014), which create severe information 
asymmetry between QFIIs and their investee firms, and thus make it more difficult and 
costly for QFIIs to clean firm information. Third, Chinese economy is imbedded with 
severe government intervention and relationship is regarded as a key factor to the 
business success. Due to the institutional differences and short-term investment history, 
QFIIs would find it difficult to build good relationships with the governments, and 
therefore difficultly and costly to contend with the controlling shareholders. Moreover, 
QFIIs are able to move their capital from China to another market when they anticipate 
a high risk, which further discourage them to engage in high cost monitoring. Therefore, 
it is expected that QFIIs in China have weaker incentives to form contestability to have 
influential effect on firm innovation policy. 
Overall, based on the above discussions, the following hypothesis is set as follows: 
H: Domestic mutual funds have strong contestability of the controlling 
shareholders to enhance firm innovation, while such an effect does not exist for QFIIs. 
3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Data and sample selection 
The initial sample consists of all the A-share firms listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2003 to 2017. The 
reason for sample period starting from 2003 is that the ownership of institutional 
investors in firms’ annual reports was not reported until 2003. The sample excludes 
firms flagged with ST and *ST
16
, firms with missing observations, and firms from the 
financial industry because their financial reports need special requirements which may 
                                                 
16
 ST stands for Special Treatment and refers to the listed firms that have had negative net profits for two 
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have has negative net profits for three consecutive 
years and thus are probably to be delisted from the stock exchanges. 
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bias the results. The sample finally consists of 2,534 firms and 25,404 firm-year 
observations. All the data are extracted from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database, which is the data source for a large body of published 
research (e.g., Fan et al., 2007; Firth et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016). 
3.3.2 Firm innovation measurement 
To be consistent with a large body of existing research (e.g., Aghion et al., 2013; 
Hsu et al., 2015; Luong et al., 2017), the patent number is used as an indicator of firm 
innovation. The patent data are obtained from the “Listed Firms’ Patents” dataset in 
CSMAR. This dataset provides the total number of patent applications by each firm in 
each year, as well as the number of patents granted in the following four years (for those 
patent applications in year t, the number of patents granted in year t+1 to year t+4). It 
also provides the total number of patents in force by the end of each year for each firm. 
Using this information, this chapter constructs three proxies for firm innovation from 
three perspectives: (1) The number of patent applications in each year, which measures 
the quantity of innovative activities. (2) The number of patents that are eventually 
granted (those applied in the application year), which measures the quality of these 
innovative activities.  (3) The number of patents in force in each year, which measures a 
firm’s stock of innovative activities. In the regression analyses, this chapter transforms 
these measures into the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patent applications, 
one plus the number of patents eventually granted, and one plus the number of patents 
in force, respectively. In addition to these three proxies, this chapter also uses ratio of 
number of patents granted to the number of patent applications as an alternative proxy 
for firm innovation performance. 
87 
 
3.3.3 Institutional investors contestability measurements 
To measure the institutional investors’ contestability of the controlling shareholders, 
the method in the existing studies of MLS are employed in this chapter (Laeven and 
Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2018). The first measure is the ratio of 
institutional investors’ ownership to the controlling shareholders’ ownership and two 
continuous variables are constructed: the first variable is Mutualratio, defined as the 
ratio of ownership held by domestic mutual funds to the controlling shareholder’s 
ownership; the second variable is QFIIratio, defined as ratio of the ownership held by 
QFIIs to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. The higher values of these two ratios 
indicate the higher relative power of the institutional investors in relation to the 
controlling shareholders.  
The second measure of contestability by institutional investors is the ownership 
dispersion and two variables are created: the first one is Mutualdisp, defined as the 
difference of ownerships between the controlling shareholders and domestic mutual 
funds divided by the sum of their ownerships; the second one is QFIIdisp, defined as 
the difference of ownerships between the controlling shareholders and QFIIs divided by 
the sum of their ownerships. The higher this ratio, the lower is the contestability of the 
control by institutional investors. 
It is noted that there are some firms having more than one institutional investor with 
at least 1% of ownership. To calculate the above-mentioned variables, the institutional 
investor with the largest ownership are chosen, following the literature of multiple large 
shareholders (Laeven and Levine, 2008). It is also possible that institutional investors 
could form a coalition and act as a block, as indicated in the study of Firth et al. (2016), 
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so the aggregate ownership of the institutional investors is also used to calculate the 
above-mentioned variables and repeats the analysis.    
3.3.4 Model 
To examine the effects of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation 
empirically, the following linear model is established: 
Patenti,t+1=β0+ β1Mutualcontesti,t+ β2QFIIcontesti,t+ β3Mutuali,t 
                    + β4QFIIi,t+ β5Asseti,t+ β6Boardi,t+ β7Indepi,t+ β8Otherinsi,t 
                    + β9Leveragei,t+ β10ROAi,t+ β11Tangibilityi,t+β12CEOgenderi,t 
                    +β13CEOagei,t+Dummy(year)+Dummy(industry)+εi,t                          (3.1) 
where Patent represents firm innovation, which are proxied by the variables discussed 
in section 3.3.2 in the regressions. Considering the causal effect that factors have on 
firm innovation, this chapter uses one-year leading firm patent numbers as the 
dependent variable in the empirical estimation. The employment of one-year leading 
dependent variable could also avoid the endogenous issue to some extent due to the 
interactive correlation between institutional ownership and firm innovation. 
Mutualcontest and QFIIcontest represent the contestability by domestic mutual funds 
and QFIIs, respectively. Empirically, this chapter runs two regressions separately. The 
first regression uses Mutualratio and QFIIratio to replace Mutualcontest and 
QFIIcontest, respectively. According to the hypothesis (H), β1 is expected to be 
significantly positive and β2 is expected to be insignificant. The second regression uses 
Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp to replace Mutualcontest and QFIIcontest, respectively. 
According to the hypothesis (H), β1 is expected to be significantly negative and β2 is 
expected to be insignificant. To mitigate the concern that these contestability proxies 
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may just capture the level of institutional investors’ ownership or the controlling 
shareholders’ ownership, the ownership levels of domestic mutual funds (Mutual) and 
QFIIs (QFII) are also included for control in the regressions. 
 
Table 3.1 Definitions of variables 
Variables Definitions 
Panel A: Firm innovation 
Patent applications The natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents applied 
Patents granted The natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents granted 
Patents in force The natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents in force 
Panel B: Institutional ownership  
Mutual The percentage of shares owned by domestic mutual funds in a firm.  
QFII The percentage of shares owned by QFIIs in a firm 
Mutualratio The ratio of mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s 
ownership 
QFIIratio The ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s 
ownership 
Mutualdisp (The controlling shareholder’s ownership-mutual funds’ ownership) / 
(The controlling shareholder’s ownership + mutual funds’ ownership) 
QFIIdisp (The controlling shareholder’s ownership-QFIIs’ ownership) / (The 
controlling shareholder’s ownership + QFIIs’ ownership) 
Panel C: Other variables  
SOE A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is ultimately 
controlled by the government and 0 otherwise 
Otherins The percentage of shares owned by other institutional investors (banks, 
insurance companies, social security funds, brokers, entrust 
companies, and financial companies) in a firm. 
Asset The natural logarithm of total assets 
Board size (Board) The natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board 
Independent directors 
(Indep) Proportion of independent directors on the board 
Leverage Total debts/total assets in book value 
ROA Net income/total assets 
Tangibility The ratio of firm fixed assets to total assets 
CEOgender The gender of CEOs, which equals to 1 if the CEO is male, and 0 if 
female 
CEOage The age of CEOs 
PC A dummy variable equal to 1 if the Chairman or CEO of the firm is 
politically connected and 0 otherwise. Politically connected is defined 
as if the Chairman or CEO was a former or is a current official of the 
government, a member of the National People’s Congress (NPC) or a 
member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC). 
Analyst The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts tracking the 
firm each year. 
HHI Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, defined as the sum of the squared 




To consider the effects of other factors on firm innovation, this chapter includes a 
set of control variables by following existing studies (Fang et al., 2014; Bena et al., 
2017; Luong et al., 2017; Rong et al., 2017). Definitions of the control variables are 
listed in Table 3.1. Specifically, Asset represents is the natural logarithm of firm total 
assets. Board is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board and Indep 
is the percentage of independent directors. Otherins denotes the sum of ownership held 
by all the other institutional investors (such as banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds, brokers, entrust companies, social securities and financial companies).  Leverage 
is the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA is return on assets, defined as the ratio of 
net income to firm total assets. Tangibility is asset tangibility, measured as the value of 
firm asset liquidation scaled by the total book assets, following Almeida and Campello 
(2007). CEOgender is the gender of CEO of each firm in each year, which equals to 1 if 
the CEO is male and 0 if female. CEOage is the age of CEO of each firm in each year. 
Year dummies and industry dummies variables are included to control for year and 
industry fixed effects.  
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics of variables used in the empirical analyses. 
Panel A shows the summary of patent information for both the full sample and 
subsample with non-zero values of patent or institutional ownership. For those 
observations with non-zero values of patent, the average number of patent applications, 
patents eventually granted and total patents in force are 54.41, 36.63 and 128.70, 
respectively. For firms which have domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders, the 
average number of patents applications, patents granted and total patents in force are 
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35.81, 23.12 and 92.27, respectively. These average patent numbers are higher than 
27.65, 17.42 and 74.04 of the full sample, indicating that patents are increased when 
there are institutional investors in a firm.  
Panel B shows the summary of institutional ownership for full sample and sample 
of firms that have institutional ownership. Among firms having domestic mutual funds 
as shareholders, the average ownership held by domestic mutual funds is 3.81% with 
the highest level being 43.80%. Among firms having QFIIs as shareholders, the average 
QFIIs’ ownership is 1.26% with the highest level being 15.08%. These statistical 
numbers are quite similar to Firth et al. (2016) and Jiang et al. (2017), and facilitate the 
examination of their various influences given large variations of the ownership 
difference. The average ratio of domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership, and the average ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership are 13.22% and 4.20%, respectively. The mean values of 
Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp are 79.95% and 92.46%, respectively. These results indicate 
high concentration of ownership in Chinese firms and the need to explore the influence 
of institutional ownership by considering the effect of controlling shareholders. Panel C 
lists the control variables used in the empirical analysis. The average board size is 8.95, 
with 3.23 (36.09%) serving as independent directors. The average ownership of the 
controlling shareholder is 36.17%, suggesting high ownership concentration. Panel D 
shows the distribution of the sample firms, of which there are 11,139 firm-year 
observations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 14,265 for non-state-owned 
enterprises (non-SOEs). The percentage of firms with managerial political connection in 




Table 3.2 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75% Max 
Panel A: Firm innovation 
A.1: Full sample 
Patent applications 25,404 27.65 253.70 0 1 13 20,107 
Patents granted 25,404 17.42 135.00 0 0 9 11,844 
Patents in force 25,404 74.04 559.50 0 4 39 43,619 
A.2: Observations with non-zero values of patent applications/patents granted/patents in force 
Patents applied 12,911 54.41 353.84 5 12 32 20,107 
Patents granted 12,081 36.63 194.97 4 10 24 11,844 
Patents in force 14,615 128.70 732.90 10 30 85 43,619 
A.3: Observations with non-zero values of mutual funds or QFIIs’ ownership  
Patents applied 15,291 35.81 301.53 0 2 17 20,107 
Patents granted 15,291 23.12 168.68 0 1 12 11,844 
Patents in force 15,291 92.27 656.20 0 8 50 43.619 
Panel B: Institutional ownership 
B.1: Full sample 
Mutual (%) 25,404 2.23 3.68 0 0.45 2.93 43.80 
QFII (%)  25,404 0.11 0.54 0 0 0 15.08 
Mutualratio (%) 25,404 7.73 15.49 0 1.21 8.77 330.20 
QFIIratio (%) 25,404 0.35 2.09 0 0 0 73.08 
Mutualdisp (%) 25,404 88.28 19.95 83.87 97.62 1 1 
QFIIdisp (%) 25,404 99.36 3.37 1 1 1 1 
Otherins (%) 25,404 3.47 8.44 0 0.88 3.12 85.64 
B.2: Observations with non-zero values of mutual funds/QFIIs’ ownership 
Mutual (%) 14,855 3.81 4.14 0.81 2.30 5.42 43.80 
QFII (%) 2,142 1.26 1.41 0.41 0.82 1.60 15.08 
Mutualratio (%) 14,855 13.22 18.38 2.25 6.68 16.66 330.20 
QFIIratio (%) 2,142 4.20 5.98 1.02 2.31 4.95 73.08 
Mutualdisp
 
(%) 14,855 79.95 21.15 71.45 87.48 95.61 99.99 
QFIIdisp (%) 2,142 92.46 9.10 90.56 95.49 97.99 99.98 
Panel C: Other firm characteristics 
Assets (Million) 25,404 9,500 52,800 1,150 2,400 5,490 2,410,000 
Leverage (%) 25,404 45.44 21.99 28.52 45.43 61.44 108.61 
ROA (%) 25,404 3.57 6.03 1.28 3.51 6.36 19.69 
Tangibility (%) 25,404 24.58 17.63 10.75 21.18 35.15 74.96 




25,404 3.23 0.66 3 3 3 8 
Controlling (%) 25,404 36.17 15.50 23.97 33.88 47.28 89.99 
CEOgender 25,404 0.94 0.23 1 1 1 1 
CEOage 25,404 47.79 6.40 43 48 52 64 
Panel D: Firm distributions according to ownership and political connections 

















This table reports the summary statistics of all the variables for the full sample from 2003 to 2017. Panel 
A is summary statistics for patent data. Panel B reports the summary statistics for institutional ownership. 
Panel C is summary statistics for variables representing firm characteristics and corporate governance. 
Panel D is summary for firm distributions between state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned-
enterprises (non-SOEs), and between firms with and without political connections. All the definitions of 
these variables are listed in Table 3.1. The value of variables is in terms of China’s currency, the RMB. 
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3.4.2 Effects of institutional investors contestability on firm innovation 
This section reports the empirical results of estimating equation (3.1) to test the 
main hypothesis. The results are shown in Table 3.3 using the patent applications as the 
dependent variable. Note that columns (1) to (3) are the results using the ratio of 
institutional ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership as contestability 
measures and columns (4) to (6) are the results using the dispersion proxies. 
Specifically, column (1) and column (2) report the results on domestic mutual funds and 
QFIIs separately, and the ratio variables are of the main interests. It is shown that the 
coefficient of Mutualratio is positive and statistically significant at 1% level (coefficient 
is 0.314 and t-value is 2.82), while the coefficient of QFIIratio is insignificant. These 
results indicate that when domestic mutual funds hold a relative closer ownership to the 
controlling shareholder, they are more able to exert their influence on improving firm 
innovation, while QFIIs’ incentive to promote firm innovation does not show such an 
incremental pattern when their ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholder. 
To make further comparison between domestic mutual funds and QFIIs, column (3) 
reports the results by putting mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ ownership together in 
one regression model. The results of variables that is more concerned are consistent 
with those separately reported in column (1) and column (2).  
Moreover, the regressions are repeated by replacing ownership ratios with 
ownership dispersion, Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp, to test the contestability by domestic 
mutual funds and QFIIs. The results are reported in columns (4) to (6). Specifically, 




Table 3.3 The effects of institutional investors on patent applications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Patent applications 
Mutualratio 0.314***  0.279***    
 (2.82)  (4.50)    
QFIIratio  1.640 1.180    
  (1.52) (1.06)    
Mutualdisp    -0.354***  -0.324*** 
    (-3.55)  (-5.81) 
QFIIdisp     -0.842 -0.283 
     (-1.15) (-0.38) 
Mutual 0.085***  0.083*** 0.054*  0.053** 
 (2.74)  (3.90) (1.67)  (2.38) 
QFII  0.082* 0.090**  0.091* 0.112** 
  (1.93) (2.08)  (1.95) (2.37) 
Asset 0.244*** 0.253*** 0.240*** 0.246*** 0.252*** 0.242*** 
 (9.07) (25.11) (22.51) (9.14) (25.09) (22.67) 
Indep 0.190 0.193 0.191 0.193 0.192 0.193 
 (0.52) (1.02) (1.00) (0.53) (1.01) (1.02) 
Board 0.060 0.063 0.058 0.059 0.063 0.058 
 (0.46) (1.09) (1.01) (0.46) (1.09) (1.00) 
Otherins 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.36) (0.76) (0.61) (0.34) (0.74) (0.55) 
Leverage -0.587*** -0.606*** -0.590*** -0.593*** -0.606*** -0.595*** 
 (-5.61) (-12.48) (-12.06) (-5.67) (-12.47) (-12.15) 
ROA 1.436*** 1.622*** 1.374*** 1.391*** 1.618*** 1.329*** 
 (5.39) (10.01) (8.36) (5.24) (9.99) (8.08) 
Tangibility -0.794*** -0.798*** -0.796*** -0.791*** -0.800*** -0.795*** 
 (-5.74) (-13.74) (-13.72) (-5.72) (-13.76) (-13.70) 
CEOGender 0.101 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.100 0.112*** 0.107*** 
 (1.27) (3.01) (2.87) (1.27) (3.00) (2.85) 
CEOAge -0.005* -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005* -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-1.67) (-3.56) (-3.48) (-1.66) (-3.55) (-3.44) 
Constant -4.893*** -5.029*** -4.794*** -4.573*** -4.184*** -4.219*** 
 (-7.99) (-20.49) (-18.94) (-7.35) (-5.42) (-5.41) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 
R-squared 0.368 0.368 0.370 0.368 0.368 0.370 
This table presents the effects of institutional ownership on firm innovation. Dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. Specifically, column (1) to (3) presents 
the results of testing the ratio of institutional ownership to the controlling shareholders’ ownership on 
firm innovation. Column (4) to (6) presents the results of testing the dispersion proxies. Mutualratio 
represents the ratio of domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. 
QFIIratio represents the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. Mutualdisp 
represents dispersion proxy for domestic mutual funds’ contestability, defined as the difference in the 
controlling ownership and domestic mutual funds’ ownership over their sum. QFIIdisp represents 
dispersion proxy for QFIIs’ contestability, defined as the difference in the controlling ownership and 
QFIIs’ ownership over their sum. Mutual is domestic mutual funds’ ownership. QFII refers to QFIIs’ 
ownership. All the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry 
dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered 
at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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separately. It is observed that the coefficient of Mutualdsip is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level (coefficient is -0.354, t-value is -3.55), indicating that closer 
ownership between domestic mutual funds and controlling shareholder (higher 
contestability by domestic mutual funds) enables domestic mutual funds to exert further 
efforts to increase firm innovation. By contrast, the coefficients of QFIIdisp are 
insignificant, suggesting that the contestability by QFIIs does not have such a 
significant effect. To make comparison between domestic mutual funds and QFIIs, 
column (6) reports the results of putting domestic mutual funds’ ownership and QFIIs’ 
ownership in one regression model. Again, the negative and significant coefficient of 
Mutualdisp still holds, while the coefficient is insignificant for QFIIs.  
The overall results in Table 3.3 are supportive to the main hypothesis that domestic 
mutual funds are sophisticated investors and are able to contest with the controlling 
shareholders and discipline managers to promote firm innovation when they hold closer 
ownership to that of controlling shareholders. By contrast, foreign institutional investors 
usually have a different culture from China where the economy is relationship-based 
and there exist various dialects. Therefore, QFIIs have no significant contestability 
effects. Furthermore, in each regression, the ownership levels of domestic mutual funds 
and QFIIs are also included as control variables. The results show that the ownership of 
both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs has a positive effect on firm innovation, which is 
consistent with Rong et al. (2017) using the Chinese setting. The results for other 
control variables are consistent with previous studies (Kochhar and David, 1996; Tian 
and Wang, 2014). Overall, these results show that the effects of institutional investors 




The results in Table 3.3 are about the effect of institutional investors’ contestability 
on the quantity of innovative activities, namely the patent applications by each firm in 
each year. This section further examines the effect of institutional investors’ 
contestability on the quality of innovative activities (measured by the number of patents 
granted) and the stock of innovation (measured by the number of patents in force). 
Empirically, equation (3.1) is re-estimated by replacing the dependent variables with the 
natural logarithm of one plus one-year leading number of patents granted, and the 
natural logarithm of one plus one-year leading number of patents in force. The results 
are reported in the first four columns in Table 3.4. Specifically, column (1) and column 
(2) report the results of using patents granted as the dependent variable, and column (3) 
and column (4) report the results of using patents in force as the dependent variable. 
These results show that the estimated coefficients of the key variables are in line with 
those reported in Table 3.3, suggesting that the contestability by domestic mutual funds 
also affects the quality and quantity of firm innovation. Their effects are subject to not 
only their identities and their ownership level, but also their ownership difference from 
the controlling shareholder’s ownership. 
In addition to the prior examination using patents granted as a quality measurement, 
the ratio of patents granted to patent applications is further employed as another proxy 
for patent quality. The results are reported in column (5) and column (6) in Table 3.4. 
Moreover, a Poisson count number model is also conducted by using the raw patent 
application number as the dependent variable, and the results are reported in columns (7) 
and (8) in Table 3.4. Again, the results indicate that regardless of firm innovation 
measurements, domestic mutual funds are able to promote firm innovation by 
competing with the controlling shareholders and forming contestability. In contrast, 
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QFIIs’ incentives to compete with the controlling shareholders are much weaker so that 
their contestability has no significant effects.  
 
Table 3.4 The effects of institutional investors on patents granted and patent in force 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable 
Patents granted Patents in force Patents granted/ 
Patent applications 
Raw number of 
patents applied 
Mutualratio 0.194***  0.283***  0.030*  0.314***  
 (3.27)  (4.08)  (1.77)  (3.60)  
QFIIratio 0.800  1.015  -0.269  -0.768  
 (0.71)  (0.74)  (-1.03)  (-0.87)  
Mutualdisp  -0.244***  -0.345***  -0.034**  -0.354*** 
  (-4.53)  (-5.46)  (-2.26)  (-4.34) 
QFIIdisp  0.070  -0.257  0.128  0.384 
  (0.10)  (-0.28)  (0.71)  (0.47) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 
R-squared 0.314 0.314 0.466 0.467 0.230 0.242   
This table presents the results using alternative measurements of firm innovation. Specifically, column (1) 
and column (2) use the natural logarithm of one plus one-year leading number of patents granted as the 
dependent variable. Column (3) and column (4) use the natural logarithm of one plus one-year leading 
number of patents in force as the dependent variable. Column (5) and column (6) use the ratio of patents 
granted to patents applied as the dependent variable. Column (7) and column (8) use the original number 
of patent applications as the dependent variables and the results are obtained using Poisson count number 
model. Control variables in equation (3.1) are included in each regression. All the variables’ definitions 
are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are included. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses in column (1) to (6). The z-statistics are reported in parentheses in column (7) and 
column (8). The z-statistics and t-statistics are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm 
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
3.4.3 Endogeneity concern 
In the previous models, one-year leading dependent variable is used to avoid 
potential reverse causality. However, there is still one endogeneity concern that 
institutional investors may select firms based on their predicted innovation performance, 
and thus the results using OLS model could be biased. Although endogeneity is less 
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likely to be ruled out completely, this section tries to establish the causality and mitigate 
this concern to a large extent by using Heckman two-stage method, propensity score 
matching (PSM) method and change regressions.   
First, the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure is applied to correct for the 
potential endogeneity issue of selection bias because institutional investors might invest 
in particular firms. Since it is argued above that domestic investors and foreign 
investors have different incentives that affect firm innovation, their preferences for 
investee firms differ (Liu et al., 2014). Therefore, instrumental variables for domestic 
mutual funds and QFIIs should be different to run the first stage of the Heckman 
method. Following Firth et al. (2016) and Rong et al. (2017), an index-inclusion dummy 
variable (Indexdom) is constructed as the instrumental variable for domestic mutual 
funds. This dummy variable equals to 1 if the firm is included in either the Shanghai 
180 Index or the Shenzhen Component Index
17
, and 0 otherwise. This instrumental 
variable is employed because domestic mutual funds might tend to mimic market 
indexes, and are thus more likely to invest in firms that are included in the market 
indexes. However, the firm innovation policy is not an inclusive criterion for these 
indexes and is therefore not related to index membership. It is expected that the 
ownership of domestic mutual funds is positively related to the index-inclusion dummy. 
With regards to QFIIs, this chapter follows Luong et al. (2017) and uses an international 
index inclusion, the MSCI China A inclusion index
18
 as an instrumental variable. A 
dummy variable (MSCI) is constructed, which equals to 1 if a firm is included in the 
                                                 
17
 Shanghai 180 Index is an index of representative 180 stocks that are traded in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE). Shenzhen Component Index inclusions was adjusted from 40 to 500 representative 
stocks traded in Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in May of 2015. The inclusion of these two indexes 
depends on a firm’s market capitalization, stock trading liquidity and market position in its industry 
sector.  
18
 MSCI China A inclusion index measures large and mid-cap representation across China securities listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). This index is designed 
for international investors and to track the progressive partial inclusion of A shares in the MSCI Emerging 
Markets Index over time. 
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MSCI China A inclusion index, and 0 otherwise. The first stage of Heckman two-stage 
procedure includes two OLS estimations where both domestic and foreign institutional 
investor ownership measurements are regressed on their respective instrumental 
variables and the same control variables from equation (3.1). This also meets the 
exclusion restrictions of conducting Heckman two-stage method, as these two 
instrumental variables are not included in the second-stage regressions. From the first 
stage, the inverse mills ratios (Lambda) are obtained and they are included as 
independent variables in the second stage regression of firm innovation. Columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 3.5 report the first-stage results, which show that the estimated 
coefficients of Indexdom and MSCI are both positive and statistically significant. These 
results indicate that the instrumental variables are efficient and valid. The results from 
the second stage are reported in columns (3) and (4). It is found that both coefficients of 
LambdaMutual and LambdaQFII are significant, which indicates that the selection bias and 
an endogeneity issue might exist in the previous analysis. After addressing the selection 
bias issue, the results of the concerned variables are still consistent with those reported 
in Table 3.3.   
Moreover, the documented relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
innovation could be driven by some unobserved firm characteristics or jointly 
determined. To address this issue, a matching sample using PSM method is constructed. 
In this matching process, for each firm-year observation in the treatment sample (i.e., 
those observations with either domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders), an 
observation in the control sample (i.e., those observations with neither domestic mutual 
funds nor QFIIs as shareholder) can be identified with the same/nearest propensity score 
of firm characteristic including firm size, board size, independent board proportion, 
other institutional ownership, leverage, ROA, tangibility, CEO gender and CEO age. In 
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this way, it can be ensured that treatment firms and control firms are similar and only 
differ in institutional investor ownership. Then, equation (3.1) is re-estimated using this 
matched sample and the results are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3.5. The 
matching sample has 20,688 observations. Since the independent variable is a one-year 
leading value, the number of observations used in each regression reduces to 18,355. 
Again, it is found that the coefficients of the key variables are broadly consistent with 
those in Table 3.3.  
The endogeneity issue is further addressed in this section by examining the change 
of the relative ownership by institutional investors to the controlling shareholders on 
patent applications. Empirically, four variables are constructed to denote the change of 
the relative institutional ownership: (1) ΔMutualratio, which is the change of the ratio of 
domestic mutual funds’ ownership to the controlling shareholders’ ownership; (2) 
ΔQFIIratio, which is the change of the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the controlling 
shareholders’ ownership; (3) ΔMutualdisp, which is the change of ownership dispersion 
for domestic mutual funds; (4) ΔQFIIdisp, which is the change of ownership dispersion 
for QFIIs. Equation (3.1) is then re-estimated by using ΔMutualratio and ΔQFIIratio, 
ΔMutualdisp and ΔQFIIdisp in the model. The results are presented in columns (7) and 
(8) of Table 3.5. It is observed that the coefficient of ΔMutualratio is significantly 
positive and the coefficient of ΔMutualdisp is significantly negative, which indicates 
that the increase of the relative ownership of domestic mutual funds to the controlling 
shareholders can further improve firm innovation. The insignificant results of 
ΔQFIIratio and ΔQFIIdisp are also consistent with the previous arguments. The results 




Table 3.5 Results of addressing potential endogenous issues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 First stage of 
Heckman  
Second stage of 
Heckman 











Patent applications Patent applications Patent applications 
Indexdom 0.740***        
 (2.69)        
MSCI  0.097***       
  (6.91)       
Mutualratio   0.281***  0.282***    
   (4.54)  (4.52)    
QFIIratio   1.492  1.131    
   (1.61)  (1.03)    
Mutualdisp    -0.327***  -0.285***   
    (-5.90)  (-4.96)   
QFIIdisp    -0.452  -0.238   
    (-0.62)  (-0.36)   
ΔMutualratio       0.089**  
       (2.08)  
ΔQFIIratio       -0.546  
       (-1.63)  
ΔMutualdisp        -0.073** 
        (-1.97) 
ΔQFIIdisp        0.289 
        (1.60) 
LambdaMutual   0.533*** 0.535***     
   (12.35) (10.70)     
LambdaQFII   -4.474*** -4.424***     
   (-6.79) (-5.68)     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,404 25,404 22,705 22,705 18,355 18,355 22,702 22,702 
R-squared 0.117 0.033 0.376 0.377 0.364 0.360 0.362 0.366 
This table presents the results of addressing endogenous issues using Heckman two-stage method, PSM 
method and considering the change of institutional ownership. Indexdom is a dummy variable equals to 1 
if the firm is included in either the Shanghai 180 Index or the Shenzhen Component Index, and 0 
otherwise. MSCI is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm is included in MSCI China A inclusion 
index, and 0 otherwise. ΔMutualratio represents the change of the ratio of mutual funds’ ownership to the 
controlling shareholders’ ownership. ΔQFIIratio represents the change of the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to 
the controlling shareholders’ ownership. ΔMutualdisp represents the change of ownership dispersion for 
domestic mutual funds. ΔQFIIdisp represents the change of ownership dispersion for QFIIs. LambdaMutual 
and LambdaQFII are inverse mills ratios obtained from the first stage of Heckman two-stage model. All the 
other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are 
included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm 
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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3.5 Additional analysis and potential channel 
3.5.1 The effects of institutional investors: SOEs vs non-SOEs 
The main argument is that institutional investors affect firm innovation via 
monitoring managers and this influence is increasing with the increasing of their 
contestability of the controlling shareholders. In China, there are two major types of 
firms controlled by two distinct types of controlling shareholders. One type is state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the governments, and the other type is non-
SOEs controlled by non-government entities such as families, individuals and private 
institutions. In the sample, almost half of the firms (43.85%) are SOEs, and the 
remaining are non-SOEs.  
It is proposed that the effects of contestability by institutional investors on firm 
innovation are weaker in SOEs than that in non-SOEs for the following reasons: First, 
under the current Chinese political system, the appointment of CEOs in SOEs is under 
direct control of the government, and the selection of CEOs is usually decided by 
administrative authorities (Fan et al., 2013; Cao et al., 2019). Candidates are from a 
pool of SOE managers or government officials (Rong et al., 2017). In this sense in 
SOEs, CEOs’ career concerns are closely related to the government assessments and 
how well they can implement the government policies to satisfy the multiple objectives. 
Thus, CEOs in SOEs are more likely to make decisions following government 
instructions rather than maximising shareholder value, and as a result, institutional 
investors could exert limited influence on CEOs’ behaviours. Second, SOEs are usually 
used by the governments to intervene in the market and satisfy political objectives, such 
as maintaining social stability, keeping employment rate and paying taxes (Pan et al., 
2019). So their business activities are largely dependent on and determined by the 
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governments, and less likely to be influenced by the other shareholders such as 
institutional investors. Moreover, domestic mutual funds are faced with political 
pressure and regulations from local governments in SOEs (Firth et al., 2010; Huang and 
Zhu, 2015), so their incentives to contend with the controlling shareholder (the 
government) would be weaker. Therefore, this chapter expects that the influence of 
contestability by domestic mutual funds would be less significant in SOEs. Empirically, 
this chapter tests the heterogeneity of the controlling shareholders’ identities by dividing 
the sample firms into SOEs and non-SOEs. The following model is also established for 
estimation:  
Patenti,t+1=β0+ β1Mutualcontesti,t+ β2QFIIcontesti,t+ β3Mutualcontesti,t*SOEi,t 
                   + β4QFIIcontesti,t*SOEi,t+β5SOEi,t+ β6Mutuali,t+ β7QFIIi,t 
                   + β8Asseti,t+ β9Boardi,t+ β10Indepi,t+ β11Otherinsi,t+ β12Leveragei,t 
                   + β13ROAi,t+ β14Tangibilityi,t+β15CEOgenderi,t+β16CEOagei,t 
                   +Dummy(year)+Dummy(industry)+εi,t                                             (3.2)           
where SOE is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a firm is an SOE and 0 if a firm is 
a non-SOE. The interactive terms between SOE dummy and contestability measures are 
included to test the effects of state-controlling shareholders. All the other variables are 
defined the same as those in equation (3.1).   
The results of estimating equation (3.2) are reported in Table 3.6 where the 
coefficients of the interactive terms are the main concerns. Columns (1) to (3) report the 
results of contestability using the ratio proxies, and columns (4) to (6) report the results 
of contestability using the dispersion proxies. Consistent with the structure of the results 
in Table 3.3, equation (3.2) is estimated by entering contestability proxies separately 
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first and then combing them together. As shown in Table 3.6, the coefficients of 
Mutualratio*SOE are significantly negative (t-value is -1.97 in column (1) and -2.09 in 
column (3)), and the coefficients of Mutualdisp*SOE are significantly positive (t-value 
is 2.59 in column (4) and 2.57 in column (6)). These results are consistent with the 
expectation, indicating that the incentives of domestic mutual funds to compete with the 
controlling shareholders become weaker in SOEs than in non-SOEs. These results are 
also supportive to the main hypothesis that institutional investors affect firm innovation 
via forming contestability to monitor CEOs’ behaviours. 
 
 
Table 3.6 The effects of institutional investors on firm innovation: SOEs vs non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable                                                                  Patent applications 
Mutualratio 0.387***  0.357***    
 (4.75)  (4.37)    
QFIIratio  1.988 1.878    
  (1.12) (1.48)    
Mutualdisp    -0.433***  -0.404*** 
    (-6.30)  (-5.85) 
QFIIdisp     -1.261 -0.838 
     (-1.10) (-1.07) 
Mutualratio*SOE -0.212**  -0.228**    
 (-1.97)  (-2.09)    
QFIIratio*SOE  -1.661 -1.038    
  (-0.98) (-0.98)    
Mutualdisp*SOE    0.238***  0.240** 
    (2.59)  (2.57) 
QFIIdisp*SOE     1.365 0.972 
     (1.27) (1.50) 
SOE -0.150*** -0.204*** -0.149*** -0.374*** -1.566 -1.346** 
 (-7.09) (-4.04) (-7.02) (-4.40) (-1.46) (-2.11) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 
R-squared 0.370 0.359 0.372 0.370 0.359 0.372 
This table presents the effects of state ownership on institutional investors’ effects. Dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. SOE is a dummy variable which 
equals to 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled by the government and 0 otherwise. All the other variables’ 
definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are included. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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3.5.2 Career concern view vs. quiet life view 
The previous results show that domestic mutual funds’ contestability can promote 
firm innovation, which is consistent with the idea that domestic mutual funds can 
alleviate the CEOs’ concerns of being fired due to early-stage failure of innovation 
(career concern view, Ederer and Manso, 2013) or exert monitoring over managerial 
behaviours to motivate CEOs to innovate (quiet life view, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2003). In particular, according to the career concern view, since innovative activities 
usually involve a large probability of failure, the managers expose themselves to a high 
risk of being fired for innovation-related reasons. The managers concern their career 
stability as the first priority, thus they do not like to invest in innovative activities. 
Institutional investors can mitigate managers’ career concerns better as they may help to 
identify stochastic reasons of innovation failure and insulate the failure from the 
managers’ responsibility. According to the quiet life view, managers prefer a quiet life 
rather than undertaking an innovation action that may negatively impact their careers. 
Institutional investors can monitor the managers not to be “lazy” for enjoying a quiet 
life. This section conducts a further analysis to differentiate between career concern 
view and quiet life view, and then provides direct evidence to show which view 
dominates in the Chinese setting and can better explain the effects of domestic mutual 
funds contestability on firm innovation. 
Following the empirical design by Aghion et al. (2013), product market 
competition is employed to test these two views. The empirical model includes the 
interaction between institutional investors’ contestability and product market 
competition. The basic idea is that managers are already disciplined to avoid the threat 
of takeover or bankruptcy when product market competition is intense, thus have more 
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incentives to innovate. In particular, consistent with the career concern view, the 
influence of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation should be stronger 
in firms facing higher level of competition, while consistent with the quiet life view, the 
influence of institutional investor contestability on firm innovation should be stronger in 
firms facing lower level of competition.   
 
Table 3.7 The effects of institutional investors based on product market competition 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable:                                                         Patent applications 
Mutualratio 0.455***  0.415***    
 (6.21)  (3.15)    
QFIIratio  1.126 1.268    
  (0.66) (0.68)    
Mutualdisp    -0.493***  -0.461*** 
    (-7.82)  (-4.09) 
QFIIdisp     -0.722 -0.342 
     (-0.60) (-0.27) 
Mutualratio*HHI -3.046***  -2.894**    
 (-4.38)  (-2.36)    
QFIIratio*HHI  -9.863 -9.209    
  (-0.79) (-0.69)    
Mutualdisp*HHI    3.118***  3.046*** 
    (5.78)  (3.23) 
QFIIdisp*HHI     5.184 3.505 
     (0.71) (0.44) 
HHI 0.285 -0.143 0.294 -2.713*** -5.329 -6.143 
 (1.43) (-0.48) (0.93) (-5.10) (-0.73) (-0.77) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 
R-squared 0.368 0.356 0.370 0.369 0.356 0.371 
This table presents the effects of product market competition on institutional investors’ effects. 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. HHI is 
Herfindahl index. All the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and 
industry dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error 
clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Product market competition is measured by Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), 
which is defined as the sum of the squared market share of each firm within the industry. 
So a higher value of HHI indicates a lower level of product market competition. 
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Empirically, this chapter re-estimates equation (3.2) by replacing SOE with HHI. The 
estimation results are reported in Table 3.7. Consistent with the structure of Table 3.6, 
columns (1) to (3) report the results of contestability using ratio proxies and columns (4) 
to (6) report the results of contestability using dispersion proxies. It is shown that the 
coefficients of Mutualratio*HHI are significantly negative in both column (1) and 
column (3), and the coefficients of Mutualdisp*HHI are significantly positive in both 
column (4) and column (6). These results suggest that the effects of domestic mutual 
funds are even stronger in firms facing higher level of product market competition. 
These results indicate that market competition and institutional investor contestability 
are complementary in affecting firm innovation, and therefore are consistent with the 
career concern view.  
By exploiting the Chinese setting, another set of analysis is able to be conducted to 
examine that the quiet life view does not explain the role of institutional investors in 
China. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) posit that in the quiet life model, institutional 
investors are able to reduce the managerial entrenchment by monitoring managers. Thus, 
in this section, it is examined whether the effects of domestic mutual funds’ 
contestability on firm innovation could be more significant when CEOs are more 
entrenched and less concerned about their careers. In particular, CEOs’ political 
connections are employed as a measurement for CEO entrenchment. There is a large 
number of studies showing that political connections can provide unique resources to 
the operation of the firms (e.g., Faccio, 2006; Claessens et al., 2008), which makes 
managers more entrenched in their positions and thus less concerned about their careers 
(Cao et al., 2017). In this sense, politically connected CEOs might have less incentive to 
conduct innovative activities to enhance firm performance, and thus are able to enjoy a 
quiet life. Following these studies, the CEOs’ political connection is identified if the 
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CEO was a former or is a current: (1) government official, (2) a member of the standing 
committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), and/or (3) a member of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The information of each 
CEO background is obtained from the Corporate Governance dataset in the CSMAR 
database. This dataset provides detailed working experience of each executive for each 
firm, so their politically related working experience can be manually collected to 
identify their political connections. Empirically, a dummy variable is constructed: PC, 
which equals to 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise, and equation (3.2) 
is re-estimated by replacing SOE with PC. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.8, and the coefficients of the 
interactive terms are the main concerns. It is observed that the coefficients of 
Mutualratio*PC are significantly negative in column (1) and column (3), and the 
coefficients of Mutualdisp*PC are significantly positive in column (4) and column (6). 
These results suggest that the effects of domestic mutual funds’ contestability on firm 
innovation are less significant when CEOs are politically connected, indicating that 
institutional investors are unable to monitor politically connected CEOs (who are 
entrenched) or force them to innovate. These results provide some additional evidence 
that quiet life view cannot explain the mechanism that how institutional investors affect 
firm innovation in China. 
Overall, the empirical results show that the effects of domestic mutual funds’ 
contestability on firm innovation are stronger in firms facing intense product market 
competition, and also less significant in firms where managers are more entrenched and 
are less concerned about their careers. These results suggest that career concern view is 
applied to explain the effects of institutional investors on firm innovation.  
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Table 3.8 The effects of political connection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: The natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one 
Mutualratio 0.442***  0.370**    
 (3.01)  (2.44)    
QFIIratio  1.545 1.827    
  (0.74) (0.82)    
Mutualdisp    -0.472***  -0.410*** 
    (-3.66)  (-3.07) 
QFIIdisp     -0.804 -0.807 
     (-0.58) (-0.58) 
Mutualratio*PC -0.311**  -0.263*    
 (-2.17)  (-1.75)    
QFIIratio*PC  -0.480 -0.575    
  (-0.28) (-0.32)    
Mutualdisp*PC    0.277**  0.237* 
    (2.24)  (1.81) 
QFIIdisp*PC     0.319 0.349 
     (0.33) (0.31) 
PC 0.337*** 0.521*** 0.343*** 0.068 0.224 -0.237 
 (9.82) (16.33) (10.02) (0.58) (0.24) (-0.22) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 
R-squared 0.311 0.266 0.313 0.311 0.255 0.313 
This table presents the effects political connection on institutional investors’ effects. Dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. PC is a dummy variable if there is 
political connection in a firm and 0 otherwise. All the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 
3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed 
using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
3.5.3 Corporate governance channel 
In the hypothesis development, it is noted that institutional investors can utilise the 
firm proprietary information to improve the corporate governance which facilitates their 
monitoring over the managerial behaviours. Then, this section aims to provide empirical 
evidence to test this argument. It has been shown that analysts are both processers and 
producers of information (Healy and Palepu, 2001), so institutional investors are likely 
to demand for analyst service (Boone and White, 2015) to increase the availability of 
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firm information to further lower the information asymmetry and make more efficient 
monitoring. In this sense, analysts can improve corporate governance.  
Then, to test whether institutional investors’ contestability can enhance firm 
innovation via improving corporate governance, the analyst coverage is used to measure 
the level of corporate governance. The analyst information is obtained from the Analyst 
Forecast dataset in CSMAR. If corporate governance is a channel, it is expected that the 
effects of domestic mutual funds’ contestability on firm innovation would be weaker in 
firms with more analyst coverage. Empirically, a new variable is created, Analyst, 
calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the raw value of analyst coverage. 
Equation (3.2) is re-estimated by replacing SOE with Analyst. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.9. The interactive terms are the main 
concern. It is obtained that the coefficients of Matualratio*Analyst in columns (1) and 
(3) are negative and significant at 5% level, and the coefficients of 
Mutualcontest*Analyst in columns (4) and (6) are positive and significant at 1% level. 
These results indicate that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds’ competition 
with the controlling shareholders are weaker in firms with more analyst coverage. These 
results suggest that the positive effects of domestic mutual funds are more significant in 
firms where corporate governance is weaker. The results support the argument that as 
important monitors, institutional investors could efficiently improve corporate 






Table 3.9 Results of testing corporate governance channel 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: The natural logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one 
Mutualratio 0.581***  0.550***    
 (2.82)  (2.68)    
QFIIratio  3.442 3.220    
  (1.41) (1.26)    
Mutualdisp    -0.635***  -0.608*** 
    (-3.94)  (-3.77) 
QFIIdisp     -2.041 -1.694 
     (-1.27) (-1.03) 
Mutualratio*Analyst -0.156**  -0.156**    
 (-2.38)  (-2.38)    
QFIIratio*Analyst  -0.554 -0.487    
  (-0.85) (-0.72)    
Mutualdisp*Analyst    0.162***  0.163*** 
    (2.95)  (2.96) 
QFIIdisp*Analyst     0.369 0.303 
     (0.86) (0.68) 
Analyst 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.073*** -0.083* -0.294 -0.387 
 (5.23) (5.71) (5.17) (-1.68) (-0.69) (-0.87) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 22,705 
R-squared 0.307 0.306 0.316 0.308 0.306 0.308 
This table presents the results of testing corporate governance channel. Dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of one-year leading patent application plus one. Analyst represents analyst coverage each year 
calculated by the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts tracking the firm each year. All the 
other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 3.1. Year dummies and industry dummies are 
included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm 
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The Chinese economy has developed rapidly since the late 1970s and the 
improvement of firm innovation is crucial for economy development. The increasingly 
important role that institutional investors play in capital markets motivates the 
investigation of their effect on firm innovation in the emerging market of China. In 
particular, the co-existence of both significant institutional ownership and controlling 
shareholders provides an interesting setting to draw meaningful inference about the 
effectiveness of institutional investors’ functions. 
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This chapter uses patent data as a measure of firm innovation and then compares 
the effect that domestic mutual funds and QFIIs have on firm innovation. This chapter 
also uses the ratio of institutional ownership to the controlling shareholders’ ownership 
and their difference to measure institutional investors’ contestability of the controlling 
shareholders. Using a large sample of Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2017, it is 
found that domestic mutual funds’ contestability can significantly enhance firm 
innovation, indicating that in the presence of controlling shareholders, domestic mutual 
funds still can efficiently improve firm innovation by forming contestability and 
competing with the controlling shareholders. However, the contestability by QFIIs does 
not have significant effect on firm innovation, because they are faced with strict 
regulations of their investment in listed firms, unique cultures such as relationship-
based and government intervened economy. These strong challenges discourage QFIIs 
to compete with the controlling shareholders. These results are robust when addressing 
endogeneity issues using the Heckman two-stage model, PSM method and change 
regressions. The results are also robust when using several different proxies for firm 
innovation. 
Moreover, the effects of contestability on firm innovation are also subject to the 
controlling shareholder’s identities, and it is found that the effect of domestic mutual 
funds’ contestability is weaker in SOEs than in non-SOEs. Further analysis shows that 
the effect of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation is achieved 
through improving corporate governance and alleviating managerial career concerns 
which are consistent with the career concerns view. In particular, this chapter finds that 
the effect of domestic mutual funds’ contestability becomes weaker when firms face 
less competitive market, when CEOs have political connections and firms with more 
analyst coverage.  
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Overall, the main results support the view that institutional investors have positive 
effects on firm innovation, but their effects are subject to the identity of institutional 
investors as well as their contestability of the controlling shareholders in China. The 
results of significant influence by the domestic mutual funds indicate the success of the 
promoting institutional ownership to some extent in China’s equity market. However, 
the insignificant influence by the foreign institutional investors calls for further reform 
on foreign institutional ownership and release of restrictions over their investment 















Chapter 4 Institutional investors, controlling shareholders and 
accounting conservatism 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the influence of institutional investors on accounting 
conservatism in China. Accounting conservatism is the asymmetrical verification 
requirement for gains and losses (Basu, 1997). Conservative accounting requires 
economic losses to be recognized on a timely basis, which can mitigate managers’ self-
interest behaviours, such as risky investments and overstating financial performance 
(Watts, 2003a; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011; Lara et al., 
2016). It has been reported that shareholders treat accounting conservatism as an 
effective governance device to mitigate the agency issue with managers (Ball, 2001; 
Watts, 2003a; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012; Lin, 2016). This particularly applies to 
institutional investors who are deemed to be sophisticated and to have a substantial 
equity stake (Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). However, this evidence is derived from 
the US setting where the agency problem between managers and shareholders 
dominates; this inference becomes unclear in emerging markets where the agency 
problem between majority and minority shareholders is prominent. In emerging markets, 
ownership is usually concentrated with controlling shareholders, who thus have strong 
incentives to monitor/discipline managers. Such incentives, to a large extent, can 
mitigate the interest conflicts between managers and shareholders, leaving the agency 
problem between controlling shareholders and other investors as the major agency issue 
(Fan and Wong, 2002). In such emerging markets, controlling shareholders are usually 
the ultimate decision makers in firm policies. Existing studies have documented that 
controlling shareholders tend to accept a low level of accounting conservatism than is 
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expected by minority shareholders. In particular, controlling shareholders would further 
downgrade their acceptable level of accounting conservatism for their self-interest 
purposes (Fan and Wong, 2002; LaFond, 2005; Cullinan et al., 2012). It is also 
documented that accounting conservatism is more beneficial to minority shareholders 
and creditors in emerging markets, as accounting conservatism provides timely signals 
of default risk, which will prevent controlling shareholder expropriation and mitigate 
creditor concerns (Ahmed et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010; Haw et al., 2014). 
Given the exsitence of controlling shareholders in emerging markets, it is thus 
worthwhile to investigate whether institutional investors, who are usually non-
controlling shareholders with a relatively large percentage of shares, still have 
incentives to require accounting conservatism.   
In addition, it has been agreed that institutional investors are sophisticated and 
professional in collecting and processing information. Thus, institutional investors have 
the  ability to directly discipline managers and influence corporate governance (Hartzell 
and Starks, 2003; Ming et al., 2018; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2000; 
Ingley et al., 2004). Therefore, insitutional investors may be less dependent on financial 
numbers to exert monitoring on managers and therefore have less demand for 
accounting conservatism. Furthermore, unlike domestic institutional investors, foreign 
institutional investors are faced with cultural barriers (Chakravarty et al., 1998; Liu et 
al., 2014; Luong et al., 2017), which mitigate their direct monitoring effects. Thus, the 
influence of institutional investors on accounting conservatism becomes more unclear 
and their demand for accounting conservatism may be subject to their identities. 
This chapter aims to provide insights into the effects of institutional investors on 
firm accounting conservatism in the emerging market of China. This presents a well-
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suited laboratory setting for analysis in the following aspects: First, China is the largest 
emerging market with characteristics that are different from developed markets, such as 
concentrated ownership, weak law enforcement and weak investor protection. 
Particularly, the major types of controlling shareholder in China are the government and 
families that have different economic objectives. Institutional investors are usually non-
controlling shareholders, so that their effects are more likely to be influenced by the 
controlling shareholders. The significant variation of controlling shareholder types 
enables testing of the influence of institutional investors in the presence of different 
types of controlling shareholders.  
Second, accounting conservatism has been emphasized in China’s regulations 
(Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, amended in 2006). However, it is 
argued that the adoption of accounting conservatism is subject to the strength of legal 
enforcement (Ahmed and Duellman, 2011). If the law enforcement is weak, the benefits 
of conservatism may not hold, which discourages institutional investors’ demand for 
accounting conservatism. The underdeveloped legal system and weak law enforcement 
in China enables this study to draw inferences of the real effects of institutional 
ownership on accounting conservatism in emerging markets. Moreover, there are 
various types of institutional investors in the market, such as domestic mutual funds 
owned by local private entities, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) owned 
by foreigners, and other state-owned institutional investors (such as banks and social 
security funds). These institutional investors have different investment objectives, so 
they may have different incentives for the level of conservatism they demand. This 
setting provides sufficient tension to investigate the effects of different types of 
institutional investors on firm accounting conservatism.  
117 
 
Empirically, this study uses China’s listed firms from 2003 to 2015 as a sample to 
investigate the different influences of domestic and foreign institutional investors on 
firm accounting conservatism. Findings are as follows: First, domestic mutual funds’ 
ownership could lower the level of accounting conservatism, while QFIIs’ ownership 
could increase the level of accounting conservatism. Second, the level of accounting 
conservatism could be further lowered when domestic mutual funds’ ownership level is 
close to that of the controlling shareholders, while further increased when QFIIs’ 
ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholders. Third, the negative effects of 
domestic mutual funds on accounting conservatism are weaker in SOEs, firms with 
lower level of ownership concentration, and firms with less analyst coverage. 
Furthermore, domestic mutual funds’ ownership has negative effects on firms’ stock 
price crash risk. The results are robust using an alternative proxy for accounting 
conservatism, and after addressing endogeneity issues using the firm fixed effects 
model, propensity score matching (PSM) method and the Heckman two-stage technique.  
This chapter contributes to existing literature in the following ways: First, this 
chapter is related to the literature about the influence of institutional investors on firm 
accounting conservatism. Existing studies about the effects of institutional investors on 
accounting conservatism are mostly focused on developed markets (Ramalingegowda 
and Yu, 2012; Cheng et al., 2015; Lin, 2016), while this chapter provides insights into 
an emerging market, China. The results show that domestic mutual funds have negative 
effects on accounting conservatism in China which is different from the case in the US 
(Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012).   
Second, this chapter extends studies of the role of institutional investors in the 
Chinese market. Given the high ownership concentration in China, the incentives for 
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institutional investors to affect firm policies are influenced by the controlling 
shareholders’ ownership. It is found that the effects of institutional investors on firm 
accounting conservatism are not only determined by their ownership level, but more 
importantly determined by the difference in ownership level between them and the 
controlling shareholders. 
More generally, this chapter enriches studies about the effects of equity investors 
on firm accounting conservatism (Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003a) by looking at an important 
type of equity investor, institutional investors. It is found that institutional investors’ 
demands for accounting conservatism are subject to their identities. In particular, local 
investors are able to monitor managers’ behaviours directly, so they rely less on 
financial numbers for monitoring and thus require a lower level of accounting 
conservatism, while foreign institutional investors require a higher level of accounting 
conservatism.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces 
background and develops hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the sample, model and 
variables measurement. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results. Section 4.5 presents 
results of additional analysis and further evidence and section 4.5 draws some 
conclusions. 
4.2 Background and hypotheses 
4.2.1 Firm accounting conservatism in China 
Accounting conservatism is the asymmetric verification threshold for recognizing 
good news as gains versus recognizing bad news as losses: the verification threshold for 
recognizing good news as gains is higher than recognizing bad news as losses (Basu, 
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1997). Conservatism has been applied to China’s firms since July 1985, when the 
Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China enacted the Accounting 
Regulations for the Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment.  In the 
following three decades, accounting regulations have been evolving and the 
conservatism principle has been playing an important role in China’s firms. At the end 
of 1992, the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China issued Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises (1992), which for the first time explicitly required 
firms to follow the conservatism principle. Issued in February 2006, Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises (amended in 2006) treats conservatism as a tool to 
reduce information asymmetry, which further emphasizes the importance of the 
conservatism principle. Currently, the benefits of accounting conservatism have been 
widely documented in terms of improving firm value by reducing information 
asymmetry, mitigating agency costs (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Watts, 2003a) and 
constraining earnings overstatement (Kwon et al., 2001). 
4.2.2 Effects of institutional investors on accounting conservatism 
Conservative accounting plays a restraining role over self-dealing behaviours of 
managers such as risky investment and overstatement of earnings (Ball, 2001; Watts, 
2003a). Accounting conservatism therefore helps reduce agency problems between 
managers and shareholders, and this favours the interests of equity holders (Ahmed et 
al., 2002; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Lafond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Lara et al., 
2009; Balakrishnan et al., 2016; Francis et al., 2013). Thus, shareholders intentionally 
require a high level of conservative accounting (Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). 
However, the incentives of institutional investors to demand for accounting 
conservatism are heterogeneous according to their identities.  
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Domestic mutual funds have been recognized as sophisticated investors and are 
well informed about the investee firms. They are able to monitor managers’ behaviours 
directly, by strengthening the managerial pay-performance relationship or through site 
visits (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; 
Ingley et al., 2004; Jiang and Yuan, 2018; Ming et al., 2018). Therefore, domestic 
mutual funds may be less dependent on the accounting numbers in conducting 
monitoring on managers, and thereby have weaker incentives to demand accounting 
conservatism. Thus, mutual funds’ ownership could lower the level of accounting 
conservatism.   
However, unlike domestic mutual funds, QFIIs are geographically far from the 
investee firms, so it is difficult for them to observe and monitor managers’ behaviours 
directly. More importantly in China, QFIIs are faced with more severe information 
asymmetry due to cultural barriers such as the relationship-based economy and the 
existence of various dialects (Chakravarty et al., 1998; Liu et al., 2014; Luong et al., 
2017). Consequently, their direct monitoring over managers’ behaviours becomes even 
less straightforward. Therefore, compared with domestic mutual funds, accounting 
conservatism, as a governance device, is more effective and important for QFIIs, so 
QFIIs tend to monitor managers via accounting numbers, rather than over managers’ 
behaviours directly. Thus, the first hypothesis is formed as follows: 
H1: Domestic mutual funds could lower the level of accounting conservatism, while 
QFIIs could increase the level of accounting conservatism. 
Furthermore, firm ownership in China is usually concentrated and the controlling 
shareholders usually dominate the decisions on information disclosure. To facilitate 
their expropriation of other investors, controlling shareholders are reluctant to adopt 
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conservative accounting to increase the information transparency (Fan and Wong, 2002; 
Cullinan et al., 2012; LaFond, 2005). In such circumstances, accounting conservatism 
could be beneficial for diversified minority shareholders as well as outside creditors by 
providing timely default alerts (Zhang, 2008; Haw et al., 2014; Nikolaev, 2010).  
In China, since the institutional investors are usually non-controlling shareholders, 
this chapter argues that their effect on adoption of accounting conservatism is 
influenced by the controlling shareholders. This argument is mainly motivated by the 
existing studies that examine the influence of multiple large shareholders (MLS). These 
studies find that large non-controlling shareholders can monitor the controlling 
shareholders’ self-interest behaviours by forming control contestability of the 
controlling shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Jiang et al., 2018; Laeven 
and Levine, 2007). In the spirit of these studies, it is proposed that the effects of 
institutional investors may not only be relevant to their absolute ownership level, but 
also subject to the relative ownership level, namely the difference between their 
ownership and that of the controlling shareholders. As domestic mutual funds have less 
incentive to adopt conservative accounting, it is expected that this effect will be even 
stronger when their ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholders. However, 
unlike domestic mutual funds, QFIIs are likely to require conservative accounting in 
order to exert monitoring. When the ownership of QFIIs is getting closer to that of 
controlling shareholders, they are more likely to require a higher level of conservative 
accounting. Thus, the second hypothesis is formed: 
H2: The negative effects of domestic mutual funds and the positive effects of QFIIs 
on accounting conservatism become stronger when their ownership is closer to that of 
the controlling shareholders. 
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4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Data and sample selection 
The sample comprises all the A-share firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2003 to 2015. The sample period 
starts from 2003 because the ownership of institutional investors in firms’ annual 
reports was not reported until 2003. Following the common procedure, the final sample 
for empirical analysis is obtained after excluding firm-year observations flagged with 
ST or *ST
19
, from financial industry or with missing information. The final sample 
includes 2,757 firms and 17,890 firm-year observations. All the data are obtained from 
the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Specifically, 
the stock price and stock return are gathered from the “Stock Market Trading” dataset. 
Financial and governance information is collected from the “Financial Statement” 
dataset and the “Listed Firm Governance” dataset.  
4.3.2 Accounting conservatism measurement 
For the empirical analysis, this chapter employs the firm-year conservatism 
measure, C_Score, developed by Khan and Watts (2009) as the proxy for accounting 
conservatism. This method has been used by Chen et al. (2013) in the context of China. 
To calculate C_Score, the following annual cross-sectional model is estimated first: 
Ei,t/Pi,t-1=(λ0+λ1Sizei,t+λ2Levi,t+λ3MBi,t)+DRi,t(ĸ0+ĸ1Sizei,t+ĸ2Levi,t+ĸ3MBi,t) 
               +Ri,t(µ0+µ1Sizei,t+µ2Levi,t+µ3MBi,t) 
                      +DRi,t*Ri,t(ʋ0+ʋ1Sizei,t+ʋ2Levi,t+ʋ3MBi,t)+εi,t                                                         (4.1) 
                                                 
19
 ST stands for Special Treatment and refers to the listed firms that have had negative net profits for two 
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have has negative net profits for three consecutive 
years and thus are probably to be delisted from the stock exchanges. 
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where E is earnings per share, P is year-end stock price per share, R is yearly buy-and-
hold return, and DR is a dummy variable that equals 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Size is the natural logarithm of market value of equity, Lev is defined as the sum of total 
debt divided by market value of equity, MB is market-to-book ratio. Equation (4.1) is 
estimated annually. Annual cross-sectional estimation of model (4.1) results in ʋ0 to ʋ3 
being constant across firms but vary over time. The good news timeliness measure is 
µ0+µ1Sizei,t+µ2Levi,t+µ3MBi,t, The measure of incremental timeliness for bad news over 
good news, or conservatism is ʋ0+ʋ1Sizei,t+ʋ2Levi,t+ʋ3MBi,t, and the total bad news 
timeliness is (µ0+µ1Sizei,t+µ2Levi,t+µ3MBi,t)+(ʋ0+ʋ1Sizei,t+ʋ2Levi,t+ʋ3MBi,t). Then, 
C_Score can be calculated for each firm-year as: 
                  C_Score=ʋ0+ʋ1Sizei,t+ʋ2Levi,t+ʋ3MBi,t                                                                               (4.2) 
The firm-level constant coefficients: ʋ0, ʋ1, ʋ2 and ʋ3 that are obtained from 
estimation of equation (4.1) are substituted into equation (4.2). Then C_Score varies 
across firms through cross-sectional variation in the firm-year characteristics (Size, Lev 
and MB). 
4.3.3 Institutional investors and ownership measurement 
To test the effects of institutional ownership on accounting conservatism (H1), two 
variables are constructed: The first variable is Mutual, which is defined as the 
percentage of common shares held by domestic mutual funds, and the second variable is 
QFII, which is defined as the percentage of common shares held by QFIIs.  
To test the ownership difference between institutional investors and the controlling 
shareholders on accounting conservatism (H2), this chapter considers three measures to 
denote the ownership differences following the existing studies (Laeven and Levine, 
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2007; Attig et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2018). Firstly, two variables are constructed to 
represent the difference between the institutional investors’ ownership level and that of 
the controlling shareholders: The first variable is Mutualdiff, which is defined as the 
controlling shareholders’ ownership level minus that of the domestic mutual funds. The 
second variable is QFIIdiff, which is defined as the controlling shareholders’ ownership 
level minus the QFIIs’ ownership. Secondly, this chapter considers the ratio of 
institutional investors’ ownership to that of the controlling shareholder, and constructs 
two variables: The first variable is Mutualratio, which is the ratio of domestic mutual 
funds’ ownership level to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. The second variable 
is QFIIratio, which is the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership level to the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership. Thirdly, this chapter considers an ownership dispersion 
measure, and constructs two variables: The first variable is Mutualdisp, which is 
defined as (the controlling shareholder’s ownership - mutual funds’ ownership) / (the 
controlling shareholder’s ownership + mutual funds’ ownership). The second variable is 
QFIIdisp, which is defined as (the controlling shareholder’s ownership - QFIIs’ 
ownership) / (the controlling shareholder’s ownership + QFIIs’ ownership).  
4.3.4 Model specification 
To test the effects of institutional investors on firm accounting conservatism, this 
chapter develops the following regression model: 
C_Scorei,t=α0+α1Mutuali,t+ α2QFIIi,t+ α3Asseti,t+ α4ROAi,t+ α5Boardi,t+α6Indepi,t 
                  + α7Leveragei,t+ α8SOEi,t+ α9Otherinsi,t+ Dummy(year)+εi,t                (4.3)   
where C_Score is the measure of accounting conservatism as defined in section 4.3.2.  
Mutual is the percentage of shares held by domestic mutual funds. QFII represents the 
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percentage of shares held by QFIIs. These two ownership level measures are put in one 
regression, which enables direct comparison between domestic mutual funds and QFIIs. 
α1 and α2 are used to test Hypothesis H1. According to H1, α1 is expected to be 
significantly negative and α2 is expected to be significantly positive.  
 
Table 4.1 Variable definition 
Variables Definitions 
Panel A: Firm accounting conservatism 
C_Score The same as that defined in the study of Khan and Watts (2009) 
Panel B: Institutional ownership  
Mutual 
The percentage of shares owned by domestic mutual funds in a 
firm.  
QFII The percentage of shares owned by QFIIs in a firm 
Mutualdiff 
The difference between mutual funds’ ownership and the 
controlling shareholder’s ownership 
QFIIdiff 
The difference between QFIIs’ ownership and the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership 
Mutualratio 
The ratio of mutual funds’ ownership to the largest shareholder’s 
ownership 
QFIIratio 
The ratio of QFIIs’ ownership to the largest shareholder’s 
ownership 
Mutualdisp 
(The largest shareholder’s ownership-mutual funds’ ownership) / 
(The largest shareholder’s ownership + mutual funds’ ownership) 
QFIIdisp 
(The largest shareholder’s ownership-QFIIs’ ownership) / (The 
largest shareholder’s ownership + QFIIs’ ownership) 
Panel C: Other variables  
SOE 
A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is ultimately 
controlled by the government and 0 otherwise 
Otherins 
The sum of the percentage of shares owned by other institutional 
investors (banks, insurance companies, social security funds, 
brokers, entrust companies, and financial companies) in a firm. 
Board size (Board) Nature logarithm of the number of directors on the board 
Independent directors 
(Independent) Proportion of independent directors on the board 
lev Total debts/total assets in market value 
Size Nature logarithm of total assets in market value 
Analyst The number of stock analysts 
Asset Natural logarithm of firm total assets.  
Leverage  The ratio of total debt to total assets 
ROA Net income/total assets 
Indexdom 
A dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is included into 
Shanghai 180 Index or Shenzhen Component Index and 0 
otherwise. 
MSCI 
A dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm is included in MSCI 
China A inclusion index, and 0 otherwise 
NCSKEW A skewness-based measure of crash risk 




In addition, this chapter also includes several control variables in the model. The 
variable definitions are listed in Table 4.1. Specifically: Asset is the natural logarithm of 
firm total assets; ROA is return on assets, defined as the ratio of net income to firm total 
assets; Board is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board; Indep is 
the percentage of independent directors; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; 
SOE is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm is controlled by the 
government and 0 otherwise; Otherins denotes the sum of ownership by all the other 
institutional investors (including banks, insurance companies, pension funds, brokers, 
entrust companies, social securities, and financial companies). Year dummy variables 
are included to control for the year fixed effects. To address the issue that institutional 
ownership and the level of accounting conservatism can be determined jointly by some 
unobserved firm-specific variables, this chapter estimates equations with firm fixed 
effects model. 
To test Hypothesis H2, equation (4.3) is re-estimated by replacing the ownership of 
institutional investors with the ownership differences between institutional investors and 
the controlling shareholder defined in section 4.3.3. Empirically, three difference-based 
regressions are carried out. In the first regression, Mutual and QFII are replaced by 
Mutualdiff and QFIIdiff respectively. In the second regression, Mutual and QFII are 
replaced by Mutualratio and QFIIratio respectively. In the third regression, Mutual and 
QFII are replaced by Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp respectively. Importantly, to mitigate the 
concern that these ownership difference measures may just capture the level of 
controlling shareholder’s ownership, this chapter also includes two new control 
variables in each regression: Mutuald and QFIId, which indicate the presence of mutual 
funds and QFIIs respectively. Specifically, Mutuald is a dummy variable which equals 
to 1 if there are mutual funds as shareholders in a firm, and 0 otherwise. QFIId is a 
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dummy variable which equals to 1 if there are QFIIs as shareholders in a firm, and 0 
otherwise. The reason that these two dummy variables are included as control variables 
rather than the ownership level of mutual funds (Mutual) and QFIIs (QFII), is because 
of the collinearity issue caused by the fact that the sum of Mutual and Mutualdiff equals 
the sum of QFII and QFIIdiff. All the other control variables have the same definitions 
with those in equation (4.3). 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical 
analyses. Panel A shows the statistics for accounting conservatism. Note that the 
average level of conservatism (C_Score) is 0.049, which is comparable to 0.062 
reported by Li (2015) for China’s firms. Panel B shows the statistics for institutional 
ownership. It is noted that among the firms that have domestic mutual funds as 
shareholders, the average mutual fund ownership is 4.028%. Among the firms that have 
QFIIs as shareholders, the average QFII ownership is 1.387%. These numbers are quite 
consistent with existing studies (Firth et al., 2016). The statistics for ownership 
difference measures show that: the mean values of Mutualdiff and QFIIdiff are 34.061% 
and 39.542%, respectively; the mean values of Mutualratio and QFIIratio are 13.902% 
and 4.273%, respectively; and the mean values of Mutualdisp and QFIIdisp are 79.169% 
and 87.293%, respectively. These statistics suggest that institutional investors are 
mostly non-controlling shareholders and the large variation of ownership difference 
measures enables the investigation of the impact of ownership differences on 
accounting conservatism. Panel C shows the statistics for corporate governance and 
firm characteristics. Note that the average board size, number of independent directors 
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and leverage ratio are 9.078, 3.288 and 45.165%, respectively. The average controlling 
shareholder’s ownership is 37.417%, which suggests that there is a high ownership 
concentration in China’s firms. Panel D shows the distribution of the sample firms, of 
which 51.33% are SOEs and 48.67% are non-SOEs.  
 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Firm 
number 
Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75% Max 
Panel A: Accounting conservatism 
C_score 17,890 2,757 0.049 0.252 0 0.039 0.090 0.650 
Panel B: Institutional ownership 
B.1: Full sample 
Mutual (%) 17,890 2,757 2.935 4.074 0 1.140 4.293 43.800 
QFII (%)  17,890 2,757 0.151 1.112 0 0 0 60.320 
Otherins (%) 17,890 2,757 2.145 3.764 0.160 0.999 2.730 73.030 
Mutualdiff (%) 17,890 2,757 34.482 16.537 21.905 32.910 46.170 89.990 
QFIIdiff (%) 17,890 2,757 37.266 15.710 24.780 35.625 48.760 89.990 
Mutualratio (%) 17,890 2,757 10.127 17.709 0 3.166 12.547 330.198 
QFIIratio(%) 17,890 2,757 0.465 2.862 0 0 0 9.765 
Mutuldisp(%) 17,890 2,757 84.825 20.856 77.704 93.861 100 100 
QFIIdisp(%) 17,890 2,757 92.011 10.880 88.298 96.615 100 100 
B.2: Observations of non-zero values of mutual funds/QFIIs’ ownership 
Mutual (%) 13,033 2,588 4.028 4.286 0.850 2.465 5.840 43.800 
QFII (%) 1,948 882 1.387 3.107 0.390 0.800 1.570 60.320 
Others (%) 13,873 2,683 2.773 4.071 0.680 1.610 3.400 73.030 
Mutualdiff (%) 13,033 2,588 34.061 16.989 21.059 32.710 46.240 88.900 
QFIIdiff (%) 1,948 882 39.542 16.454 26.445 39.130 51.576 88.300 
Mutualratio (%) 13,033 2,588 13.902 19.443 0 3.166 12.547 330.198 
QFIIratio (%) 1,948 882 4.273 7.681 0.960 2.157 4.668 100 
Mutualdisp (%) 13,033 2,588 79.169 21.893 70.020 87.000 95.497 99.989 
QFIIdisp (%) 1,948 882 87.293 13.511 82.002 91.704 97.126 99.932 
Panel C: Corporate governance and firm characteristics 
Board Size 17,890 2,757 9.078 1.894 8 9 9 19 
Independent 
Directors 
17,890 2,757 3.288 0.683 3 3 4 8 
Leverage (%) 17,890 2,757 45.165 20.932 28.865 45.769 61.570 89.740 
Asset (million) 17,890 2,757 11,600 61,300 1,370 2,810 6,720 2,410,000 
ROA (%) 17,890 2,757 4.151 5.341 1.589 3.921 6.796 19.268 
Controlling (%) 17,890 2,757 37.417 15.697 24.940 35.760 48.910 89.990 
Panel D: Firm type distributions 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
Observations  9183(51.33%) 8707(48.67%) 
This table reports the summary statistics of all the variables for the full sample from 2003 to 2005. Panel 
A is summary statistics for accounting conservatism (C_Score). Panel B reports the summary statistics for 
institutional ownership. Panel C is summary statistics for variables representing corporate governance and 
firm characteristics. Panel D is summary for firm distributions between state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) 
and non-state-owned-enterprises (non-SOEs). All the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 
4.1. The value of variables is in terms of China’s currency, the RMB. 
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4.4.2 Institutional investors and accounting conservatism 
The results of estimating equation (4.3) are reported in Table 4.3, and validate the 
first hypothesis (H1). The dependent variable is accounting conservatism (C_Score). 
Table 4.3 reports the results of institutional investors’ effects on firm accounting 
conservatism with and without considering the additional effects of control variables.  
 
Table 4.3 Effects of institutional ownership on accounting conservatism 
Dependent variable: C_Score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Mutual -0.138** -0.081** -0.151** 
 (-2.31) (-1.98) (-2.52) 
QFII 1.437*** 0.332** 1.356*** 
 (3.56) (2.38) (3.51) 
Asset  0.002 0.008 
  (1.35) (1.32) 
ROA  0.017 0.137*** 
  (0.50) (2.61) 
Board  -0.018* -0.038 
  (-1.79) (-1.57) 
Independent  -0.023 -0.009 
  (-0.70) (-0.14) 
Leverage  -0.165*** -0.201*** 
  (-16.29) (-9.99) 
SOE  0.009*** -0.024 
  (2.64) (-1.43) 
Otherins  0.004 -0.060 
  (0.11) (-0.92) 
Constant  0.149*** 0.078 
  (3.73) (0.58) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes No 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes 
Observations 17,890 17,890 17,890 
R-squared 0.309 0.330 0.347 
This table reports the results of institutional investors’ ownership on firm accounting conservatism. 
Dependent variable is C_score. Specifically, column (1) shows results of using firm-fixed effects model 
without including other control variables except for year dummies. Column (2) shows results of using 
ordinary least square (OLS) model after including a set of control variables as well as year and industry 
fixed effects. Column (3) shows results of using firm-fixed effects model after including a set of control 
variables. Mutual refers to domestic mutual funds’ ownership. QFII refers to QFIIs’ ownership. All the 
other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Specifically, column (1) reports the results of using a firm-fixed effects model without 
controlling other variables except for year dummies. Column (2) reports the results of 
an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression after including a set of control variables in 
equation (4.3) as well as industry fixed effects. Column (3) reports the results of using 
firm-fixed effects model after including all the control variables in equation (4.3).  The 
overall results indicate that the estimated coefficients of the key variables are consistent, 
so this chapter mainly focuses on the third column for an interpretation. 
In column (3), it is observed that the estimated coefficient of Mutual (-0.151) is 
negative and significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.52). By contrast, the estimated 
coefficient of QFII (1.356) is positive and significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.51). 
These results suggest that accounting conservatism is a decreasing function of domestic 
mutual fund ownership, while it is a positive function of QFII ownership. The results 
support hypothesis H1 that domestic mutual funds have negative effects on firm 
accounting conservatism, while foreign institutional investors have positive effects on 
conservatism. 
The results of testing the effects of ownership difference between institutional 
investors and the controlling shareholders (H2) are reported in Table 4.4. Column (1) 
shows the results using ownership difference proxies, column (2) shows the results 
using ownership ratio proxies and column (3) shows the results using ownership 
dispersion proxies. In column (1), it is found that the estimated coefficient of Mutualdiff 
is positive and significant at the 1% level (coefficient is 0.181, and t-value is 2.91). 
However, the estimated coefficient of QFIIdiff is negative and significant at the 1% 
level (coefficient is -0.246, and t-value is -3.26). Column (2) shows that the coefficient 




Table 4.4 Effects of ownership difference between institutional investors and controlling 
shareholders on accounting conservatism 
Dependent variable: C_Score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Mutualdiff 0.181***   
 (2.91)   
QFIIdiff -0.246***   
 (-3.26)   
Mutualratio  -0.029*  
  (-1.80)  
QFIIratio  0.251**  
  (2.22)  
Mutualdisp   0.169*** 
   (2.75) 
QFIIdisp   -0.297** 
   (-2.45) 
Mutuald 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.15) (-0.35) (-0.25) 
QFIId 0.014* 0.007 0.007 
 (1.79) (0.80) (0.82) 
Asset 0.009 0.008 0.008 
 (1.43) (1.32) (1.33) 
ROA 0.154*** 0.131** 0.130** 
 (2.89) (2.50) (2.50) 
Board -0.039 -0.038 -0.038 
 (-1.59) (-1.54) (-1.54) 
Independent -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.13) 
Leverage -0.199*** -0.203*** -0.203*** 
 (-9.86) (-10.07) (-10.04) 
SOE -0.024 -0.025 -0.024 
 (-1.41) (-1.45) (-1.45) 
Otherins -0.071 -0.061 -0.059 
 (-1.07) (-0.93) (-0.90) 
Constant 0.090 0.075 0.202 
 (0.66) (0.55) (1.35) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,890 17,890 17,890 
R-squared 0.346 0.346 0.346 
This table reports the results of effects of ownership difference to that of the controlling shareholders on 
firm accounting conservatism. Mutualdiff represents the difference between domestic mutual funds’ 
ownership and the controlling shareholder’s ownership. QFIIdiff represents the difference between QFIIs’ 
ownership and the controlling shareholder’s ownership. Mutualratio represents the ratio of mutual funds’ 
ownership to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. QFIIratio represents the ratio of QFIIs’ ownership 
to the controlling shareholder’s ownership. Mutualdisp represents the difference of ownership between 
mutual funds and the controlling shareholder, and then scaled by their sum. QFIIdisp represents the 
difference of ownership between QFIIs and the controlling shareholder, and then scaled by their sum. All 
the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics 
(in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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coefficient of QFIIratio is 0.251 and significant at the 5% level (t-value is 2.22). In 
column (3), the coefficient of Mutuldisp is 0.169 and significant at the 1% level, while 
the coefficient of QFIIdisp is -0.297 and significant at the 5% level. These results 
indicate that domestic mutual funds have greater incentive toward lower conservatism 
when their ownership is close to that of the controlling shareholders, while QFIIs tend 
to increase conservatism when their ownership is close to that of the controlling 
shareholders. The results support hypothesis H2.  
Overall, the results are in line with the previous argument. Domestic mutual funds 
and QFIIs have contrary influence on firm accounting conservatism. The reason is that 
unlike domestic mutual funds, QFIIs are faced with more cultural challenges in 
observing managers’ actions directly, so QFIIs are more dependent on conservative 
financial numbers to monitor/ discipline managerial behaviour. Consequently, QFIIs 
have more demand for conservative accounting. These results are consistent with 
previous research about the difference in influence of domestic and foreign investors 
(Ferreira et al., 2017; Kang and Kim, 2010). 
4.4.3 Alternative measure of accounting conservatism 
To test the robustness of the results, this study also employs the accruals and cash 
flows (ACF) based accounting conservatism measure, suggested by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005). This measurement has also been used in the study by Lara et al. 
(2009). Ball and Shivakumar (2005) propose the following model: 
                Accri,t=β0+β1DCFOi,t+β2CFOi,t+β3CFOi,t*DCFOi,t+µi,t                    (4.4) 
where Accr denotes annual total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary items 
minus cash flow from operations. CFO is operating cash flow. DCFO is a dummy 
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variable that equals to 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise. Accr and CFO are both 
scaled by average total assets. In this model, β3 represents ACF-based accounting 
conservatism; a higher value of β3 corresponds to higher level of accounting 
conservatism. 
In the spirit of Lara et al. (2009), this study includes interactive terms in equation 
(4.4) and establishes the following model:  
  Accri,t= θ0+ θ1DCFOi,t+ θ 2CFOi,t+ θ 3CFOi,t*DCFOi,t+ θ4Mutuali,t 
                     + θ5Mutuali,t*CFOi,t + θ6Mutuali,t*DCFOi,t+ θ7Mutuali,t*CFOi,t*DCFOi,t 
              + θ8QFIIi,t+ θ9QFIIi,t*CFOi,t + θ10QFIIi,t*DCFOi,t 
                     + θ11QFIIi,t*CFOi,t*DCFOi,t+µi,t                                                             (4.5) 
where all the variables have the same definitions as those in previous equations. θ7 and 
θ11 reflect the effects of mutual funds and QFIIs on accounting conservatism, 
respectively. According to H1, θ7 is expected to be significantly negative, while θ11 is 
expected to be significantly positive. 
The results of estimating equation (4.5) are reported in Table 4.5. Column (1) 
shows results of focusing on ownership level of institutional investors and column (2) to 
(4) show results of focusing on the difference of ownership by institutional investors to 
the controlling shareholders. This chapter is mainly concerned with the coefficients of 
interactive terms that reflect the effects of domestic mutual funds and QFIIs on firm 
accounting conservatism. In column (1), it is observed that the coefficient of 
Mutual*CFO*DCFO (-12.858) is negative and significant at the 10% level (t-value is 




Table 4.5 Results of using accrual and cash flows-based measurement for conservatism 
Dependent variable: Accr ( annual total accruals) 
 Ownership level Ownership difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mutual 1.194***    
 (7.40)    
Mutual* CFO *DCFO -12.858*    
 (-1.87)    
QFII 0.649    
 (0.76)    
QFII* CFO *DCFO 40.813*    
 (1.90)    
Mutualdiff  -1.089***   
  (-6.83)   
Mutualdiff * CFO *DCFO  12.832**   
  (2.47)   
QFIIdiff  1.425***   
  (7.70)   
QFIIdiff* CFO *DCFO  -16.702***   
  (-2.75)   
Mutualratio   0.210***  
   (5.28)  
Mutualratio* CFO *DCFO   -2.849**  
   (-2.26)  
QFIIratio   0.181  
   (0.95)  
QFIIratio* CFO *DCFO   16.543***  
   (2.77)  
Mutualdisp    -0.098 
    (-0.79) 
Mutualdisp* CFO *DCFO    11.687*** 
    (3.71) 
QFIIdisp    -0.204 
    (-0.86) 
QFIIdisp* CFO *DCFO    -17.293*** 
    (-2.65) 
Constant and other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,507 16,507 16,507 16,507 
R-squared 0.082 0.089 0.078 0.081 
This table reports the results of institutional investors’ ownership on firm accounting conservatism using 
accrual and cash flows based measurement. The estimation method is firm fixed effects model. 
Dependent variable is annual total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary items minus cash 
flow from operations. Mutual refers to domestic mutual funds’ ownership. CFO is operating cash flow. 
DCFO is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise. Accr and CFO are both 
scaled by average total assets. Constant and the control variables (other less concerned variables in 
equation (4.4)) are included. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error 





10% level (t-value is 1.90). These results provide evidence consistent with Table 4.3, 
that domestic mutual funds have negative effects on firm accounting conservatism, 
while QFIIs have positive effects on accounting conservatism. With similar analysis, the  
results of the interactive terms in columns (2) to (4) suggest that domestic mutual funds 
have increased incentive to lower the accounting conservatism level when their 
ownership level is relatively close to that of the controlling shareholder, while QFIIs 
have a stronger demand for accounting conservatism when their ownership level is 
closer to that of the controlling shareholder. Overall, the previous findings are robust 
when using accrual and cash flows-based measurement for conservatism.  
4.4.4 Endogeneity concern 
The previous results using a firm fixed effects model can address endogeneity 
issues caused by the omitted unobservable firm-level variables. However, there is still 
an endogeneity issue: sample selection bias because institutional investors may tend to 
invest in those firms that implement a particular accounting conservatism policy. 
Therefore, to address this endogeneity issue and check the robustness of the previous 
results, this study employs the propensity score matching (PSM) method and the 
Heckman two-stage model to re-estimate the parameters of the empirical models.  
First, previous regressions are re-estimated using a PSM sample. A sample is 
constructed in which the treatment sample and control sample are matched by some 
similar firm characteristics. In this matching process, for each firm-year observation in 
the treatment sample (i.e., observations with both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs as 
shareholders), this chapter identifies an observation in the control sample (i.e., 




Table 4.6 Results of addressing endogeneity issues using PSM matching sample 
Panel A: Comparison of firm characteristics between treatment firms and control firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Treatment firms Control firms  Difference 
Asset 22.455 22.474 -0.019(-0.40) 
ROA 0.061 0.059 0.002(0.84) 
Board 2.329 2.337 -0.008(-1.10) 
Independent 0.365 0.364 0.001(0.29) 
Leverage 0.453 0.459 -0.006(-0.91) 
SOE 0.633 0.648 -0.015(-0.85) 
Others 0.020 0.019 0.001(0.40) 
Panel B: Results of using PSM matching sample 
Dependent variable: C_Score 
 Ownership level Ownership difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mutual -0.388*    
 (-1.93)    
QFII 1.263*    
 (1.72)    
Mutualdiff  0.307*   
  (1.76)   
QFIIdiff  -0.349*   
  (-1.69)   
Mutualratio   -0.080*  
   (-1.79)  
QFIIratio   0.276*  
   (1.77)  
Mutualdisp    0.220** 
    (2.14) 
QFIIdisp    -0.380* 
    (-1.95) 
Constant and 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 
R-squared 0.317 0.303 0.311 0.310 
This table shows the results of addressing endogeneity issues using PSM matching sample. Specifically, 
Panel A shows the comparison of firm characteristics between firms which have mutual funds and QFIIs 
as shareholders and control firms. T-tests are conducted to test for differences in mean values between 
firms which have mutual funds and QFIIs as shareholders and control firms. The t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses in Column (3).  Panel B shows the regressions results of using PSM matching sample. 
Constant and all the control variables in equation (4.3) are included in each regression and all the other 
variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) in other regressions are 
computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
the same/nearest propensity score of firm characteristics including firm size, ROA, 
board size, proportion of independent directors, leverage ratio, the type of ultimate  
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controlling shareholder and ownership of other institutional investors. Second, the 
matching sample obtained from PSM method is used to re-estimate the equations. The  
results of using the PSM method are reported in Table 4.6. Panel A compares firm 
characteristics between the treatment sample and the control sample. It is suggested that 
these characteristics are unlikely to drive the difference of accounting conservatism in 
firms with and without domestic mutual funds or QFIIs as shareholders. This validates 
the construction of matching sample. Panel B shows the regression results using this 
matching sample. All the results for the key variables are consistent with those in Table 
4.3, which confirms that the main results are robust. 
In addition, this chapter also uses the Heckman two-stage method to address any 
potential sample selection bias issue. The first stage of the procedure involves an 
analysis where the ownership of domestic mutual funds and QFIIs are separately 
regressed against the control variables from equation (4.3). To meet the exclusion 
restrictions, instrumental variables are included in each regression that are not included 
in the second-stage regression. The regression regarding domestic mutual funds 
includes an index-inclusion dummy variable (Indexdom). Indexdom is equal to one if 
the firm is included in the Shanghai 180 Index or the Shenzhen Component Index, and 0 
otherwise. In the regression regarding QFIIs, this method follows Luong et al. (2017) 
and includes an international index inclusion, the MSCI China A inclusion index. A 
dummy variable (MSCI) is constructed which equals to 1 if a firm is included in the 
MSCI China A inclusion index, and 0 otherwise. The inverse mills ratio (LambdaMutual 
and LambdaQFII) is obtained from the first stage and is included as an independent 
variable in the second stage regression analysis of accounting conservatism. First stage 




Table 4.7 Results of addressing endogeneity issues using Heckman two-stage method 
 First stage  Second stage  
Dependent variable Mutual QFII C_Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indexdom 0.008***      
 (2.66)      
MSCI  0.001**     
  (2.27)     
Mutual   -0.283***    
   (-4.62)    
QFII   1.260***    
   (3.53)    
Mutualdiff    0.216***   
    (4.01)   
QFIIdiff    -0.672**   
    (-2.40)   
Mutualratio     -0.041***  
     (-3.04)  
QFIIratio     0.241***  
     (2.59)  
Mutualdisp      0.176*** 
      (2.92) 
QFIIdisp      -0.287** 
      (-2.44) 
LambdaMutual   3.592** 20.966 -3.714** -3.696* 
   (2.52) (1.39) (-2.44) (-1.90) 
LambdaQFII   -2.718*** 13.736*** 1.383*** 1.382 
   (-3.17) (11.88) (12.08) (1.26) 
Constant and controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,890 17,890 17,890 17,890 17,890 17,890 
F-value 28.88 5.89     
R-squared 0.154 0.009 0.356 0.353 0.353 0.353 
This table shows the results of addressing endogeneity issues using Heckman two stage method. 
Specifically, column (1) and column (2) are the results of the first stage. Column (3) and column (4) are 
results of the second stage. Indexdom is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if a firm is included in 
Shanghai 180 Index or Shenzhen Component Index, and 0 otherwise. MSCI is a dummy variable which 
equals to 1 if a firm is included in MSCI China A Inclusion Index, and 0 otherwise. Constant and all the 
control variables in equation (4.3) are included in each regression and all the other variables’ definitions 
are the same as in Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) in other regressions are computed using 




second stage are given in columns (3) to (6) of Table 4.7. From the first stage, it is 
found that domestic mutual funds are more likely to invest in firms which are included  
in the Shanghai 180 Index or the Shenzhen Component Index, and QFIIs are more 
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likely to invest in firms which are included in the MSCI China A inclusion index. Then, 
in the second-stage results, it is observed that most of the coefficients for LambdaMutual 
and LambdaQFII are significant, indicating that sample selection bias and the 
endogeneity issue might exist in the previous analysis. After correcting for these 
endogeneity issues, the ownership level of domestic mutual funds still has negative 
effects on accounting conservatism, while QFIIs’ ownership level has positive effects. 
Both the negative effects of domestic mutual funds and the positive effects of QFIIs are 
stronger when their ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholders.   
4.5 Additional analysis and further evidence 
4.5.1 The effects of state ownership 
China’s firms can be classified into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-
owned enterprises (non-SOEs) based on the identity of the controlling shareholders. 
SOEs are firms ultimately controlled by the government, and non-SOEs are firms which 
are controlled by non-government entities. It is expected that the influence of 
institutional investors on accounting conservatism would be weaker in SOEs than in 
non-SOEs for the following reasons: Under the current Chinese political system, the 
appointment of managers in SOEs is usually decided by administrative authorities (Fan 
et al., 2013), so managers are more likely to make decisions following government 
policies. Therefore, managers’ behaviour is less likely to be monitored or affected by 
other non-controlling shareholders. Consequently, the direct monitoring by institutional 
investors would be less efficient in SOEs. Therefore, the negative effects of domestic 
mutual funds on accounting conservatism may become weaker in SOEs. In addition, 
SOEs are under severe control from the government, which makes them more like 
government institutions that have multiple objectives such as maintaining social 
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stability plus political objectives, rather than maximizing shareholder value. In this case, 
firm policies, including the adoption of conservative accounting are less likely to be 
influenced by other shareholders. Thus, in this section it is proposed that the effects of 
both domestic mutual funds and QFIIs on firm accounting conservatism would be 
weaker in SOEs than in non-SOEs.  
 
Table 4.8 Effects of state ownership 
Dependent variable: C_Score 
Sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutualdiff 0.019   0.337***   
 (0.20)   (4.14)   
QFIIdiff -0.070   -0.443***   
 (-0.61)   (-4.81)   
Mutualratio  0.016   -0.062***  
  (0.71)   (-2.78)  
QFIIratio  0.238*   0.429**  
  (1.81)   (2.01)  
Mutualdisp   0.116   0.333*** 
   (1.48)   (3.03) 
QFIIdisp   -0.264*   -0.573*** 
   (-1.73)   (-2.63) 
Constant and 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,183 9,183 9,183 8,707 8,707 8,707 
R-squared 0.334 0.334 0.334 0.406 0.405 0.405 
This table shows the results of examining the effects of state ownership. The estimation method is firm 
fixed effects model. Dependent variable is C_score. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) are results of testing 
SOEs. Columns (4) to (6) are results of testing non-SOEs. Constant and all the control variables in 
equation (4.3) are included in each regression and all the other variables’ definitions are the same as in 
Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm 
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
To provide evidence of this, the baseline regressions are repeated among SOEs and 
non-SOEs. The results of key variables are reported in Table 4.8. Columns (1) to (3) are 
results using the SOE subsample, and columns (4) to (6) are results using the non-SOE 
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subsample. It is observed that all the coefficients of key variables are significant in the 
non-SOEs subsample; while in the SOE subsample the ratio and dispersion proxies are 
significant only at the marginal level, which suggests that both the negative effects of 
domestic mutual funds and the positive effects of QFIIs are more pronounced in non-
SOEs. These results support the main argument of this chapter that the requirement of 
institutional investors for conservative accounting is subject to the identities of the 
controlling shareholders, and is also dependent on the efficiency of direct monitoring. 
Another possible reason for the weaker effects of institutional investors on accounting 
conservatism may be that SOEs are favoured by the government with soft credit 
constraints and government funding support, so creditors have less concern about the 
default risk of SOEs (Chen et al., 2010). As the monitoring initiative from creditors is 
weaker, the incentives for domestic mutual funds to require accounting conservatism 
become stronger. Overall, the results are in line with the literature about the weakening 
effects of state ownership on institutional investors’ impact in China (Firth et al., 2010; 
Huang and Zhu, 2015).  
4.5.2 The effects of ownership concentration 
Based on the main argument and previous evidence, the effects of institutional 
investors on accounting conservatism are subject to their ability to directly monitor the 
behaviour of managers, and more importantly are also influenced by their contestability 
of the controlling shareholders. It is thus expected that the influence of institutional 
investors would be more significant when there is a higher level of ownership 
concentration. Therefore, this chapter primarily proposes that the main results regarding 
the influence of institutional investors would be more significant in firms with a higher 
level of ownership concentration. To provide evidence of this, the sample is divided into 
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two groups: one group includes firms with higher level of ownership concentration, and 
the other group includes firms with lower level of ownership concentration. A firm is 
identified as with higher level of ownership concentration if the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership is larger than the mean value of the full sample, and a firm is 
identified as with lower level of ownership concentration if the controlling 
shareholder’s ownership is less than the mean value.  
 
Table 4.9 Effects of ownership concentration 
Dependent variable: C_Score 
Sample Firms where ownership is more 
concentrated 
Firms where ownership is less 
concentrated 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutualdiff 0.269***   0.147*   
 (2.70)   (1.68)   
QFIIdiff -0.428***   -0.156   
 (-3.25)   (-1.19)   
Mutualratio  -0.087**   -0.027  
  (-1.98)   (-1.52)  
QFIIratio  0.540*   0.139  
  (1.94)   (0.99)  
Mutualdisp   0.359**   0.078 
   (2.33)   (1.02) 
QFIIdisp   -0.610**   -0.120 
   (-2.01)   (-0.79) 
Constant and controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,948 8,948 8,948 8,942 8,942 8,942 
R-squared 0.329 0.329 0.329 0.374 0.374 0.374 
This table shows the results of examining the effects of ownership concentration. The estimation method 
is firm fixed effects model. Dependent variable is C_score. Columns (1) to (3) are the results of using 
firms where ownership is more concentrated as the sample. Columns (4) to (5) are the results of using 
firms where ownership is less concentrated as the sample. Constant and all the control variables in 
equation (4.3) are included in each regression and all the other variables’ definitions are the same as in 
Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm 




The baseline regressions are repeated for the firms with the higher and lower levels 
of ownership concentration. The results are presented in Table 4.9. The structure is 
consistent with that of Table 4.8. Columns (1) to (3) are the results of using firms where 
ownership is more concentrated. Columns (4) to (6) are the results of using firms where 
ownership is less concentrated. It is observed that all the results for key variables are 
significant in firms with the higher level of ownership concentration, while almost all of 
the coefficients in firms with lower level of ownership concentration are not significant, 
except that the coefficient of Mutualdiff is just marginally significant (t-value is 1.68). 
These results indicate that the negative effects of domestic mutual funds on accounting 
conservatism are more significant when ownership is more concentrated. These results 
support the previous argument and further verify that the demand by mutual funds in 
China for accounting conservatism differs from that in developed countries.  
4.5.3 The effects of firm information asymmetry 
Based on the argument above, the effects of institutional investors on firm 
accounting conservatism are subject to their direct monitoring capacity and 
effectiveness. It is difficult for institutional investors to monitor managers’ behaviour 
directly when information asymmetry is severe (Prendergast, 2002). Consequently, 
institutional investors may rely more on financial numbers for monitoring. It is 
proposed that the negative effects of domestic mutual funds on conservatism would be 
less significant in firms where there is more severe information asymmetry. Because the 
presence of analysts could improve the information environment (Healy and Palepu, 
2001), analyst coverage is used here as the measurement of information asymmetry. 




To provide evidence, the sample firms are divided into two groups: one group 
includes firms that have less severe information asymmetry, and the other group 
includes firms that have more severe information asymmetry. Firms of which the 
analyst number is more than the mean value of the sample are identified as having lower 
level of information asymmetry. Firms of which the analyst number is less than the 
mean value are identified as having higher level of information asymmetry. The 
baseline regressions are then repeated among these two groups. The results are reported 
in Table 4.10. Consistent with the structure of Table 4.8, columns (1) to (3) are results 
 
Table 4.10 Effects of information asymmetry 
Dependent variable: C_Score 
Sample Firms with more analyst coverage Firms with less analyst coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mutualdiff 0.316***   0.051   
 (4.26)   (0.34)   
QFIIdiff -0.433***   -0.081   
 (-3.74)   (-0.52)   
Mutualratio  -0.056***   -0.010  
  (-2.61)   (-0.30)  
QFIIratio  0.181   0.451*  
  (1.35)   (1.77)  
Mutualdisp   0.203***   0.200 
   (3.03)   (1.51) 
QFIIdisp   -0.309**   -0.393 
   (-2.33)   (-1.51) 
Constant and controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,843 8,843 8,843 8,705 8,705 8,705 
R-squared 0.469 0.468 0.468 0.312 0.313 0.312 
This table shows the results of examining the effects of firm information asymmetry. The estimation 
method is firm fixed effects model. Dependent variable is C_score. Specifically, columns (1) to (3) are 
results of testing firms which have more analyst coverage. Columns (4) to (6) are results of testing firms 
which have less analyst coverage. Constant and all the control variables in equation (4.3) are included in 
each regression and all the other variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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for firms with lower of information asymmetry, and columns (4) to (6) are results for 
firms with higher information asymmetry. It is observed that all the coefficients of 
domestic mutual funds measures are significant at the 1% level in firms with more 
analyst coverage, while they are not significant in firms with less analyst coverage. This 
indicates that the negative effects of domestic mutual funds’ ownership on accounting 
conservatism are stronger when there is a lower level of information asymmetry. In 
addition, the more significant results of QFIIs in firms with more analyst coverage 
reflect that decreased information asymmetry also facilitates QFIIs in positively 
promoting accounting conservatism. 
Overall, these results are consistent with the primary argument that as there is a 
lower level of information asymmetry in firms where there is more stock analyst 
tracking, and hence the direct monitoring of domestic mutual funds is more efficient. 
Thus, domestic mutual funds are more likely to rely on direct monitoring over managers’ 
behaviour than on financial numbers, thus their negative influence on conservatism 
becomes stronger.  
4.5.4 Alternative explanation of domestic mutual funds’ effects 
Based on the results above, this chapter argues that domestic mutual funds have 
negative effects on accounting conservatism. The reason is that domestic mutual funds 
are able to improve the corporate governance level by directly monitoring managers’ 
behaviours, hence they are less dependent on financial numbers. However, there could 
be an alternative explanation of domestic mutual funds’ negative effects on accounting 
conservatism in that domestic mutual funds may collude with the controlling 
shareholders in lowering the conservatism level for their private benefit. To test this 
alternative explanation, this chapter examines the effects of domestic mutual funds on 
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stock price crash risk. If domestic mutual funds collude with the controlling 
shareholders to not adopt conservative accounting, then bad news will be less likely to 
be recognized in a timely manner, leading to a higher probability of crash risk (Jin and 
Myers, 2006). Therefore, the presence of domestic mutual funds could increase the level 
of stock price crash risk. Empirically, this chapter employs a skewness-based measure 
of crash risk (NSKEW) proposed by Chen et al. (2001). Specifically, for each firm j, in 
year t, NSKEW is calculated by taking the negative of the third moment of firm-specific 
weekly returns for each sample year and dividing it by the standard deviation of firm-
specific weekly returns raised to the third power, the higher the value of NSKEW, the 
higher possibility of stock price crash risk: 
     
3/23/2 3 2
, ,[ 1 ] / [ 1 2 ]
        
     i t j tNSKEW n n w n n w                                    (4.6) 
The baseline regressions are then repeated by replacing C_Score with NSKEW. The 
results are reported in Table 4.11. The coefficient of Mutual is negative (-3.585) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is -17.52), which suggests that the 
presence of domestic mutual funds in a firm could significantly reduce the crash risk of 
stock price. In addition, the significant positive coefficients of Mutualdiff and 
Mutualdisp, and the significant negative coefficient of Mutualratio indicate that when 
domestic mutual funds hold closer ownership to that of the controlling shareholder, the 
stock price crash risk turns lower. The result is contradictory to the proposed alternative 
explanation that mutual funds lower accounting conservatism by colluding with the 
controlling shareholder in impeding information disclosure. Thus, the presence of large 
controlling shareholders and efficient direct monitoring reduces the requirement of 
mutual funds for conservatism.  
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Table 4.11 Effects of institutional investors on stock price crash risk 
Dependent variable: NCSKEW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mutual -3.585***    
 (-17.52)    
QFII 0.106    
 (0.10)    
Mutualdiff  3.712***   
  (17.48)   
QFIIdiff  -4.062***   
  (-16.48)   
Mutualratio   -0.666***  
   (-11.26)  
QFIIratio   0.373  
   (1.12)  
Mutualdisp    0.979*** 
    (4.65) 
QFIIdisp    -0.621 
    (-1.52) 
Constant and controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,801 17,801 17,801 17,801 
R-squared 0.099 0.100 0.092 0.095 
This table reports the results of institutional investors’ ownership on firm stock price crash risk. The 
estimation method is firm fixed effects model. Dependent variable is NCSKEW. Constant and all the other 
variables’ definitions are the same as in Table 4.1. Year dummies are included. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Firm accounting conservatism has plenty of benefits such as reducing agency 
problems and mitigating information asymmetry. The increasingly important role that 
institutional investors play in capital markets motivates this investigation of their effects 
on firm accounting conservatism in the emerging market of China.  
Using China’s listed firms from 2003 to 2015 as a sample and employing the 
C_Score, developed by Khan and Watts (2009) as the proxy for accounting 
conservatism, this chapter compares the effects that domestic mutual funds and QFIIs 
have on firm accounting conservatism. The main findings are as follows: First, unlike 
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the US market, domestic mutual funds negatively influence the degree of accounting 
conservatism, while QFIIs positively influence the degree of accounting conservatism. 
The reason is that compared with QFIIs, domestic mutual funds are more able to 
monitor managers’ actions through other direct monitoring mechanisms such as site 
visits, so they are less dependent on accounting conservatism and their ownership could 
lower the level of conservatism. Second, when institutional investors’ ownership is 
close to that of the controlling shareholder, domestic mutual funds’ negative effects on 
conservatism become stronger. However, when QFIIs’ ownership is close to the 
controlling shareholders their positive effects are stronger. Third, the negative effects of 
domestic mutual funds and positive effects of QFIIs on accounting conservatism 
become weaker in: state-owned enterprises, firms that have a lower level of ownership 
concentration, and firms with higher information. The results are robust when using 
alternative measurement of accounting conservatism and after addressing endogeneity 
issues.  
Overall, the main results support the view that institutional investors’ demands for 
accounting conservatism are subject to their identities as well as their ownership 
difference from the controlling shareholders’ ownership.   
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
This thesis is motivated by the substantial development of institutional investors in 
the Chinese capital market during the last two decades. Since the ownership in China’s 
firms is highly concentrated and controlling shareholders usually play a dominant role 
in deciding a firm’s policies, this thesis aims to examine whether institutional investors 
could play an effective monitoring role in China’s listed firms, and whether their role 
could be influenced by the large controlling shareholders’ level of ownership. To 
achieve these objectives, this thesis first investigates the effects of institutional investors 
on CEO pay-performance relationship. Secondly, this thesis examines how institutional 
investors’ contestability of controlling shareholders influences firm innovation and 
gives a better understanding of the role of institutional investors in monitoring managers’ 
long-term investment decisions. Finally, this thesis examines whether institutional 
investors require a high level of accounting conservatism. The findings from this thesis 
are as follows:  
5.1 Effects of institutional investors on CEO pay-performance relationship 
In chapter 2, this thesis examines the effects of institutional investors on the CEO 
pay-performance relationship. A strong CEO pay-performance relationship is believed 
to be a good way to mitigate the agency problem between managers and shareholders. 
As one of the most important types of shareholders, institutional investors are 
sophisticated and professional in processing information, so they may be able to 




Since the behaviours of institutional investors are subject to their identities, this 
thesis is interested in the different effects that domestic mutual funds and QFIIs have on 
the CEO pay-performance relationship. This thesis provides empirical evidence that 
domestic mutual funds and QFIIs have different effects on the CEO pay-performance 
relationship. Specifically, since domestic mutual funds are professional in processing 
information and are more informed about the investee firms, they are able to exert 
effective monitoring on managers and thereby have positive effects on the CEO pay-
performance relationship. However, the effects of QFIIs on the CEO pay-performance 
relationship are insignificant. The reason is that QFIIs are faced with more information 
asymmetry due to cultural and language barriers, which makes it less straightforward 
for QFIIs to monitor managers effectively. 
By considering the difference between the ownership of institutional investors and 
the controlling shareholders, this thesis further finds that the positive effects that 
domestic mutual funds have on CEO pay-performance are stronger when their 
ownership is closer to that of the controlling shareholders. This finding implies that 
under the high level of ownership concentration in emerging markets, the behaviours of 
institutional investors are not only determined by their ownership level, but more 
importantly, are determined by the difference between their ownership and that of the 
controlling shareholders. When mutual funds’ ownership level is getting closer to that 
of the controlling shareholders, they are able to contend with the controlling 
shareholders and improve corporate governance by uniting other minority shareholders. 
In addition, this thesis further finds that the effects of domestic mutual funds vary 
across firms. The positive effects of domestic mutual funds on CEO pay-performance 
relationship are more significant in non-SOEs than SOEs, reflecting that severe 
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government control restrains the monitoring role of other shareholders. , This thesis also 
finds that since corporate governance is weak when a firm has weak industry 
tournament, domestic mutual funds have more incentives to strengthen the CEO pay-
performance relationship. In more developed regions the monitoring effects of domestic 
mutual funds are more significant due to the better investor protection and reduced 
information asymmetry. 
Overall, this thesis finds that QFIIs and domestic mutual funds have heterogeneous 
effects on the CEO pay-performance relationship. The effective monitoring of domestic 
mutual funds is not only relevant to their ownership level but also to the difference of 
their ownership to that of the controlling shareholder. The effectiveness of domestic 
mutual funds’ monitoring role is subject to the institutional background including the 
severity of government intervention and weak investor protection. 
5.2 Effects of institutional investors’ contestability on firm innovation 
Chapter 3 examines how institutional investors’ contestability of the controlling 
shareholders influences firm innovation. In the past decade, China’s economy has been 
growing substantially and innovation has been and remains a crucial driver. During the 
same period, institutional investors have also developed significantly. As an important 
type of shareholder, institutional investors usually hold diversified portfolios, so they 
have incentives to encourage investment in innovative projects which are risky but with 
possibility of high returns. Therefore, institutional investors have positive effects on 
firm innovation performance. However, the ownership is highly concentrated in China’s 
firms and the controlling shareholders’ dominant role in deciding firm policies may 
influence institutional investors’ behaviours. Thus, the impact of institutional investors 
may be subject to their ability to contest with the controlling shareholders. 
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The main conclusion drawn from the empirical results is that when domestic mutual 
funds’ ownership level is closer to that of the controlling shareholders, domestic mutual 
funds’ contestability of the controlling shareholders is strengthened and firm innovation 
can be improved. However, QFIIs do not have such contestability effects. This can be 
attributed to the more severe information asymmetry faced by QFIIs due to the cultural 
and language barriers, which make it difficult and costly for QFIIs to contest with the 
controlling shareholders. By contrast, domestic mutual funds are able to contend with 
the controlling shareholders in improving firm innovation when their ownership is close 
to that of the controlling shareholders. 
Furthermore, this thesis provides evidence that the influence of domestic mutual 
funds’ contestability on firm innovation is weaker in SOEs. The reason is that the 
appointment of CEOs in SOEs is under the control of the government, so they tend to 
make decisions following government instructions, rather than on the benefits of 
shareholders. In addition, the effects of mutual funds’ contestability on innovation are 
also stronger in firms with non-politically connected CEOs, firms facing more 
competitive markets, and firms with less analyst coverage. These results are consistent 
with the view that domestic mutual funds’ contestability affects firm innovation by 
alleviating managers’ career concerns.  
To conclude, the influence of institutional investors on firm innovation is not only 
determined by their ownership level, but is also subject to the difference in their 
ownership level to that of the controlling shareholders, i.e. contestability. Moreover, the 
effects of contestability are also heterogeneous across different types of institutional 
investors. Mutual funds’ contestability has positive effects on firm innovation while 
QFIIs have no such contestability effects.  
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5.3 Demand of institutional investors for accounting conservatism 
Accounting conservatism is believed to be a good governance device for 
shareholders. It is found in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that the monitoring of domestic 
mutual funds on managers is more effective than QFIIs in terms of improving CEO pay-
performance sensitivity and improving firm innovation performance, therefore it is 
interesting to further look into their effects on accounting conservatism. In Chapter 4, 
this thesis discusses the effects of domestic mutual funds and QFIIs on firm accounting 
conservatism.  
This thesis finds that since domestic mutual funds are able to monitor managers’ 
behaviours through direct ways such as strengthening the CEO pay-performance 
relationship and improving firm innovative investment, their dependence on financial 
numbers is weak. Consequently, domestic mutual funds require less conservative 
accounting of the investee. Another important reason for domestic mutual funds’ 
reduced demand for conservatism is that the main agency problem in China exists 
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders rather than between 
managers and shareholders. By contrast, QFIIs are more reliant on financial numbers to 
conduct monitoring, so they require a higher level of accounting conservatism. Using 
the same method, testing the influence of the controlling shareholders finds that the 
negative effects of domestic mutual funds and the positive effects of QFIIs on 
accounting conservatism are both stronger when their ownership is closer to that of the 
controlling shareholders. In addition, further evidence indicates that the demand of 
institutional investors for accounting conservatism is stronger in firms where the 
controlling shareholders are non-state entities, there is a higher level of ownership 
concentration and less severe information asymmetry. 
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To summarise, institutional investors’ demand for accounting conservatism is 
subject to their identities. Domestic mutual funds do not require conservative 
accounting while QFIIs do. The negative effects of domestic mutual funds on 
accounting conservatism vary across firms with different types of controlling 
shareholders, different levels of ownership concentration and information asymmetry. 
5.4 Summary and implications 
In summary, the role that domestic and foreign institutional investors play is 
heterogeneous in China. Domestic mutual funds have information advantages, are more 
informed of the local investee firms and are sophisticated in processing information. 
These factors facilitate their monitoring on managers, including a significantly positive 
impact on the CEO pay-performance relationship, and are able to contest with the 
controlling shareholders by improving firm innovation output. As a result of the 
efficient and significant direct monitoring, domestic mutual funds are less dependent on 
financial numbers to overlook managers’ self-interest behaviours. However, QFIIs are 
faced with more severe information asymmetry, caused by cultural and language 
disadvantages, which constrains their monitoring role in the investee firms. 
Consequently, QFIIs are not able to significantly improve CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity, and they do not have contestability effects in terms of improving firm 
innovation output. Therefore, they have more incentive to demand conservative 
accounting to monitor/ discipline the behaviour of managers. 
The high ownership concentration in China’s firms has an impact on the monitoring 
role of institutional investors. To be specific, the behaviours of institutional investors 
are not only determined by their ownership level, but more importantly, are determined 
by the difference in ownership between them and the controlling shareholders. When 
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institutional investors are close in ownership to the controlling shareholders, domestic 
mutual funds tend to contend with the controlling shareholders and hence improve 
corporate governance, while QFIIs’ behaviours are more likely to be captured by the 
controlling shareholders. The role of institutional investors in the investee firms is 
subject to institutional characteristics, particularly the level of ownership concentration, 
which is higher in emerging markets. 
An important implication of this thesis is that in China, due to the unique culture 
and the existence of various dialects, foreign institutional investors and domestic 
institutional investors have different incentives and behaviours. Foreign institutional 
investors’ effects are constrained in terms of improving corporate governance level and 
improving firm policies for the following four  reasons: First, QFIIs hold a relatively 
lower level of ownership compared with domestic mutual funds. Therefore, it is very 
hard for QFIIs to monitor managers’ behaviours or compete with the controlling 
shareholders. Second, as discussed in Chapter 1, QFIIs are faced with strict regulations 
from the government on ownership level and the overall investment quota. The 
ownership held by a single QFII in a listed firm is not allowed to exceed 10%, and the 
total ownership of all the QFIIs in a listed firm is not allowed to exceed 30%. Therefore, 
QFIIs have very limited ability to influence the decision makings of a firm. Third, QFIIs 
are owned by foreigners who usually have a different culture from the local culture in 
China, such as the uncommon used language and relationship-based economy, which 
increase the information asymmetry level faced by QFIIs (Chakravarty et al., 1998; 
Kang and Kim, 2010; Liu et al., 2014; Ferreira et al., 2017). This further makes it 
difficult for QFIIs to monitor managers. Fourth, QFII portfolios are more diversified so 
that they are able to move their capital from China to another market when they feel 
risky, while domestic mutual funds are less likely to do so. Therefore, QFIIs may not 
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exert direct monitoring on managers or have no significant effects on firm overall 
corporate governance or firm innovation. Thus, QFIIs are more likely to be captured by 
the controlling shareholders and thereby comply with the controlling shareholders’ 
decisions. Overall, due to the lack of ability of QFIIs to monitor managers or compete 
with the controlling shareholders, it is hard for QFIIs to have significant effects on 
corporate governance or firm policies. Practically, these findings provide a reference for 
regulators to make policies, in particular the insignificant monitoring role of foreign 
institutional investors calls for the further release of restrictions over their investment in 
China. In addition, this thesis also provides information to help individual investors 
make appropriate investment decisions.  
5.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
It is acknowledged that this research has some limitations. One limitation is sample 
selection. The sample used in this thesis includes all China’s A-share listed firms. The 
case is unclear for unlisted firms due to the limited data available. Future research in 
this area can provide further insights into unlisted firms by conducting surveys to collect 
the required information. In addition, as domestic mutual funds do not have investment 
in China’s B-share firms, the sample does not cover these firms. However, QFIIs do 
have a level of ownership of China’s B-share firms, so future research on QFIIs’ effects 
can include B-share firms. 
The other limitation is the measurement of CEO compensation in Chapter 2, where 
CEO pay only includes cash pay (including salary, bonus and other cash compensation). 
Some existing literature measures CEO compensation as all components of CEO wealth 
including stock options, grants and restricted stocks grants. However, the conclusions 
may not be influenced since there are very few listed firms in China (127 firms in the 
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sample) using stock options and restricted stocks incentives. Future research on 
institutional investors and CEO incentives can focus on CEO total wealth including 
stock options and restricted stocks.  
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